This article aims to analyse the finances of the Coimbra city council from 1557 to 1836. Our objective is to examine the causes of long-term changes in municipal revenue and expenditure, particularly during the extended period of decline that occurred between the mid-17th century and the late 18th century. This study will focus on the composition of revenue and expenditure, as well as on revenue collection mechanisms. We aim to present the empirical data on the revenue and expenditure components that allow us to understand the changes that took place. Finally, we hope to be able to explain the causes that led to significant variations in revenue and expenditure in a dialogue with existing literature. The primary sources used correspond to municipal revenue and expenditure books, supplemented by other sources such as legislation, correspondence and auction books.

This is an introduction to the special issue that presents new research on the state and its links to economic and social development. The special issue focuses on the processes of institutional transformation of the state, looking at how fiscal states arise in the developing world. The resulting set of articles presents a variety of approaches, ranging from case studies (at state and regional level), to comparative historical analysis and to macro-quantitative (country and cross-country level) perspectives. The overarching message is that historical, political and institutional factors are key to understanding the process of fiscal states formation and change around the developing world.

This article combines cross-national statistical analysis and in-depth historical case studies of Argentina and Chile to explore the relationship between two crucial dimensions of state capacity. We show that information capacity contributes to the development of fiscal capacity. When states have accurate information about their subject populations, territories, and economies, they are more effective at mobilizing revenues. In developing this argument this article makes three broader contributions. First, while existing scholarship either treats distinct dimensions of state capacity as separate entities, or simply assumes that they complement each other, our findings urge scholars to treat state development as sequential and to further investigate how multiple dimensions of state capacity are interrelated. Second, the paper suggests a broader underlying set of mechanisms – economies of scope – which connect these dimensions, and explores them in the specific context of how information capacity facilitates fiscal capacity. Third, we join the scholarship on the importance of societal compliance in the creation of the fiscal state, but with a focus on elite cooperation with the state's information collection efforts, which we show to be crucial to tax state development.

We argue that tax revenues and political institutions placing constraints on the executive power may reinforce each other over time and so co-evolve in the long run. This may also bring a shift in the composition of revenues, from taxes levied on a narrow base to broadly levied taxes. To test these hypotheses, we use historical cross-country data covering 31 countries for 1800–2012 and panel time series methods allowing for different forms of country-specific heterogeneity and cross-section dependence. The results offer three main findings. First, executive constraints, whether they are judicial or legislative, and tax revenues are cointegrated. While in the short run they can drift apart, this will be temporary because there is a long-run relationship between the two. Second, evidence of cointegration is strongest for revenues from direct taxes, suggesting that the existence and nature of a long-run relationship may be mainly related to the emergence of broad-based taxation. Third, long-run causality runs mostly from executive constraints to taxation. This is most evident for income taxes. Our findings link Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17, implying that the goal of promoting inclusive and accountable institutions may work in synergy with that of generating internal resources to finance development goals.

Although a Labor government fiscal stimulus had helped Australia weather the 2008 global financial crisis, budget deficits increased, and the public service was targeted for economies. The Liberal/National (Coalition) opposition won office in 2013, promising public sector cuts. In this context, the Walton et al. concept of a forcing strategy helps analyse the 2014–2016 bargaining round in the Australian Public Service. A forcing strategy involves three negotiating processes: distributive bargaining to achieve concessions in pay and working conditions, the structuring of attitudes to heighten animosity between the negotiating parties, and the management of internal differences to minimise intragroup conflicts. The Liberal/National (Coalition) government adopted elements of these approaches, requiring Australian Public Service agencies to reduce a range of employment conditions to justify pay increases. Interactions between Australian Public Service management and the principal Australian Public Service trade union, the Community and Public Sector Union became increasingly hostile over the course of the bargaining round. In addition, internal differences emerged between the Australian Public Service Commission, which oversaw the bargaining process, and individual Australian Public Service agencies. We consider the efficacy of this forcing strategy in light of the potential for the Community and Public Sector Union to mobilise its membership to resist such an approach to pay negotiations.

The impact of the financial crisis has reignited debate about the scope and scale of public sector restructuring and its consequences for the workforce in Britain. The economic crisis precipitated austerity measures concentrated on expenditure reductions with the intention of reducing the public deficit. Because the public sector pay bill comprises over half of current public spending, achieving deficit reduction has major consequences for the total pay bill and the workforce. This article assesses the restructuring of the public sector and public sector employment relations in Britain and identifies underlying continuities in public sector restructuring over recent decades. Drawing on and repositioning New Labour’s legacy, the Coalition government used the economic crisis to establish a pro-austerity frame that has legitimated deep cuts in public sector employment and involved measures to refashion public sector employment relations. The article considers the consequences of this agenda and responses by trade unions and indicates some of the limits and uncertain prospects for public sector restructuring under conditions of austerity.

Despite repeated calls for retrospective regulatory review by every President since the 1970s, progress on implementing such reviews has been slow. We argue that part of the explanation for the slow progress to date stems from misalignment between the goals of regulatory review and the institutional framework used for the review. We define three distinct goals of regulatory review – the rule relevance goal, the rule improvement goal, and the regulatory learning goal. We then examine the text of the Presidential Executive Orders and major Congressional legislation addressing retrospective review, and document which goals were targeted and which institutions were used to conduct the reviews. We find that the U.S. federal government has almost always sought review of one rule at a time, conducted by the agency that issued or promulgated the rule and that these reviews tend to focus on rule relevance and costs. This institutional framework for retrospective review – one rule, assessed by the promulgating agency, focused on relevance and cost – is only well-suited to a narrow interpretation of the rule improvement goal. We then review alternative institutional structures that could better meet the rule improvement goal and the broader regulatory learning goal across multiple rules and agencies, and we offer recommendations for developing new guidance and institutions to promote multiagency regulatory learning.

Much of public policy-making has in recent decades been driven by the idea of evidence-based policy – policy rooted in the principles of social science and, more specifically, empirical validation based on social and behavioural science. This article argues that evidence-based policy, while helping to improve the design of policies aimed at changing individual behaviour, lacks a recognition that individual and group choices are embedded in social relationships and institutions. There is a risk of over-relying not only on probabilistic models that under-state our condition of ‘radical uncertainty’ but also on data and metrics that are disconnected from the everyday experience of workers and citizens whose needs and interests cannot always be measured or managed. Since uncertainty is a fundamental reality of both the economy and social life, policy-making needs robust conceptual narratives to make sense of numbers and provide a sound basis on which to make decisions allied to ethical judgements.

In the wake of the economic downturn of 2008–2009, researchers and policymakers have focused considerable attention on the extent of unfunded liabilities in US public sector pension plans and the implications for the long term fiscal sustainability of state and local governments. In response to the growth in liabilities, many states have introduced legislation that cuts back on defined benefit (DB) plan commitments, in some cases even shifting the pension system from a DB to a defined contribution or hybrid plan. This paper explores the factors that have led states to engage in pension reform, focusing particular attention on one factor that has only recently gained attention in the research literature: contribution volatility. While unfunded liabilities have significant long-term solvency implications, in the short term fluctuations in the amount of required contributions pose substantial difficulties for the ability of plan sponsors to balance budgets and engage in strategic planning. We begin by quantifying the volatility in the required contributions US states were expected to make between 2001 and 2013 and comparing the volatility of pension spending to other relevant tax and spending measures. Next, we describe the various types of pension reforms that states have implemented and examine the fiscal pressures facing those states that have engaged in reform. States with greater fluctuations in their required payments have been more likely to reduce benefits and increase employee contributions; they have also been more likely to institute these reforms sooner.

Numerous regulatory reform proposals would require federal agencies to conduct more thorough economic analysis of proposed regulations or expand the resources and influence of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which currently reviews executive branch regulations. Such reforms are intended to improve the quality of economic analysis agencies produce when they issue major regulations. We employ newly gathered data on variation in current administrative procedures to assess the likely effects of proposed regulatory process reforms on the quality of agencies’ regulatory impact analyses (RIAs). Our results suggest that greater use of advance notices of proposed rulemakings for major regulations, advance consultation with regulated entities, use of advisory committees, and expansion of OIRA’s resources and role would improve the quality of RIAs. They also suggest pre-proposal public meetings with stakeholders are associated with lower quality analysis.

This paper examines problems of setting targets for health care performance in which the centre sets a uniform set of targets and levels of performance. The case study examined by the paper is from the system of performance assessment of ‘star ratings’ that was introduced from 2001 by the Department of Health to give each organisation in the NHS in England a single summary score from zero rating to three stars. Star ratings were directed at holding trusts' chief executives to account for the local delivery of national priorities through a process of ‘naming and shaming’, in which Chief Executives of zero-rated organisations were at risk of losing their jobs. This paper outlines the underlying model and its three underlying assumptions: the centre can determine a scoring system to prioritise what matters; failures of performance that are not reflected in the scoring system do not matter; and the advantages of a system of scoring on accountable targets outweigh the disadvantages of various types of gaming responses. This paper examines the application of the model of star ratings to a case study of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which are complex organisations with three diverse sets of responsibilities: delivering primary care, commissioning secondary care, and supervising public health. It outlines an alternative model and the issues this raises for governance of health care performance.