Civilian populations are at risk from exposure to toxic materials as a result of accidental or deliberate exposure. In addition to industrial hazards, toxic agents designed for use in warfare now are a potential hazard in everyday life through terrorist action. Civil emergency medical responders should be able to adapt their plans for dealing with casualties from hazardous materials (HazMat) to deal with the new threat.

Chemical and biological warfare (CBW) and HazMat agents can be viewed as a continuous spectrum. Each of these hazards is characterized by qualities of toxicity, latency of action, persistency, and transmissibility. The incident and medical responses to release of any agent is determined by these characteristics.

Chemical and biological wardare agents usually are classified as weapons of mass destruction, but strictly, they are agents of mass injury. The relationship between mass injury and major loss of life depends very much on the protection, organization, and emergency care provided.

Detection of a civil toxic agent release where signs and symptoms in casualties may be the first indicator of exposure is different from the military situation where intelligence information and tuned detection systems generally will be available.

It is important that emergency medical care should be given in the context of a specific action plan. Within an organized and protected perimeter, triage and decontamination (if the agent is persistent) can proceed while emergency medical care is provided at the same time.

The provision of advanced life support (TOXALS) in this zone by protected and trained medical responders now is technically feasible using specially designed ventilation equipment. Leaving life support until after decontamination may have fatal consequences. Casualties from terrorist attacks also may suffer physical as well as toxic trauma and the medical response also should be capable of dealing with mixed injuries.

Hazardous materials incidents result from the release of materials considered to be harmful or potentially harmful to human beings or the environment. This article describes a train derailment and subsequent hazardous materials release with the evacuation of approximately 50,000 citizens. The hazardous materials release took five days to control and resulted in 561 patient visits to local emergency departments for symptoms related to chemical exposure. The evacuation and emergency medical operations are described and serve as a model for developing community emergency preparedness plans and managing victims involved in hazardous materials incidents.

Federal [U.S.] law and the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations mandate plans and mechanisms for response by hospitals to hazardous material incidents/accidents be developed and implemented. This paper describes the response of the University Hospitals of Cleveland to these regulations and to the anticipated needs of the community and local industiy. The physical plant constructed and its relationship to the emergency department personnel for staffing this unit are described. Utilization patterns since implementation of this program are presented.

On 14 July 1991, at 2150 h, a train derailment occurred near the Cantara rail curve about six miles above Dunsmuir in Northern California. The derailment spilled approximately 19,000 gallons of metam-sodium into the Sacramento River. When mixed with loater, metam-sodium degrades to methylisothiocyanate (MITC) and other gases. The contaminated river water passed the town of Dunsmuir and other occupied areas exposing residents to MITC gas.

From 15 July to 20 July (five days), a total of 360 people underwent triage. The majority of patients displayed minor exposure symptoms that did not require hospital care. Mercy Mt. Shasta Hospital, a small rural hospital close to Dunsmuir, received the majority of patients. As of 29 July, 15 days after the incident, Mercy Mt. Shasta Hospital had seen 244 exposed patients in its emergency department, and had admitted five. Three had symptoms that could have been spill-related. Three Regional Poison Control Centers provided medical toxicology advice.

Medical management of the emergency medical services (EMS) response to the event was piecemeal and weak. There did not appear to be a medical operations component at local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC). Most health care personnel interviewed complained about inadequate information about the substance and the situation. Local fire service mutual- aid agreements to obtain additional fire service and ambulance personnel worked well. It is important to emphasize that everyone who believed they had been exposed to the chemical underwent triage and received appropriate acute medical care.