Scholars are increasingly taking note of a species of government institutions that fall outside the traditional separation of powers and have come to be known as the “fourth branch”: these institutions are created by constitutional design to engage in independent oversight and investigation of the other branches. Using South Africa as a case study of “fourth branch” institutions, this chapter dives deeply into the South African cases on corruption (such as the Scorpions litigation, set in its political background) before turning to the more general theme of Chapter 9 institutions in South Africa, then surveying the rise of the furth branch in constitutional systems around the world. The chapter concludes by evaluating both the value and the limits of the “deep dive” case study approach to understanding topics in constitutional design.

This chapter analyses the standards of review in Irish constitutional property law and their relationship to the text of the constitutional property clauses. It has a particular focus on the proportionality principle, which is an important point of convergence between many jurisdictions with constitutional property rights guarantees. It focuses on the distinctive questions that arise where it is deployed by judges in constitutional property rights adjudication. It futher considers the impact of the progressively framed text of the Irish Constitution's property rights clauses on the formulation and application of standards of review. It demonstrates that the form of constitutional property clauses may have limited impact in shaping the application of general standards of review, and argues for a greater judicial focus on the core question of fairness posed by constitutional property law.

This chapter synthesises the broad picture that emerges from Irish constitutional proeprty law about the mediation of property rights and social justice, and about the impact of progressively framed constitutional property guarantees on that mediation. It highlights the rewards for progressive property theory of doctrinal analysis and a wider comparative lens. Most fundamentally, it emphasises the political nature of constitutional property law in two ways. FIrst, judges gravitate away from innovative interpretation and application of ideas like social justice towards deference to the determinations of the elected branches of government. Second, constitutional property law can have political, and wider cultural effects, that do not reflect the strict legal effect of constitutional property rights as reflected in doctrine. It concludes that Irish constitutional property law demonstrates the challenges of implementing progressive property ideas in legal doctrine, but at the same time provides an illuminating example of a broadly coherent and effective attempt to implement a progressive constitutional structure for achieving partial resolutions of the tension betwene property rights and social justice.

This chapter considers the evolutions in the practice of judicial review in Kenya, and the continued relevance of English law, in the broader context of the role of judicial review in facilitating the attainment of democratic governance. It argues that English law bequeathed to Kenya an ambivalent legacy that continues to shape the exercise of the judicial review power. In theory, law has promised to provide a bulwark against the abuse of governmental power. In practice, however, it has largely served to facilitate authoritarianism. The chapter begins by locating judicial review in the context of governance in colonial and post-colonial Kenya. It then examines the nature and role of judicial review in the Kenya colony, Independent Kenya, and more recently after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

From the very beginning, Eastern’s administrators’ autonomy was challenged directly by occasional incursions from the local penal reformers and indirectly by the state legislature's lackluster patronage. These challenges became more invasive in the 1850s, peaking in the 1860s. In response, Eastern's administrators sought to establish jurisdiction over their prison by proclaiming their own special expertise and insisting on deference in matters affecting Eastern. By the 1870s, however, penal actors on the national stage were likewise proclaiming their own expertise and professional status, while Eastern's administrators felt increasingly irrelevant. In response to these national-level developments, the administrators further developed their claims to professional status. In this context, the administrators' claims to professional status provided them a more promising path to self-aggrandizement than continuing to proclaim the Pennsylvania System's superiority. Consequently, the administrators shifted their focus from the Pennsylvania System to their status as professional penologists. It was this shift from defense to professionalization that deinstitutionalized the Pennsylvania System.