This chapter addresses what Heidegger considers one of the basic problems of philosophy, that is, the alleged incompatibility between the notion of Being, our thinking, and logic. To begin with, it discusses how Heideggerians have dealt with this incompatibility by discussing what Casati calls an irrationalist and rationalist interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy. Then, the chapter argues that both of these interpretations face exegetical and philosophical problems. To conclude, it defends an alternative way of addressing the incompatibility between our thinking, logic, and the notion of Being. In this connection Casati notes Heidegger’s suggestion, in some of his late works, that the real problem lies in the philosophical illusion that we can actually assess the limits of our thinking and, thereby, our logic. Heidegger’s philosophy aims, the chapter submits, at freeing us from such a philosophical illusion by delivering an experience that reminds us that we can never look at our thinking, as it were, from “on high,” i.e., from a standpoint that would enable us to grasp its limits or determine that it has no limits whatsoever.

By discussing different interpretations, Chapter 12 shows that Kierkegaard is a suprarationalist, who takes faith to be above reason, not against it. Specifically, he is neither an irrationalist, who takes faith to be irrational, nor an antirationalist, who claims that faith and reason oppose each other, without any logical contradiction or irrationality. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, faith seems capable of overcoming the hostility and antagonism between faith and reason that antirationalism emphasizes. Still, Kierkegaard’s nonreligious pseudonyms do contrast faith and reason in order to counteract theological views that are overly rationalistic and scientific. Indeed, Kierkegaard goes as far as criticizing the Augustinian idea of faith seeking understanding. But instead of promoting blind faith, he attacks rationalist and intellectualist accounts of faith that do not do justice to the mysteries of divine revelation and the incarnation. He therefore maintains that faith cannot be reduced to conceptual understanding, although it must nevertheless both involve and seek practical understanding.

By examining little-known primary sources that are largely untranslated, Chapter 11 examines whether religious faith is absurd or irrational for Kierkegaard. It is shown that Kierkegaard was familiar with the irrationalist reading of his work as developed by his forgotten contemporary Magnús Eiríksson in the book Is Faith a Paradox and “By Virtue of the Absurd”? (1850). More importantly, Kierkegaard’s (drafted) reply to Eiríksson is clear that faith is only seemingly absurd and irrational, something that undermines the irrationalist reading of him considerably. Still, faith does seem absurd to nonbelievers since it provokes and scandalizes our understanding. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard argues that faith overcomes this absurdity and offense. Finally, his neglected reply to Eiríksson sheds light on his much-discussed use of pseudonyms and the relation between Fear and Trembling and Concluding Unscientific Postscript in particular.