In this study, we focus on European immigration attitudes in the perspective of deservingness perceptions and political orientation. Our data are conducted from the European Social Survey (2016) database, which contains 21 European countries and 39,400 participants. We used the multilevel method to study the relationship between immigration attitudes and deservingness perceptions. The results demonstrate that the more negative deservingness perceptions are, the more negative immigration attitudes more likely become. Moreover, country-level political orientation moderate the relationship between immigration attitudes and deservingness perceptions. Deservingness perceptions have a greater role in explaining immigration attitudes on countries with political left-context, which gives us a new perspective to understand the public debates about immigration.

Populist supporters have been found to take cues from populist incumbents. Yet, little is known about how they incorporate party cues in their political beliefs when populists are in office. This research note argues that (1) citizens who identify with populist parties engage in partisan motivated reasoning – that is, they are driven by the desire to be consistent with their partisan allegiances – and that (2) they engage in partisan motivated reasoning more intensely than their non-populist counterparts because populist party cues strongly prompt them to process biased information. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey, it is evidenced that populist supporters express much warmer economic views when their parties hold power. Warm economic views are also found to increase significantly more in accordance with strength of partisanship and exposure to political information for populist supporters than for non-populist supporters when their respective parties govern. Results highlight a mechanism by which populist incumbents are likely to remain attractive despite their poor economic record. They have implications for our understanding of the mainstreaming of populist parties in Europe.

This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey, our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.

Normative democratic theory assumes that political systems should ensure civil, political and social rights, and this claim has become more salient since the economic crisis that began in 2008. This conception of citizenship was developed most prominently by T.H. Marshall (1950), and it has been further elaborated by numerous other authors, resulting in a clear division between procedural/electoral democracy concepts and authors emphasizing egalitarian concepts of democracy. We use latent class analysis to assess democratic ideals among European citizens as reported in the 2012 European Social Survey. The findings demonstrate that a majority of Europeans consider political and social rights as equally important, while some citizens predominantly emphasize either political or social rights. Furthermore, the focus on social rights is not limited to those with left-leaning ideologies. Considering current manifestations of discontent about the politics of austerity, we discuss the implications of social citizenship concepts for democratic legitimacy in Europe.

How do citizens evaluate democracy? Previous literature trying to address this question has often relied on single indicators to assess citizens’ assessment of democracy. This article contributes to this debate by using multiple indicators measuring different attributes to find a summary measure of citizens’ evaluations of democracy. Using the special module of the sixth round of the European Social Survey ‘Europeans’ understandings and evaluations of democracy’ and applying Bayesian factor analysis with country random effects, this article tests whether multiple indicators form an underlying trait measuring citizens’ evaluations of democracy. It finds the scores of this measure at the individual and country levels and validates this measure against other measures built at the system level, including the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ indicator, also illustrating its functioning as a dependent and an independent variable.

The paper analyses how perceptions of government quality – in terms of impartiality and efficiency – impact on attitudes to taxes and social spending. It builds on data from the European Social Survey 2008 from 29 European countries. The paper shows a large degree of congruence between expert-based judgments and the general public's perceptions of the quality of government. It also shows that the quality of government has a clear, independent effect on attitudes to taxes and spending, so that people who perceive institutions as efficient and fair want higher taxes and spending. But government quality also conditions the impact of egalitarianism on attitudes to taxes and spending: in high-quality-of-government egalitarianism has a clearly stronger impact on these attitudes. It is concluded that government quality is an important and so far neglected factor in explaining attitudes to welfare policies.

Background: National attitudes towards the elderly and their association with elderly suicide mortality in 26 European countries were assessed, and Eastern and Western European countries compared.

Methods: For each country, mean age-adjusted, gender-specific elderly suicide rates in the last five years for which data had been available were obtained from the WHO European Mortality Database. Questions about citizens’ attitudes towards the elderly were taken from the European Social Survey. Correlations between attitudes and suicide rates were analyzed using Pearson's test. Differences between mean scores for Western and Eastern European attitudes were calculated, and data on labor-market exit ages were obtained from the EUROSTAT database.

Results: Perception of the elderly as having higher status, recognition of their economic contribution and higher moral standards, and friendly feelings towards and admiration of them are inversely correlated with suicide mortality. Suicide rates are lower in countries where the elderly live with their families more often. Elderly suicide mortality and labor-market exit age are inversely correlated. In Eastern European countries, elderly people's status and economic contribution are seen as less important. Western Europeans regard the elderly with more admiration, consider them more friendly and more often have elderly relatives in the family. The data also show gender differences.

Conclusions: Society's attitudes influence elderly suicide mortality; attitudes towards the elderly are more favorable among Western European citizens; and extended labor-market inclusion of the elderly is a suicide-protective factor.