Chapter 6 discusses the policies of colonization in India in a comparative perspective with Korea and Taiwan under Japanese rule. In this chapter, I consider the differences in policies of colonization. At the time of independence, the share of industry in total GDP was not very different in the three countries. Modern industries had developed in India, Korea and Taiwan during the colonial period. The two big differences in colonial policies were with respect to agriculture and education. Japan imported essential food grains from the colonies. This prompted investment in improvements in agriculture to raise productivity. A large proportion of land came under irrigation in both colonies enabling introduction of new varieties of seeds. The British government in India did little to raise agricultural productivity. Second, the Japan as a colonizer expanded primary education, helping to create a literate workforce. A large proportion of industrial workers became literate. In India as a result of the emphasis on higher education, mainly the service sector occupations benefitted in terms of human capital.

Putting things on public display is an ancient habit, which took off in the cities of the early modern world, not least Edo (today’s Tokyo), its largest. It was clear to Japanese observers of international exhibitions in the 1860s, however, that there was a categorical difference between them and the shows of Edo. This chapter uses their experience to specify the difference and to explain why they were able and eager to import the practice of exhibition to Japan. On the one hand, international exhibitions showed Japan to be at odds with the emerging world of industry and empire, not least given its sclerotic political constitution. On the other, by disaggregating its exhibits, they also revealed the archipelago to possess resources (e.g., silk) and abilities (especially craft), with value on the international market. The world of industry and empire, revealed at the exhibition, was a challenging, even threatening, one, but its more perceptive Japanese observers could see reasons for hope.

This chapter explores Hopkins’s responses to the environmental degradation he witnessed in the 1870s and 1880s – from the time of his earliest professional assignments in the industrial north to his final years in Dublin – when the destructive effects of manufacturing industry, mechanization, and urban expansion were becoming increasingly apparent. Drawing on select poems, journals, and letters especially those to his family and friends when he relocates and describes his new surroundings, the chapter compares his views to those of his contemporaries such as John Ruskin and the industrial ‘Lanarkshire poets’ near Glasgow, Scotland. It focuses particularly on the pollution of air and water by mines and mills, and the emphasis Hopkins places on the purity of these elements for the well-being of both human and non-human life. It also notes Hopkins’s awareness of the damage done to whole ecosystems in the name of social and economic ‘progress’.

This chapter adopts an Anthropocene framework to contextualize Gerard Manley Hopkins. Placing his work within the epoch of human geophysical agency, I argue, affords new perspective on his radical contribution as an ecological witness. It allows us to see that Hopkins’s depictions of natural entities involved an intuition about their embeddedness in larger systems, many inchoately explained by contemporary science; that his representations of non-human nature seldom avoided the ‘anthropos’ (the ‘human’ in Anthropocene), whether as destructive interloper or divinely privileged steward; and that his life and work included moments of prescience about human activity interfering with Earth-system processes. To recontextualize Hopkins thus is to furnish different ways to interpret his work (in wider conceptual networks and deeper time horizons) and to animate that work’s reception (in light of present concerns). It is also to affiliate Hopkins with ecopoets whose formal innovations might be fruitfully juxtaposed with his poetics.

Andrew Mangham analyses the importance of narrative for the German embryologist Karl Ernst von Baer, and its influence on George Eliot’s early fiction. This chapter evidences the way in which knowledge from Europe was acquired, debated, and adopted in London soirées. Van Baer’s work was welcomed by the circle of radicals, including Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and Marian Evans, who congregated around John Chapman’s Westminster Review. Newly available in a partial translation by Huxley and the botanist Arthur Henfrey, von Baer’s Uber Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere (1828) specifies a theory of growth based on early differentiation of individuals, which seemed to chime with the period’s investment in industry, but also insisted on the importance of narrative. The early work of George Eliot, specifically Scenes of Clerical Life (1857) and Adam Bede (1859), bears the imprint of von Baer’s models of individuation in the secularism that we find in her work.

The chapter recalls and summarizes the principal arguments made in the book.

During the war, American industries depended on a steady stream of Chinese hog bristles, tungsten and tin ore, alongside a whole host of other raw materials. This chapter focuses on how demand for these products prompted the US government to forge new connections to Chinese businessmen and government agencies. These connections served as the foundation for lucrative postwar trans-Pacific business networks between American and Chinese that enriched Chinese and American businessmen alike and continued throughout the 1940s. The Chinese case served as the blueprint for an idealized postwar economic order that, envisioned by Wilsonian liberals in the US government, was anchored by free trade, private business, and the circulation of American dollars.

By examining transportation, agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, and commerce, this chapter explores the regional division of labor among residents of the landscape trilogy.

This chapter delves into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) takeover and reconstruction of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Manchuria between 1948 and 1952. It was here, during the Civil War, that the CCP first experimented with Soviet-style centralized economic planning. In the early People’s Republic of China, Manchuria emerged as the largest center of socialist industrialization, owing to the heavy industry facilities built by the Japanese and the SOE system developed by the Nationalists. The CCP drew on the expertise of the remaining Japanese and Nationalist engineers, managers, and skilled workers to reconstruct Angang and other major SOEs in Manchuria. The party co-opted these knowledge workers by carefully incorporating former Nationalist Chinese as members of the new regime and segregating the Japanese from the local Chinese community. The CCP’s reliance on Japanese and Nationalist experts came to an end as Cold War tensions intensified during the Korean War.

This chapter explores Sino–Soviet cooperation in the early to mid-1950s. The People’s Republic of China’s First Five-Year Plan sought to develop heavy industry by importing advanced technology from the Soviet Union. One-third of the Sino–Soviet collaboration projects were based in Manchuria, utilizing the physical infrastructure inherited from the pre–Chinese Communist Party era. Soviet experts in China and Chinese students and trainees in the Soviet Union played key roles in transferring Soviet technology. By learning from Soviet knowledge and skills and adapting them to suit Chinese conditions, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as Angang gradually reduced their technological dependence on the Soviet Union while supporting other SOEs across China.

This chapter examines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts to politically mobilize Angang employees. Angang educated workers and engineers in the official Maoist ideology through study programs and propaganda campaigns. Under the danwei system, employees relied on Angang for social welfare benefits. To improve their positions within the CCP–created system, workers and engineers negotiated with state-owned enterprise (SOE) authorities, leveraging the discourse and institutional rules established by the party-state. These negotiations were exemplified by the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957. SOE workers and engineers participated in the CCP project of socialist industrialization by pursuing their interests within the ideological rules of the game set by the party-state.

This chapter delves into Mao’s endeavors to reconfigure socialist industrialization from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. Amid waning Sino–Soviet relations, Mao criticized Soviet-style centralized planning and advocated decentralization during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961). This policy shift granted local officials increased horizontal control over major state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such as Angang. Following the Great Leap Forward’s collapse, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constructed new industrial SOEs within inland “Third Front” regions as a bulwark against potential American and Soviet attacks, thereby reducing resource allocation for Angang and Manchuria. Commencing in 1966, the Cultural Revolution further decentralized power from nationally-owned SOEs such as Angang to local CCP cadres and military forces. Despite these attempts to deviate from the Soviet model, these efforts still preserved essential aspects of socialist industrialization. Nevertheless, the Sino–US rapprochement of 1972 presented China with the prospect of integration into the US-led capitalist global economy.

This chapter focuses on the years 1945–1948 to examine the Soviet occupation of Manchuria and Nationalist China’s efforts to reconstruct the region’s industry. During the Second Sino–Japanese War (1937–1945), China’s Nationalist Government developed heavy industry state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the inland region. Following Japan’s defeat, Manchuria was first occupied by Soviet military forces, who removed a considerable amount of industrial equipment from Angang and other Japanese enterprises to send it to the Soviet Union. Despite all the damage done during the Soviet occupation, Manchuria still had better industrial facilities than other parts of China. After the Soviet retreat in the spring of 1946, the Nationalist government consolidated and reorganized formerly Japanese enterprises into large-scale Chinese SOEs such as Angang. The Nationalists reconstructed these SOEs by employing Japanese engineers still staying there, while building on their experience running SOEs in the inland region and sending for Chinese managers and engineers from the inland. The Japanese and Nationalists thus unintentionally provided the foundations for the Chinese Communist Party’s socialist industrialization after 1948.

This chapter examines bureaucratic politics surrounding Angang in the early People’s Republic of China (PRC). Major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as Angang were subject to both vertical control from the PRC government in Beijing and horizontal control from local Chinese Communist Party organizations. The tension between these two lines of control manifested in debates over the “one-chief system” – a Soviet-style top-down management structure. This tension was also evident in Angang’s construction, production, and sales. Despite the ostensibly centralized system, the PRC planned economy operated at the grassroots level as a field of constant negotiation among various government offices and SOEs, each interpreting the state policies in their own way.

This chapter examines Sweden’s emissions trends and the evolution of climate policy in an international perspective by focusing on its role and interdependent relationship with climate action in the EU and with international climate coalitions. The chapter examines the assumption that Sweden is a front-runner and role model in setting and implementing ambitious climate policy. The emission trends across sectors suggest that Sweden has been able to swiftly reduce its emissions, in particular from industry and energy conversion, but that current reduction rates are insufficient to reach its decarbonization target. Reducing emissions in agriculture and transport poses perhaps the greatest challenges for the Swedish state. The chapter also discusses the limits and possibilities for the State to implement its decarbonization target while being dependent on the climate policies in the EU, notably the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). It also looks at Sweden’s role in international climate governance by zooming in on its role in international climate collaborations and clubs. Finally, the chapter provides three reasons for caution when it comes to Sweden’s reputation as a role model. First, that the rate of GHG reduction has declined significantly. Second, that consumption-based approaches to counting GHG emissions demonstrates that Sweden remains a high-emitting country. Third, that Sweden’s consumption-levels are far above the global average and its current consumption patterns should not be emulated by other countries.

This chapter aims to dig deeper into the source of knowledge driving innovation. What are the sources of innovation and how different sources impact innovations are other vital questions for academics, practitioners, and students. After providing historical developments, this chapter discusses sources of innovation by analyzing a typology of top-down vs. bottom-up, external vs. internal sources of innovation, and collaborative sources for innovation. For instance, while ideas emanating from employees are typically bottom-up and internal sources, ideas emanating from the prime minister are top-down and external sources of innovation. This chapter also discusses external innovations beyond the government, such as business and industry, citizens, service users, universities, and research centers, and the implications of these different sources on public sector innovation.