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2 results

  • Chapter 9 - Neo-Aristotelianism and substance

  • Edited by Tuomas E. Tahko, University of Helsinki
  • Book:
    Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    08 December 2011, pp 140-155

  • Summary

    Neo-Aristotelianism in metaphysics is an extension of and/or in imitation of Aristotle's metaphysics. This chapter begins with a brief account of what Aristotle had to say about substance. It summarizes the features of Aristotle's metaphysics of substance that provide the basis for saying that a later philosopher defends a 'neo-Aristotelian' theory of substance. Chisholm also places the category of substance within a more general theory of categories, in much the same way that Aristotle did. Like both Aristotle and Chisholm, Jonathan Lowe's latest system of categories is intended to postulate what kinds of entities there are, and not just to represent what kinds of entities are epistemically possible. Aristotelian theories of substance both from those who would eliminate substances or reduce them to instances of some other ontological category or categories, and from metaphysical antirealists.

  • Chapter 8 - Four categories – and more

  • Edited by Tuomas E. Tahko, University of Helsinki
  • Book:
    Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    08 December 2011, pp 126-139

  • Summary

    Jonathan Lowe has proposed that the four fundamental categories of things in the world are: substances, kinds, modes, and properties. In modern analytic philosophy, under the influence of predicate logic and its pioneers, this fourfold classification of things at the fundamental level was generally reduced to a twofold distinction between individual things and properties or attributes. Aristotle's categories are clearly intended to delimit the fundamentally different kinds of thing in the world: they are the supreme genera of being. The search for a good scheme of categories is a good place to start and pursue ontology. Fortunately, Lowe is one of the metaphysicians who are committed to the real-world relevance of their theories, and while the author does not see eye to eye on theory, he does agree substantially on the importance of the right attitude to metaphysics: realist, ambitious, yet realistically fallibilist, and above all, serious.