This article discusses sexual harassment in the east African cut-flower and horticultural industry, based on research on 62 farms in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It argues that sexual harassment is fostered both by coercive labour conditions within global value chains and by existing hierarchical gender relations. The research finds that harassment is widespread, that many lack a vocabulary to describe or discuss this, and that female casual and temporary workers are most likely to be targeted. Action research coupled with organisation of workers, however, has been effective in giving ‘voice’ to those suffering harassment: this is a first step in a feminist labour mobilisation and policy formulation. Procedures against sexual harassment are beginning to be formulated: a key concern is implementation. Addressing sexual harassment is central in ensuring the security of working people, particularly the most marginalised.

We are now close to reaching what climate scientists advise is a ‘tipping point’ when the injuries we have visited on the planet will become self-reinforcing and produce an ecosystem that is alien to human life. The mal-distribution of consumption within and between nations is a major reason why there is little agreement on appropriate remedial action. Ensuring planetary survival while reducing inequity is made the more difficult, because the richest one-seventh of the world’s population has already reached consumption levels beyond the capacity of the planetary ecosystem to accommodate it.

Although the issue of redistribution is glossed over by Marglin, there are three reasons why decarbonisation must be accompanied by a massive scaling up of redistribution from the global North to South if the agenda is to be founded on a social justice approach. First, constructing a capital infrastructure in the South in a manner that maximises the potential for decarbonisation would tend to be very import-intensive. Hence, it would require external financing or else risk running aground through balance of payment constraints. Second, there is already a tendency in the global economy of siphoning resources from South to North, in particular through the increasing control over flows of value and wealth by Northern corporations from their commanding positions within international networks. Southern productivity needs to be contextualised from this perspective given the risk that climate negotiations lock in the subordination of Southern countries within these global networks, rather than seeking ways for Southern producers to leverage more value for the output and carbon emissions they are already producing. Third, population and labour transitions in the South place relatively greater pressure than in the past on employment generation in tertiary (service) sectors, in which distributive and redistributive processes play essential roles in bolstering labour demand. The neglect of global redistribution could undermine the capacity of Southern countries to face these broader development challenges, which are already immense even in the absence of decarbonisation. A key question is how to organise global redistributive transfers in a manner that does not continue to subordinate Southern populations to Northern interests. The challenge for decarbonisation is the forging of a political will for redistribution that is motivated by climate change rather than geopolitics, and that respects national ownership and self-determination.

The existing literature shows that transparency and monitoring reduce trade costs, improve regulatory practices and build and sustain trust. In this paper, using 555 specific trade concerns (STCs) raised by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee in the period 1995–2018, we develop a novel classification of STCs. We distinguish between STCs aiming to exchange information (transparency STCs) and those aiming to monitor compliance with the TBT agreement (monitoring STCs). We show that: (i) when STCs intend to foster transparency, they are mainly used in relation to notified measures, thus suggesting that they are used to acquire not only new but also higher quality information than that provided merely by notifications; (ii) when STCs intend to challenge the compliance of WTO members with the TBT Agreement, they primarily address draft measures, thus suggesting that they are used to promote accountability and improve good regulatory practices; and (iii) STCs raised at the draft stage are less likely to escalate to a dispute than those raised on adopted measures. Guided by these findings, we suggest the potential for some reforms to improve the efficiency of the system. These include: introducing a reporting system on the outcome of STCs; using STCs raised in committees to fill the gap of missing notifications; systematically using the STC mechanism at the stage of draft measures; and building in the dispute settlement system the requirement to raise the matter and discuss it within the relevant committee before filing a formal dispute settlement case.

The Latin American debt crisis consumed the 1980s and was not restricted to Latin America. Starting from the August 1982 Mexican weekend, the crisis had three phases: Concerted Lending (1982-5), Baker Plan (1985-9) and Brady Plan (1989 to mid 1990s). This article describes the evolution of the debt strategy and the road to embracing debt write-downs at the end of the decade. In the absence of an external coordinating mechanism, four groups of parties had to reach agreement on any change in the strategy: the borrowing countries, their commercial bank lenders, the home-country authorities of those lenders, and the International Monetary Fund as the principal international institution. Each group could effectively veto any change in the strategy. This need for consensus is lesson number one from the 1980s for today. Lesson number two is that political economy aspects dictated that the strategy be implemented on a case-by-case basis. The article concludes with an application of these lessons to a similar, but even more global, potential debt crisis in the wake of the COVID pandemic.

We look at the effect of the WTO on stabilizing international trade using both a fixed-effects and an event study approach. Our results show that WTO members experience lower trade volatilties in a predictable and integrated system. In addition, we focus on the trade volatility comovement among countries in a multilateral framework. Previous research has mainly focused on WTO membership in a bilateral trade framework, which only allows interactions between two trade partners without considering any possible influence from other countries. A bilateral trade framework does not fully capture the effect of WTO membership, nor does it investigate why the multilateral platform of the WTO should exist. With a unique setup estimating interactions among multiple trading dyads, we find strong evidence supporting positive correlation or comovement of trade volatilities across trading pairs. Such a comovement appears much stronger among WTO members than between WTO and non-WTO members. Due to the feedback mechanism among dyads in a multilateral framework, such as the WTO, bilateral trade stability may further stabilize the global trade. Our results remain robust to a battery of sensitivity checks.

To what extent is the Euro Area common business cycle affected by the inclusion of the UK into this group? To answer this question, a semi-structural model estimated by the Kalman filter, which is robust to outliers and structural breaks, is used. We look at the correlations between business cycles taking potential phase shifts into account. On the one hand, a finding — coherent with existing literature — is that adding the UK to the euro group lowers correlations within the group. On the other hand, the UK cycle is increasingly linked to the Euro Area business cycle and has statistical properties that do not differ substantially from the Euro Area cycles.

Membership in the monetary union imposes higher demands on factor market flexibility, since neither the exchange rate nor monetary policies can be used to deal with country-specific shocks. In this paper we assess the ability of the twelve new EU member states (NMS-12) to dampen the impact of shocks by means of macroeconomic wage flexibility. Following the structural VAR approach elaborated in Moore and Pentecost (2006), real wage flexibility is measured by the responsiveness of real wages to real (permanent) and nominal (temporary) shocks. The analysis of Moore and Pentecost (2006) is extended in three ways: by employing a new Eurostat labour cost data set covering 1996Q1 to 2007Q3, by using a large sample of 24 EU member countries, and by assessing the sensitivity of the results to the sample length. We find evidence of heterogeneous real wage adjustment across the new as well as the mature EU economies. Overall, the degree of real wage flexibility in the NMS-12 lies within the bounds of the corresponding values for the Euro Area ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ member countries.