This chapter compares the short-lived norm neglect regarding the 2011 no-fly zone over Libya with the longer-lasting, yet fragile, norm neglect of the Philippines and China regarding Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (SCS). In these entrenched norm disputes, norm neglect was surprising. This chapter shows that social pressure from in-group members in the Libya case and from the arbitral tribunal and domestic compliance constituencies in the SCS case facilitated claim agreement. While these audience reactions continue to uphold norm neglect in the SCS case, key audiences’ perception that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition’s implementation lacked output legitimacy led to a norm impasse on Syria.

Moreover, the missing shared normative basis for the claim agreements rendered them fragile. The blurring of responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (PoC) reduced the social strength or precision of R2P, as well as its breadth. The decrease in acceptance, and thus depth, of R2P due to the contested implementation of the no-fly zone further reduced the relative strength of R2P. In the SCS case, norm neglect is ongoing and thus the effect on norm strength remains to be seen. The increasing acceptance of the arbitral award and China’s frame rapprochement have slightly strengthened the applicability of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) norms.

The Conclusion provides a brief overview of important findings of this book. It then suggests three areas for future research: First, to improve our understanding of reputational mechanisms, scholars could further study why states sometimes refrain from publicly criticizing opponents whose norm interpretations were clearly shown to be inapplicable. Second, scholars could study the interplay of domestic audience and in-group reactions to norm interpretations in greater detail. Third, further research could explore how the explicitness of (dis)agreement over norm frames and claims affects norm strength, in particular how silence should be interpreted and differs from clear endorsement or criticism of specific norm interpretations. The Conclusion also gives guidance on how my alternate endings typology could be applied to non-state actors such as transnational advocacy networks, for example to study whether they prioritize gaining support for their preferred norm frame, behavioral claim, or both, when trying to establish new norm understandings.

This chapter identifies factors that are extrinsic to norms and affect the stability of the alternate endings. Three classical elements of rhetoric guide the analysis: speakers, audiences, and arguments. The chapter first discusses my focus on critical states with decision-making authority. Speakers need the support of important audiences to avoid or reduce social and material costs of proposing "inappropriate" norm interpretations. Some audiences are more important than others: Speakers are likely to prioritize gaining approval for their norm interpretations from their in-groups and domestic audiences. The chapter gives guidance on identifying in-groups. Speakers try to gain support for their norm interpretations through their argumentation: We would expect the use of legal language and output legitimation when norm interpretations are openly proposed, and identity-based legitimation when actors try to hide exceptionalist norm interpretations. Lastly, I draw attention to a particular kind of speaker – agents to whom norm interpretation was delegated. When agents are involved, perceptions of agent competence also affect what interpretations can be upheld. The chapter concludes that audience reactions, argumentation, and delegation to agents affect the extent of collective expectations surrounding norm application, and thus norm strength.

Trump’s “grab ’em by the pussy” remark was an example of a communicative “routine”: an interactional pre-fabricated exercise, seemingly innocuous, and often experienced as fun. In the type of routine Trump participated in, an Alpha individual establishes a superordinate position with respect to other participants (the In-group) by targeting an individual or group of individuals (Targets) outside the interaction, often by identifying the victim or victims with a social stigma. The stigma extends beyond the duration of the routine, and so has consequences for the Targets that extend well beyond the seemingly innocuous duration of the routine, often (but not always) violently threatening their physical well-being. The routine is familiar to the participants and – as social routines do – recruits the Alpha (Trump) and the In-group (his interlocutors) to their respective roles in an automatized way. There are significant negative consequences for not participating as an In-groupie, including exclusion from the group of interactants or even becoming the next target. Trump’s “grab ’em by the pussy” exchange was thus not just some individuals blowing off steam, but an example of a widely recognizable social routine that enlists interactants into its patterns and hierarchy.