Chapter 6 continues the Jordan case study by providing an important assessment of the theory’s expectations over time. Drawing on archival documents, internet search data, elite interviews, and secondary sources, the chapter shows that Jordan’s kings have shared power more credibly when they have more reasons to be concerned about popular discontent. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that Jordanians have responded to these changes as the theory expects, becoming more likely to blame the king for their grievances when the monarchy controls the decision-making process more directly, and less likely to blame the king when he delegates more credibly to other political elites. Not only do these findings demonstrate the theory’s utility for explaining changes in authoritarian decision-making over time, but they also help to account for alternative explanations to the argument, such as the possibility that the Jordanian monarchy benefits from traditional legitimacy that protects its reputation from popular anger.

Chapter 4 begins the detailed case study of Jordan. It first provides important background information on the country and reviews academic literature explaining the monarchy’s durability over the past century. It then draws on my elite interviews and other country-specific sources to explain how Jordan’s policymaking process functions. The chapter shows that the Jordanian king does grant meaningful decision-making influence to political elites in the cabinet and parliament, even though this delegation can result in policies that do not reflect the monarch’s preferences and can increase potential elite threats against the monarchy. The chapter also provides evidence that this delegation is intentionally used by the monarchs as a blame avoidance strategy. Interviews with senior decision-makers, including former chiefs of the royal court and prime ministers, reveal that the monarchy is aware that its reputation is likely to suffer if the king governs more directly and attracts more blame for the public’s grievances. This awareness is also reflected in how the Jordanian educational system teaches students about the decision-making process, and in the monarch’s willingness to share power more credibly for economic and social issues rather than foreign policy and security issues.

The Israel Jordan peace treaty is an example of the role precedent can play in international law. Although precedents are not binding, nevertheless major parts of the Israel Jordan treaty are copied verbatim from the Egypt Israel treaty. This was done for a variety of reasons. Jordan was a far smaller and weaker State than Egypt, and it was convenient for Jordan to rely on text that had been agreed upon by the stronger brother Arab State. Diplomats and international lawyers are, mostly, a conservative group and are happy to follow a beaten path. The Egypt Israel treaty had been signed fifteen years before the treaty with Jordan and had proved itself as viable. An example of this viability is the settlement of disputes clause. The clause in the Egypt Israel Treaty had an element of ambiguity, and Jordan suggested changing it. The Jordanian negotiators agreed to accept the text of the clause in the treaty with Egypt after the Israel negotiators pointed out that the clause in the treaty with Egypt had enabled the parties to successfully submit the Taba dispute to arbitration.