Members of the ethnic majority tend to view immigrants and ethnic minorities as less willing to contribute to the collective. Why is this the case? I argue that in Europe, ethnic attributes signal citizens’ socioeconomic resources, cultural values, and norm compliance and that these factors, rather than ethnic identities per se, explain why citizens are expected (not) to contribute. Through a novel conjoint experimental design in Denmark that manipulated respondents’ access to information about these different mechanisms, the argument finds support. First, in information-sparse environments, ethnic majority members expect that minority members contribute substantially less to the provision of public goods than majority members. Second, this ethnic bias is reduced by each of the three mechanisms and explained away once information on all three is available. This demonstrates that negative expectations toward minorities operate through multiple, complementary channels and that stereotype-countering information can reduce the majority-minority expectation gap.

Two rationales have emerged for why individuals keep their promises: (a) an emotional commitment to keep actions and words consistent, a commitment rationale and (b) avoidance of guilt due to not meeting the expectations of the promisee, an expectations rationale. We propose a new dichotomy with clearer distinctions between rationales: (1) an internal consistency rationale, which is the desire to keep actions and words consistent regardless of others’ awareness of the promise and (2) a communication rationale, which captures all aspects of promise keeping that are associated with the promisee having learned of the promise, including but not limited to promisee expectations. Using an experiment that manipulates whether promises are delivered, we find no support for the internal consistency rationale; only delivered promises are relevant. In a second experiment designed to better understand what aspect of promise delivery influences promisor behavior, we manipulate whether the promise is delivered before or after the promisee is able to take a trusting action. We find late-arriving promises are relevant though not as relevant as promises delivered before the promisee chooses whether to take the trusting action. We conclude that implicit contracting does not fully explain promise keeping, because had it done so, late-arriving promises would also be irrelevant.

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator's preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure's rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.

This paper analyzes if men and women are expected to behave differently regarding altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave differently. Moreover, while women believe that women are more generous, men consider that women are as generous as men.

Central banks are increasingly communicating their economic outlook in an effort to manage the public and financial market participants’ expectations. We provide original causal evidence that the information communicated and the assumptions underlying a central bank’s projection can matter for expectation formation and aggregate stability. Using a between-subject design, we systematically vary the central bank’s projected forecasts in an experimental macroeconomy where subjects are incentivized to forecast the output gap and inflation. Without projections, subjects exhibit a wide range of heuristics, with the modal heuristic involving a significant backward-looking component. Ex-Ante Rational dual projections of the output gap and inflation significantly reduce the number of subjects’ using backward-looking heuristics and nudge expectations in the direction of the rational expectations equilibrium. Ex-Ante Rational interest rate projections are cognitively challenging to employ and have limited effects on the distribution of heuristics. Adaptive dual projections generate unintended inflation volatility by inducing boundedly-rational forecasters to employ the projection and model-consistent forecasters to utilize the projection as a proxy for aggregate expectations. All projections reduce output gap disagreement but increase inflation disagreement. Central bank credibility is significantly diminished when the central bank makes larger forecast errors when communicating a relatively more complex projection. Our findings suggest that inflation-targeting central banks should strategically ignore agents’ irrationalities when constructing their projections and communicate easy-to-process information.

We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.

Guerini and Moneta (2017) have developed a sophisticated method of providing empirical evidence in support of the relations of causal dependence that macroeconomists engaging in agent-based modelling believe obtain in the target system of their models. The paper presents three problems that get in the way of successful applications of this method: problems that have to do with the potential chaos of the target system, the non-measurability of variables standing for individual or aggregate expectations, and the failure of macroeconomic aggregates to screen off individual expectations from the microeconomic quantities that constitute the aggregates. The paper also discusses the in-principle solvability of the three problems and uses a prominent agent-based model (the Keynes + Schumpeter model of the macroeconomy) as a running example.

According to the “miracle of aggregation” principle, in the absence of systematic biases, errors in individual judgments within a population should cancel each other out and lead to a correct decision at the aggregate level. This article explores potential individual- and group-level correlates of the accuracy of citizens’ electoral expectations and investigates how potential markers of political sophistication—namely, educational attainment and political interest—could be used to improve upon the raw aggregation of citizens’ forecasts using massive survey datasets collected during six Canadian national and provincial election campaigns between 2011 and 2022 (n = 279,003). We find that while educational attainment and interest increase the probability of a correct forecast at the individual level, delegating the forecasting task based on these variables does not necessarily lead to improvements in the accuracy of aggregate-level predictions. At the group level, we fail to uncover any evidence that sociological or informational diversity increases forecasting accuracy.

Expectations-based reference dependence has been shown to be important across a variety of contexts in Psychology and Economics. Do expectations play a role in moral judgment? The higher our beliefs are relative to an outcome, do we punish more harshly? This paper reports a series of experiments investigating the hypothesis that expectations as reference points per se affect punishment. The experimental design varies the expectation the Punisher holds just before she learns what actually occurred. In tandem with the manipulation, expectations are shown to vary significantly and substantially. However, punishment does not respond to these exogenous changes in expectations. After 17 sessions, 295 Punishers, and six experimental setups, expectations are shown not to affect punishment in any systematic way.

Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.

This essay is in celebration of the contributions of Mario Rizzo. I argue that among contemporary economists in the Austrian School of Economics tradition it is Rizzo that advanced, more than his contemporaries, the scientific research program of rational choice as if the choosers were human beings; the dynamic subjectivism and the agony of choice and social interaction; the causal processes and the institutional dynamics that make up a complex social order; and the role of law, politics and civil society in shaping commercial life. In making this argument, I attempt to arbitrage the contributions of two essays of Rizzo’s: ‘Law Amid Flux’ and ‘The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory’.

According to the theory of guilt aversion, agents suffer a psychological cost whenever they fall short of other people’s expectations. In this paper, we suggest that there may be limits to this kind of motivation. We present evidence from an experimental dictator game showing that behavior is consistent with guilt aversion for relatively low levels of recipient expectations, roughly up to the point where the recipient expects half of the available surplus. Beyond that point the relationship between expectations and transfers becomes negative. Moreover, we examine this relationship at the individual level and establish a typology of subjects depending on how and whether they condition their behavior on recipient expectations.

Tourism wildlife interactions are controversial, the debate hinging largely on the compromised welfare of the animals used. Despite this, lion cub (Panthera leo) interactions are popular, and there is a need to understand what motivates interactors to participate in the activity, their perceptions and expectations. We surveyed the attitudes of 300 visitors to three lion cub interaction facilities in South Africa. Whilst 38% of interactors were aware of the controversy around lion cub interactions, 69% desired the experience regardless. It is widely assumed that lion cub interaction opportunities are big attractions, yet 74% of respondents said that they would still have visited if lion cub interactions were not offered. Whilst 84% of interactors felt that their expectations were met, 61% said that the interaction had no impact on them. Several of those interviewed interacted with multiple species, and 34% determined that their favourite engagement was with animals that interacted back voluntarily. Most of those interviewed chose the interaction for their children (69%). Whilst 58% felt the experience was educational, only 2% of these had learnt about the plight of lions in the wild. When asked to reflect on the welfare of the lion cubs they had interacted with, ‘Freedom from discomfort’ was seen as the most important factor, as well as ‘Freedom to express natural behaviour’. Interactions were viewed with a variety of emotions and generated a range of beliefs. We conclude that the findings can be used by facilities to better prepare visitors for the experience, ensuring that interaction animals are better able to serve in their role as ambassador representatives.

This paper evaluates (i) the transmission of global uncertainty shocks to the expectations of professionals and disagreement among them and (ii) the relevance of policy choices in open economies in the context of the impossible trinity. Relying on a large set of survey data covering a wide range of expected macroeconomic outcomes for 33 countries, we establish evidence for an expectation channel of global uncertainty shocks. Global uncertainty exerts significant and adverse effects on expectations over domestic macroeconomic outcomes across the board and also frequently spills over to disagreement over these outcomes, increasing domestic uncertainty. Finally, we identify nonlinear relationships between the policy choices in an open economy and the transmission of uncertainty shocks. Policy choices affect the expected downswing in GDP in the aftermath of uncertainty shocks, the expected response of monetary policy, and the exchange rate and disagreement over future macroeconomic outcomes.

This paper distinguishes news about short-lived events from news about changes in longer term prospects using surveys of expectations. Employing a multivariate GARCH-in-Mean model for the US, the paper illustrates how the different types of news influence business cycle dynamics. The influence of transitory output shocks can be relatively large on impact but gradually diminishes over two to three years. Permanent shocks drive the business cycle, generating immediate stock price reactions and gradually building output effects, although they have more immediate output effects during recessions through the uncertainties they create. Markedly different macroeconomic dynamics are found if these explicitly identified types of news or uncertainty feedbacks are omitted from the analysis.

Is it possible to exploit cognitive biases so that a non-professional taster prefers one wine to several other absolutely identical wines? To address this question, three complementary experiments were carried out. Each time, five wines were tasted blind in a tasting laboratory by 24 to 34 tasters. Converging evidence from the experiments shows that participants were not capable of identifying that some of the wines they were tasting were absolutely identical. Moreover, the results show that by providing information about the wines’ ratings, prices, or reputation, tasters’ expectations can be modified, and, as a result, their evaluations of the wines can be altered. Specifically, we show that it is possible to modify the ranking between different wines and to get tasters to prefer a wine over other absolutely identical wines. Finally, a surprising finding was that experienced tasters express stronger opinions and adapt their evaluations more strongly after being given manipulative information on the wines they taste.

The impact of employment protection legislation has been thoroughly analyzed in varied contexts. Most studies highlight the potential harm of the legislation on labor outcomes, although evidence remains inconclusive. However, the literature has focused primarily on ex post impacts, analyzing the regulation’s effect after implementation. This article departs from that analysis to focus on anticipated or ex ante effects of labor regulation. More specifically, we study the role of firms’ expectations in future stricter labor legislation related to employment and income in Peru’s formal and informal labor market. To account for expectations, we used the number of news items related to the approval of a proposed law—the General Labor Law—to increase labor rigidities in Lima’s most important business newspaper. Using the Peruvian labor survey, we find a negative but decreasing relationship between firms’ expectations of a future stricter labor market and employment and average income. We also collect evidence that bigger news items and ones closer to the front page have a negative relationship with formal employment and income.

In natural conversation, multiple factors likely impact the social force of a sociolinguistic variant, yet researchers have tended to examine individual factors in isolation. This paper considers two underexamined factors together—the role of a variable's internal constraints and the role of stylistically congruent surrounding speech—to understand their combined influence on how a single variable's realization is socially interpreted. Focusing on English variable (ING), two accent rating experiments used stimuli varying the grammatical category of (ING) words and varying the stylistic congruence (natural sentences versus spliced stimuli) between (ING) realization and sentence frames. Results indicate that listeners showed sensitivity to (ING)'s internal constraints but only when the congruence between (ING)'s realization and other cues was not disrupted by using spliced stimuli. These findings suggest that internal constraints and stylistic congruence play a role in social signaling, and have methodological implications for the use of splicing.