This article analyses the structure and changes of large companies based on a new database of the 200 largest non-financial firms operating from 1913 to 1971 in Argentina. The main contribution of the research consists of the elaboration of the rankings of the 200 largest companies according to their paid-up capital between 1913 and 1971 and the construction of a database of large companies based on homogeneous sources and criteria. The study identifies the long-lasting presence of family-based diversified business groups and foreign multinationals from the first global period to the end of Import Substitution Industrialisation. It also shows that the presence of foreign companies among the 200 largest firms is higher than that identified in other countries. The study constitutes the first comprehensive research into big business in Argentina until the 1970s and a first attempt to identify the life cycles of the largest companies in Argentina.

In the 1990s, three Scandinavian news media companies, Bonnier, Kinnevik, and Schibsted, internationalized their newspapers. Despite doing this during the same period, competing in the same industry and institutional environment, being exposed to the same opportunities by the opening of the Eastern European markets, and all belonging to a smaller language area, they differed in their internationalization models as well as in their outcomes. Despite initial successes, Bonnier and Kinnevik eventually discontinued their newspapers in the new markets, in many cases following significant losses, while Schibsted fared better. The main explanation for using different internationalization models was differences in business models, basically striving to do business internationally in a similar way as domestically. That is, they did not choose a specific internationalization model but sought to simply expand their business models internationally. Consequently, this article finds that when researching internationalization, more focus should be placed on business models.

Samsung has largely shifted its electronics manufacturing out of China, and mostly to Vietnam. In that process, it has, to date, avoided local labour market (LLM) difficulties faced by its subsidiaries in industrial parks in China: in particular, pervasive skill shortages among the electronics assembly workers on whom Samsung’s manufacturing depends. Labour retention problems in China had significantly challenged its commitment to invest in necessary employee training. By contrast, Samsung’s domination of foreign direct investment (FDI) within particular Vietnamese industrial parks has removed the inter-employer competition it experienced in China. A deeper explanation involves Samsung’s development – as Vietnam’s largest single source of FDI, and major producer of that country’s exports – of synergistic and symbiotic relationships with Vietnam’s national and subnational governments. These relationships have allowed Samsung to influence development strategies for industrial parks and their LLMs. Samsung has invests expansively in forms of education and training whose benefits extend beyond the areas in which its manufacturing facilities operate, to populations that the company does not employ. Providing benefits beyond typical success criteria for FDI in developing economies, Samsung has helped Vietnam’s party-state meet its own legitimacy needs with its internal constituencies, contributing to a broader practical consensus in favour of the party-state’s development policies. This article therefore widens the perspective of FDI to embed it in national and subnational business–government relations.

In an era where legally binding international trade agreements are increasingly shaping domestic regulation in a wide range of areas, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the US, Australia, Japan and nine other Pacific Rim Countries, representing over 40% of world trade, has been described as setting the standards for 21st century trade agreements. This article analyses why the negotiations have dragged on for 5 years, and the resistance to the potential impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement on national democratic decision-making on health, environmental and other public interest regulation.

In the context of the working-class backlash against free trade represented by Brexit, the recent surge of right-wing political parties in Europe and the 2016 US presidential election, it is timely to take stock of the threats to jobs and wages posed by recent negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The European Commission selectively relied on econometric analyses, predicting a positive impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Its proposed legal text on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ fell short of the European Parliament’s negotiating guidelines, which themselves failed to ensure protection of labour standards. The activities of corporate lobbies threatened the effective protection of workers’ rights. Major risks to workers’ rights are posed by discrepancies between US and European Union labour and social law and labour standards. The most recent legal text lacks compliance monitoring provisions and sanction mechanisms against member states failing to ratify core labour conventions. The investment court system does not resolve the problems of the discredited investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for which it is the proposed replacement. The year 2016 has provided a foretaste of the dislocation likely from trade and investment regulation that sees social and environmental standards and labour rights simply as barriers to corporate profits.

Although the positive socio-economic effects of remittances for recipient countries in the short term are unmistakable, inflows of remittances may at the same time exert adverse effects on the trade competitiveness of an economy, by appreciating the real exchange rate. This phenomenon is characterised as an instance of the ‘Dutch disease’ – the negative impact of windfall revenue inflows on the competitiveness of other tradable sectors and hence on overall economic growth. While the real effect of workers’ remittances on real exchange rates in a recipient economy is still a controversial issue, several studies have analysed evidence for the existence of the ‘Dutch disease’ phenomenon in various sets of countries. The main objective of this study is to examine whether remittance flows have had any adverse effect on the international trade competitiveness of a selected group of developing countries during the period from 1995 to 2014. Using a one-step system Generalised Method of Moments specification within a simultaneous equation approach, it shows that remittance flows depreciate the real exchange rate at their levels and that the lagged value of remittances create the Dutch disease for this country group. In addition, we confirm that while trade openness and world real interest rates contribute to a depreciation in real exchange rates, gross domestic product per capita and net Official Development Aid inflows tend to appreciate real exchange rates. A policy implication is that trade liberalisation policies that lower tariff rates on capital imports and new export-oriented incentive programmes should be accompanied by measures designed to prevent appreciation in the real exchange rate: steps in this direction such as recent macroeconomic and prudential capital flow management initiatives are briefly referenced.

This paper provides a method to assess the risk relief deriving from a foreign expansion by a life insurance company. We build a parsimonious continuous-time model for longevity risk that captures the dependence across different ages in domestic versus foreign populations. We calibrate the model to portray the case of a UK annuity portfolio expanding internationally toward Italian policyholders. The longevity risk diversification benefits of an international expansion are sizable, in particular when interest rates are low. The benefits are judged based on traditional measures, such as the Risk Margin or volatility reduction, and on a novel measure, the Diversification Index.

We analyse the trade routes between the UK and EU countries. Our results show that the relative importance of the UK as a trading partner in the EU has slightly decreased. We further decompose the total value added into components that quantify the value added that is generated through direct trade with the UK and the indirect trade that is channelled through third countries. Close to one third of the total value added is generated through indirect trade and two thirds through direct trade. Furthermore, 18 per cent of EU countries’ value-added trade to the UK passes through the UK onto other countries.

The UK's automotive industry has been one of the ‘star performers’ of the UK economy in recent years – unlike most other manufacturing sectors. Output has increased by over 60 per cent since 2010 and there has been over £8 billion worth of investment in the industry in the past five years. The industry supports some 800,000 jobs in the UK. It is seen as having benefitted from EU membership. So what might Brexit mean for the UK automotive sector, and its workers? This paper considers short-run impacts, before turning to the impact of uncertainty on foreign direct investment inflows and then the nature of a possible trading relationship. Some brief reflections on policy implications round off the paper.

The literature on internationalisation processes in family businesses has boomed with the emergence of new approaches and different perspectives. One of these schemes analyses the so-called born-again global firms, mostly technology companies, which experienced an internationalisation process after one or more serious incidents affecting it. The case of Ines Rosales extends the frontier of the meaning of a global born-again firm to firms in industries and traditional products. One of its most striking aspects is that the flagship product is centennial and based on basic ingredients. In addition, the production process of the firm mix production by hand and mechanised developments. Inés Rosales shows the ability of a family Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) in a process of internationalisation even in culturally distant markets through the traditional cake of olive oil.

The economic and financial crisis has meant sizeable employment losses that resulted from different adjustment mechanisms in domestic firms and multinational companies. This may be due to either production plant closures or downsizing by firms that remain active. This paper evaluates the importance of both phenomena for multinational and domestic firms in Belgium over the period preceding the crisis (1997-2008), using a firm-level dataset. Our results reveal that multinational enterprises tend to leave the local market more frequently than domestic firms with comparable firm and sector characteristics. Further, multinational incumbents face employment adjustment costs for white-collar workers that are around half of those borne by domestic firms. In sum, our findings suggest that multinational firms are more flexible in terms of plant location as well as in terms of employment adjustment. However, before the crisis, foreign multinationals created more jobs on average than other types of firms.

In the present study we investigate the relationship between foreign ownership and innovation activities using the firmlevel data of the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS) covering twelve European countries. Probit estimates based on 28,000 firms' observations show that foreign-owned firms are more innovative than domestic firms, particularly in the New EU Member States. However, results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the differences in the percentage of innovating firms between foreign-owned and domestic firms reveals that the differences are mainly due to the different firm characteristics rather than the differences in coefficients. In particular, the dominance of foreign-owned firms in the largest firm size group is the main factor contributing to the gap in the percentage of innovators between foreign-owned firms and domestic firms. Furthermore, using the fractional logit model, we find that in the New EU Member states, foreign ownership has a positive and significant impact on the share of market novelties as well as on the share of new products in turnover. In this case, the results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis indicate that the ownership difference in the share of innovative sales is not due to the differences in the observed firms' characteristics.

This article examines some effects of the political and military alliance between Spain and the United States on the Spanish business community in the 1950s and 1960s. The technical aid is taken to be the set of official programs and private contracts and investments that helped disseminate in Spain the techniques and ideas associated with the American model. The articulation process of the economic interests of the United States in Spain is quantitatively and qualitatively analysed. Our research reveals that technical aid and the pro-American circles formed around it, which were partially based on existing business relations, were essential to such process. The Spanish case shows therefore, first, that US foreign economic policy favoured, even if only indirectly, American business during the Cold War. Second, this work provides material and ideas to analyse the Spanish «miracle» as a rather exogenous growth process.