The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) is a well-documented fact of empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book building approach, a closed book auction, and an open book auction. We report underpricing in each of these IPO mechanisms. Uncertainty about the aftermarket behavior may partly explain IPO excess returns but underpricing persists even in the repeated setting where uncertainty is negligible and despite the equilibrium adjustment dynamics, that we observe in the data. The data reveal a market-wide impact of investors’ reluctance to sell in the aftermarket at a price below the offering price. We conclude that a behavioural bias similar to the disposition effect fosters IPO underpricing in our setting.

In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices, two outcomes that are important for financial stability. Compensation schemes can drive a wedge between how investors and traders value the asset. Limited liability makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and increase prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors increase liquidity provision and asset price bubbles are larger. Bonus caps have no clear effect on liquidity provision and they fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving traders skin in the game fosters financial stability.

We examine experimentally how complexity affects decision-making, when individuals choose among different products with varying benefits and costs. We find that complexity in costs leads to choosing a high-benefit product, with high costs and overall lower payoffs. In contrast, when complexity is in the benefits of the product, we cannot reject the hypothesis of random mistakes. We also examine the role of heterogeneous complexity. We find that individuals still (mistakenly) choose the high-benefit but costly product, even if cheaper and simple products are available. Our results suggest that salience is a main driver of choices under different forms of complexity.

Many models of investor behavior predict that investors prefer assets that they believe to have positively skewed return distributions. We elicit detailed return expectations for a broad index fund and a single stock in a representative sample of the Dutch population. The data show substantial heterogeneity in individuals’ skewness expectations of which only very little is captured by sociodemographics. Across assets, most respondents expect a higher variance and skewness for the individual stock compared to the index fund. Portfolio allocations increase with the skewness of respondents’ return expectations for the respective asset, controlling for other moments of a respondent’s expectations.

Although now widespread in financial markets, circuit breakers remain controversial among researchers and professional investors. We formalize the popular argument that circuit breakers provide a “cooling-off” period for investors during market runs and we test it in the laboratory. Our experiment reproduces a market where investors fear future liquidity shocks but receive news about the true state over time. Notably, we find that when information quality is poor circuit breakers can have perverse effects on trading behavior. However, when information quality is high, circuit breakers can improve welfare by providing agents with time to learn about the true state, when private incentives to wait for more information are insufficient.

Our research addresses the effect of shared vs. mixed group identities in an information cascade game. We vary whether subjects always choose after a decision maker who shares the same identity or after a decision maker with a different identity. We find that subjects’ inclination to follow their predecessor is stronger in groups uniquely consisting of ingroup members compared to mixed groups. We relate this result to recent social cognition research.

Experimental asset markets with a constant fundamental value ($\mathrm{F}\mathrm{V}$) have grown in importance in recent years. A methodological examination of the robustness of experimental results in such a setting which has been shown to produce bubbles, however, is lacking. In a laboratory experiment with 280 subjects, we investigate whether specific design features are sufficient to influence experimental results. In detail, we (1) vary the visual representation of the price chart, and (2) provide subjects with full information about the FV process. We find overvaluation and bubble formation to be reduced when trading prices are displayed at the upper end of the price chart. Surprisingly, we do not find any effects when subjects have full information about the FV process.

This study investigates the impacts of behavioral finance on stock market volatility. The primary aims are to explain the reasons behind changes in the S&P 500 price within the context of behavioral finance and to analyze investor behavior in response to these changes. To achieve this, the research employs time-series analysis over a 10-year period, focusing on the S&P 500, real interest rates, consumer confidence, market volatility and credit default swaps while considering the effects of behavioral biases. The findings reveal several significant correlations: rising real interest rates negatively affect stocks due to loss aversion and sentiment. Conversely, higher consumer confidence tends to positively influence the stock market, driven by herding behavior and optimism. Additionally, market volatility shows a negative correlation with the S&P 500, influenced by risk aversion, recency bias and herding behavior. Moreover, an increase in credit default swap rates leads to stock market declines, primarily influenced by risk perception, loss aversion and herding behavior.

We report the effects of framing settings in annuity demand after conducting a survey-based experiment with members of a Dutch occupational pension plan. We gave participants the option to allocate up to 20% of their projected pension accrual to a lump sum. In particular, we investigated the joint effects of consumption and investment frames and gain and loss frames. We present strong evidence for framing effects in annuity demand. Framing effects remain significant when we control for individual characteristics. We also find robust evidence of individual characteristics influencing annuity demand, highlighting the importance of heterogeneity among participants, for example risk aversion, time preference and trust in the pension fund. Gender and long-term debt positions have significant impact how one responds to framing. We conclude that Dutch plan members generally welcome the partial lump sum option over mandatory full annuitization. The application of frames appears to predictively steer annuity demand. The precise effect framing may have, would probably also depend on the institutional environment, which predefines the perspective through which individuals filter annuities.

This special issue on financial knowledge and retirement security builds on prior studies in this journal on the economic causes and consequences of financial literacy for retirement security.

This paper analyzes whether herding and skillful managers may coexist. When herding appears, managers tend to present poor timing abilities; however, a weak herding level (a result commonly found in pension funds) may evidence a mixed scenario, where some managers develop skills, and others follow the herd. Additionally, when informational cascades emerge, some managers may act as leaders, anticipating others’ movements. Nonetheless, this anticipatory skill does not mean that leaders also anticipate market movements and present timing skills. Our results show herding and inter-temporal herding in a sample of Spanish pension funds, though the imitation behavior is not strong. We also find evidence of a mixed scenario, in which some non-herding managers present timing skills, while herding funds are not able to develop these abilities. Finally, we find successful timing for certain leaders, showing that the anticipation of others’ movements does not show real timing abilities.