According to its advocates, legal titling promises to improve investment (both public and private) and prospects for political order. A persistent puzzle is why its actual impact is often ambiguous or even harmful. Our theory suggests the answer lies in the qualities relating to government: when the state enjoys a monopoly on coercion and administrative capacity, when political decision makers face constraints, and when there are inclusive institutions linking communities to the state, legal titling can improve economic and political well-being. Since these political preconditions for successful legal titling are likely to be absent in conflict-affected states, it is unlikely that legal titling will be effective in such states. The evidence from Afghanistan supports our theory. The legal-titling projects in the country have not worked well, for the reasons just listed. Yet community-based recording of landownership – donor-assisted, community-initiated programs that partner with communities, not the state, to document who owns what land, buildings, and commons – have improved household land-tenure security. These community-based programs illustrate how working with customary governance institutions improves the impact of development assistance.

In 1878, Russia challenged British interests in Afghanistan by sending a mission to Kabul, which the Afghan Amir, Sher Ali Khan, appeared to have welcomed. In defence of his forward policy, the British Viceroy in India, Lord Lytton, sent his own emissary. When he was denied entry, the British issued an ultimatum which the Amir rejected. The British invaded in order to secure regime change. Afghan forces included both traditional irregular militias and regulars trained with British weapons by former Indian NCOs. They enjoyed superior numbers, local knowledge, mobility, and some enterprising commanders. British superiority in weapons, discipline, and training was marked. They also adopted khaki uniforms which replaced the traditional scarlet, which frustrated the Afghan use of the long-range jezail. These advantages enabled the defeat of Afghan forces under the new Amir, Ayub Khan, at the Battle of Ahmed Khel (19 April 1880). British and Indian forces were insufficient in numbers, however, to control much of the country. A defeat at Maiwand led to a renewed British commitment and General Sir Frederick Roberts’ successful 300-mile march brought decisive victory at Kandahar. The Amir was replaced with a more compliant leader, and the British withdrew.