In December 1946 the General Assembly requested that the Economic and Social Council prepare a draft genocide convention with a view to its adoption at the 1947 session of the Assembly. The Secretariat prepared a draft convention with the assistance of three experts in international criminal law, Raphael Lemkin, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres and Vespasian Pella. However, the Economic and Social Council did not complete consultations with Member States in 1947. In early 1948, the Council established an Ad Hoc Committee composed of representatives of several Member States which prepared a revised draft. This draft was then revised and adopted by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in December 1948. The Assembly also adopted resolutions calling for consideration of the establishment of an international criminal court and for the extension of the Convention to colonies. The Convention entered into force in January 1951 after the threshold of twenty ratifications or accessions had been achieved.

The title of the Convention and article I both refer to the obligation to prevent genocide. However, the Convention provides no other guidance on the scope of this obligation. In its 2007 judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia the International Court of Justice held that Serbia had had been in breach of its obligation to prevent genocide because it failed to exert pressure on Bosnian Serb forces who were preparing to commit genocide at Srebrenica. The doctrine developed by the Court was quite radical in that it recognized an extraterritoriaoutside their own gterritory unless l dimension of the obligation, one that varied in scope depending upon the influence the State Party was capable of exerting. Prevention of genocide is also contemplated in the General Assembly resolution on the responsibility to protect. Means employed to prevent genocide must be otherwise lawful. States cannot use force to prevent genocide unless authorised pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VIII of the Genocide Convention contemplates the role of organs of the United Nations in the implementation and enforcement of the Convention. There are many examples of States raising charges of genocide before the General Assembly and the Security Council. However, these bodies have onlyr rarely agreed to characterize acts as genocidal. In 1994, very controversially the Security Council resisted describing the unfolding genocide in Rwanda by its proper name. In 2004 the Secretary General established the position of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. Genocide, including the scope fo the Convention, has also been considered by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on apartheid, the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council.

The post-First World War minorities treaties regime was an initial attempt by international law to address the rights of national and ethnic minorities. Its shorcomings prompted Raphael Lemkin, in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, to propose a new category of international crime that he named genocide. The International Military Tribunal prosecuted acts of genocide using the category of crimes against humanity. Several of the defendants were convicted of acts aimed at destruction of Europe’s Jewish population. However, crimes against humanity were confined to acts associated with aggressive war. At the first session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, a resolution on genocide was proposed in order to address the peacetime atrocities that were neglected in the Nuremberg judgment. The resolution recognized genocide as an international crime and called for preparation of a convention.

The UN General Assembly, a body including representatives of all UN member governments, serves as the primary forum for defining a better world order through peaceful change. It has endorsed programs of peaceful change at all levels of ambition at different times and on different issues. Much of its activity has focused on the minimalist goal of averting or ending particular wars. On other issues, most notably decolonization, national economic development, and adding environmental concerns to the intergovernmental agenda, it has contributed to incremental change in the states system. Yet the limits on what governments would endorse became clear on issues such as human rights where changes would affect domestic political orders. The end of the Cold War and related domestic-level political changes provided the context for higher ambition, which peaked in 2005 when the General Assembly endorsed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs offered a vision of deep peace in which universal respect for human rights, human development, and human security prevail within ecologically sustainable societies. Yet the subsequent spread of authoritarian rule within states and increased geopolitical tensions between major states have reinforced governments’ traditional approaches to states system, reducing the ambition of programs for peaceful change.

This chapter considers the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as articulated in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) project. At the NIEO’s core was the push to consolidate the legal status of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over natural resources. This idea’s champions argued that ownership and control of resources is an essential and necessary element of statehood, one that involves the right to nationalize foreign-held property. By contrast, its critics contended that no state could lawfully seize assets of foreign investors without compensation. They also insisted that the quantity of such compensation should be determined by international law, or through international arbitration, in the event of disagreement. While most aspects of the NIEO, including resource sovereignty, had been debated for some time, partly during broader discussions of neocolonialism and uneven development within the UN Conference on Trade and Development, it was only in 1974 that the project was formalized in a set of General Assembly resolutions. This project was largely the expression of a desire on the part of political and legal elites in the global South to renegotiate their roles in the world capitalist system, reforming rather than repudiating the existing international order.

In this chapter, Nigel White assesses the contribution of the UN’s collective security system to the settlement of international disputes. This chapter tests the assumption that impartial law-based dispute settlement by the Security Council is neither achievable because of its political nature nor required by the UN Charter. This chapter analyses the provisions of the Charter and practice of the Security Council in the field of peaceful settlement, looking for evidence of impartiality in both inter-State and intra-State disputes and assessing the influence of peacekeeping mandated by the Council upon impartiality. This analysis shows that the concept of impartiality in peaceful settlement has largely disappeared and asks, in the conclusion, whether it is possible and desirable to (re)turn to impartiality.

This chapter revisits UN General Assembly resolution 181(II) recommending the partition of Palestine. It undertakes critical international legal analysis of the resolution with reference to the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine whose report formed the basis of the resolution. Contrary to the traditional historiography, this chapter posits that the resolution was neither procedurally ultra vires the General Assembly, nor were its terms substantively consistent with prevailing international law as regards self-determination of peoples. Set against the larger context of the international legal status of Palestine from WWI to the end of the British Mandate, this chapter argues that resolution 181(II) was the opening act in the reification of Palestine’s legal subalternity within the newly minted UN system. It demonstrates that the resolution was an embodiment, in legal terms, of the lingering tension between the rule by law of late-European empire and the ostensible rule of law of the post-WWII era. It also shows that the resolution helped hasten the dissolution of Palestine and the dispersal of its people, the consequences of which remain with us today.

This chapter critically examines Palestine’s unsuccessful 2011 UN membership bid. It examines the report of the UN Committee on the Admission of New Members which, under US pressure, could not unanimously recommend Palestine’s membership to the Security Council after examining whether Palestine satisfied the criteria for membership as set out in article 4(1) of the UN Charter. Propelled by this unsuccessful bid, Palestine turned to the General Assembly which upgraded its status to that of a non-Member Observer State in 2012. Although the legal consequences of this upgrade have been considerable, including allowing the State of Palestine to accede to a host of international treaties and multilateral organizations, its juxtaposition against the refusal of the Committee on the Admission of New Members to recommend membership to the Security Council in accordance with the international rule of law is demonstrative, yet again, of the international rule by law principle at work. Although the UN has allowed for a gradual and qualified recognition of Palestinian legal subjectivity over time, its failure to provide the legal and political foundation upon which those rights may actually be realized, namely membership in the Organization, has continued to disenfranchise Palestine and its people.

This chapter critically examines the distinctive institutional and normative regime created by the UN for the Palestinian refugees in the immediate aftermath of the Nakba in the form of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. It juxtaposes that regime against the international institutional and normative regime applicable to all other refugees in the world, as administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The special regime for Palestinian refugees is widely regarded as reflective of the UN’s unique responsibility for their plight. Yet, a critical examination of the UN record on the early history, mandate, and regulatory framework underpinning this regime reveals that it was never intended to give effect to Palestinian refugee rights as established under prevailing international law, including as affirmed by the UN itself. The resulting ‘protection gap’ that has consequently emerged for Palestinian refugees, marked by uneven and confused state practice concerning their plight as well as ongoing gender discrimination against them by the UN, is demonstrative of the Organization’s role in the maintenance of Palestinian legal subalternity on the international plane.

The chapter begins with a brief summary of the theory and findings. It then examines whether the strong relationship between electoral autocracies and Chinese foreign spending is evident among a wider range of issues based on analysis of United Nations General Assembly votes. The findings indicate that electoral autocracies have displayed a markedly higher propensity to vote with China since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. The chapter then discusses theoretical, policy, and business implications in turn.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the use of force under the auspices of the UN, in particular the Security Council. Chapter 3 first sets out and examines the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and the division of competence between the various organs of the UN – the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat – to provide an understading as to how force was originally envisaged as being employed under the auspices of the UN. Given the Security Council’s primacy both within the Charter and in practice, the chapter goes on to examine the specific powers of the Council in relation to the use of forcible measures within the Charter and the limitations imposed upon these. Following this it then examines how these powers and responsibilities have been implemented in practice in both the Cold War and post-Cold War era. In particular, it has developed the practice of ‘authorising’ states, coalitions of states and regional organisations to use force to implement its mandate. The chapter finally addresses the relationship between the UN and regional – and, by extension, collective defence – organisations in the context of the use of force.

The human rights to water and sanitation (HRtWS) have their genesis, history and interpretations. They are also subject to tension, controversy and dispute. A studied approach to these foundations is necessary in order to ensure a basis for their formulation, implementation, evaluation and monitoring. For the approach to the three dimensions that make up the analytical framework used in this book, an understanding of these aspects is not only desirable but necessary. Understanding the factors involved in the realization or violation of HRtWS, the ways in which the policies actually reach them, to a greater or lesser degree, and the population groups at particular risk, pre-supposes clarity regarding the different approaches for the rights and the elements that underlie each of these. In this context, the objective of this part of the book is to provide elements for the reader to get a closer view of these fundamentals, to get a more complete understanding of the topic and, from there, to have a theoretical-conceptual basis to address drivers, policies and people.

It is shown that the form of an institution, its legal character, and membership do not determine procedural density.

The finding that the procedural density regarding an activity is zero is very prevalent in the sample. The reasons for this usually lie in low state interest, which is demonstrated via case studies of the European Advertising Standards Alliance and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

During coding, there were certain procedural steps which occurred more frequently than others but no distinct patterns of combinations of procedural steps. This leads me to assume that procedure as a design element is valued for its variety and flexibility.

Whether an activity is hard or soft law or somewhere in between greatly determines state interest in procedural justice. This is further explored via a case study of the Human Development Index.

Like the legal character, the exact characteristics of an administrative activity affect procedural density. This is illustrated using the different branches of the International Telecommunications Union and their procedure.

Of the different kinds of procedural steps, review is by far the least prevalent because it strongly affects state interests and often juxtaposes them with individual rights and interests. This is illustrated with comparative case studies of the Interpol Commission for the Control of Files and the ICANN Independent Review Procedure.

Procedural justice in the shape of procedural steps is a more flexible design tool than an institution's different organs. All things being equal, it is therefore preferred. This is demonstrated by the decentralized compliance monitoring mechanism used by the International Electrotechnical Commission.

The main findings from the empirical research are summarized.

A power on the part of the General Assembly of the United Nations to decide on a partition of Palestine was said to flow from the text of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter, however, gives the General Assembly decision-making powers only with respect to issues internal to the United Nations. It was argued that the member states construed the Charter so as to give it a power to partition Palestine. In response, it was argued that the member states did not do so. Many of them wanted the International Court of Justice to decide that point. It was argued that even if the Charter did not explicitly give a power to partition Palestine, such a power was implied by the Charter. In response, it was argued that there was no basis for such an implication.

Apart from the issue of forced expulsion, the issue of an obligation to repatriate could have been put to the International Court of Justice. Populations are deemed to have a right to be repatriated when exodus occurs, it was argued. They also have a right to nationality when sovereignty changes in a territory. The United States pressured the Provisional Government of Israel to repatriate. The Provisional Government of Israel denied an obligation to repatriate. It blamed the Arab states for the exodus and said that the populations of displaced Arabs became the responsibility of those states. It said that repatriation while the situation was unsettled would give the Arab states a military advantage. It said that repatriation could be considered only in the context of peace agreements with the Arab states. It said that nationality did not have to be offered to the displaced Arabs because they had shown disloyalty by departing. The General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for repatriation and established a three-nation committee to oversee its implementation.

In late 1948, the General Assembly scheduled a major debate to consider what the General Assembly might do to resolve the conflict. Syria and the other Arab states again proposed that the International Court of Justice be asked for an advisory opinion. Twenty-one states voted in favor, the same number, twenty-one, voted against, and four abstained. That split meant there was not a majority in favor, so the proposal failed. In December 1948 in the Security Council, Syria again forced a vote on the issue but again fell short.

Chapter 3 considers the meaning of an ‘act of aggression’, defined in Article 8bis (2) of the Rome Statute. It opens with a comparative analysis of the terminology employed in the UN Charter to describe inter-State armed force. It then summarises the shortcomings of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly (GA) Resolution 3314 (1974), which provided a basis for Article 8bis (2). Among other things, it is demonstrated that the 3314 Definition does not reflect the understanding of an act of aggression seen in the practice of the UN Security Council, GA, or the International Court of Justice. It is also explained how some of the 3314 Definition’s shortcomings were exacerbated by the selective use of its provisions in Article 8bis (2). In addition, the chapter considers the treatment of the acts of non-State actors, and cyber operations and emerging weapons technologies. Finally, the chapter analyses the status of the ‘Understandings’ adopted by the ICC Assembly of States Parties alongside the aggression amendments, and their effect on our understanding of the definition of the State act element of the crime.

A legacy of the Cold War is that nuclear arms protect nations from attack; a stance that supporters of the TPNW wish to change. Indeed, this author would contend that nuclear weapons do not protect nations but actually threaten national, regional and global security. Many advocates of nuclear disarmament believe that the TPNW marks a new beginning; it was even celebrated with the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), at the time, a relatively newly formed civil society organization. The TPNW demonstrates international support to take decisive action to eliminate nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to international peace and security.