The Introduction gives an overview of the book’s most important findings and contributions. Since international relations are anarchical and international legal norms are incomplete or in tension with other norms, there is potential for contestation whenever a general norm is applied to specific situations. The reactions of others to proposed norm interpretations can alter norms and their strength. The second section describes the book’s rhetorical approach, and the third section summarizes the main theoretical contributions. First, the "alternate endings" typology shows that it matters whether dispute parties (dis)agree on the norm frame or behavioral claim. Frame agreement is an internal source of stability. Moreover, the typology can guide assessment of how contestation affects norm strength. Second, I describe the focus on audience reactions, argumentation, and speakers (including delegation to agents) when analyzing extrinsic influences on the persistence of norm interpretations, and thus of alternate endings. The fourth section discusses the main contributions to the existing literature on norm strength, the dual quality of norms, legal argumentation and interpretive communities, and delegation to courts and other relevant agents. The Introduction then discusses the research design and methodology, before concluding with an overview of the remaining chapters.

This chapter explores the policy framework within which utility model systems are constructed. The chapter suggests several policy arguments which may help developing and low-income countries adopt a utility model regime which suits their national development phase. It encourages pushing the flexibility boundaries of such rights in relation to the justification and nature of the right.

In a period of rising threats to constitutional government within countries and among them, it is a crucial time to study the rule of law in transnational context. This framework chapter defines core concepts, analyzes the relation between national and international law and institutions from a rule-of-law perspective, and assesses the extent to which rule-of-law practices are shifting at the domestic and international levels in parallel. Part I explains our conceptualization of the rule of law, necessary for the orientation of empirical study and policy responses. Following Martin Krygier, we formulate a teleological conception of the rule of law in terms of goals and practices, which, in turn, calls for an assessment of institutional mechanisms to advance these goals, given varying social conditions and contexts. Part II sets forth the ways in which international law and institutions are important for rule-of-law ends, as well as their pathologies, since power is also exercised beyond the state in an interconnected world. Part III examines empirical indicators of the decline of the rule of law at the national and international levels. It notes factors that could explain such decline, and why such factors appear to be transnationally linked. Part IV discusses what might be done given these shifts in rule-of-law protections. In conclusion, we note the implications of viewing the rule of law in transnational context for conceptual theory, empirical study, and policy response.

A dozen years ago, Jeremy Waldron published an influential article arguing that sovereign states are not entitled to the benefits of the international rule of law. His conclusion follows from his assertions that the purpose of the rule of law is to protect individual liberty, and the purpose of international law is to protect individuals. This chapter critically responds to his position. International law is based on the notion that states are autonomous and equal members of the international society ordered through legal relations. The legal relations of the international community of states, I argue, constitute the horizontal dimension of the rule of law, which Waldron overlooked. Focusing on horizontal rule-of-law functions, I provide descriptive, theoretical, and normative reasons why states are, and should be, entitled to the benefits of the rule of law. In the course of this critical engagement with Waldron’s position, I lay out a broad understanding of the rule of law that applies within states and the international community.

International organizations have issued recommendations and prescriptions on constitution-making and reform, especially since 1989. However, such constitution-shaping activities by European and universal organizations, notably the UN, have for the most part not led to a better operation of the rule of law on the ground. Besides these problems of effectiveness, normative concerns against constitutional assistance and advice by international organizations have been raised. It is suggested that, in order to become more legitimate (which might then also improve effectiveness), constitution-shaping by international organizations needs to absorb postcolonial concerns. This includes respect for local rule-of-law cultures flowing from non-European constitutional thought and the inclusion of a much deeper social agenda with a global ambition. Thus revamped, international organizations’ constitution-shaping role could be reinvigorated so as to sustain the rule of law on the domestic level, thereby contributing to transnational ordering and global constitutionalism.

The Conclusion describes how, while the handbook started with the main technological and legal challenges regarding collection of digital evidence, the research shows that even though the challenges are shared by legal systems across the globe, the answers are not. Legal solutions to similar problems are fragmented, disparate and often unsatisfactory. Even if technology-neutral solutions are preferable to make sure hard-fought EU legislation and international agreements can stand the test of time, the legal reality appears to be quite different. Despite positive recent legal developments at EU and international levels, future approximation of national approaches seems highly desirable to enable LEAs to conduct effective criminal investigations to protect society and its citizens from new criminal phenomena. At the same time, protection of citizens’ fundamental rights should be reinforced, not just at the national level but in a cross-border context, considering that many criminal investigations now reach beyond national borders. Global initiatives are, however, hampered by tensions between democratic and non-democratic states, making a one-size-fits-all solution inadequate.

Histories of harbour development at Cochin have assumed that the Cochin Harbor Project was motivated by the colonial state’s economic interests and that it provides yet another illustration of the technological hubris associated with high modernism. Through a close analysis of the debates and discussions preceding the execution of the project however, this chapter shows that both of these assessments are inaccurate. Unlike what such accounts suggest, every stage of the Cochin Harbor Project was mired in doubt – with senior officials conceding that the project was likely to have an adverse impact on the port and its surroundings. Why then was this project executed despite such concerns? I argue that far from representing the colonial state’s confident mobilization of technology to meet its economic and strategic needs, as commonly assumed, the Cochin Harbor Project was in fact an uneasy compromise between the divergent and often competing political and economic interests of the colonial state and the princely states of Malabar. At a time of increasing environmental and political instability, a development project, this chapter shows, offered the best possibility of not only meeting the criterion of ‘productive works’ that was so central to colonial finance but also securing the cooperation of the princely states of Malabar that were becoming increasingly assertive.

The introduction offers a historical overview of terrorism through the ages and describes the development of international counterterrorism law. It discusses the interplay between terrorism and international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. It also introduces some of the controversy surrounding terrorism as a term.

This chapter starts from the premise that secondary sanctions are invariably adopted to exert pressure upon foreign economic or financial actors operating in third states, with the intention to modify their conduct in alignment with the primary sanctions already imposed by the sanctioning state against the target state. As follows, due to their extraterritorial scope and their exceptional capacity to encroach upon the sovereignty of other countries, the legal status of secondary sanctions under international law is controversial. This contribution seeks to elucidate if secondary sanctions may amount to economic coercion and whether as a result these measures could constitute a breach to the principle of non-intervention. The chapter closes by exploring the potential avenues for regime interaction between the rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction by states and the principle of non-intervention in the context of secondary sanctions.

The growing range and changing nature of unilateral sanctions have seen the emergence of a new label of so-called ‘secondary’ sanctions, as opposed to the more traditional ‘primary’ sanctions. While there is no accepted legal definition of secondary sanctions, in essence, secondary sanctions restrict economic transactions between third countries which may be entirely lawful under the law of these countries. Their extraterritorial character gives secondary sanctions their distinctive and particularly controversial character. Secondary sanctions create inter-State tension and may possibly violate a number of public international law regimes. They may harm the politico-economic interests of third States and cause headaches for private economic operators, whose potential exposure to secondary sanctions complicates the already complex web of multi-jurisdictional norms governing their international business transactions.