Since the election of Aleksandar Vučić and the Progressives, Serbia has witnessed a slow decline in media freedom, which scholars such as Subotić (2017) argue has been worse than in the 1990s. Although the government had adopted a package of three laws in August 2014 to bring the media landscape up to European standards, the implementation of the laws has been limited and marginal, with the Progressives engaging in fake compliance. The adoption of the new media strategy 2020–2025 in 2020 has not led to genuine domestic reform and compliance to EU conditionality. In fact, the EU Commission and journalists’ associations in Serbia have criticized the decline in Serbia’s media freedom, citing continued attacks on journalists and indirect political and economic control through advertising and project co-financing, which continue to be features of the Serbian media landscape. In the absence of clear and credible EU conditionality, the decline of media freedom is in the eye of the beholder, where the gap between public engagements with Serbian politicians and the critical stance of progress reports regarding the degradation of the media have enabled Serbian elites to exploit this ambiguity to continue their strategy of fake compliance vis-à-vis rule of law.

This article undertakes a critical revisitation of mass–elite congruence on EU matters, taking stock of 30 years of research and addressing durable ambiguities flagged by recent scholarship. Its specific contribution leverages EUEngage elite and mass survey data gathered in 2016 in 10 European countries. Examining congruence at both the country and the party level, we carry out an uncommon multidimensional analysis that encompasses general European integration and certain key sub-dimensions. At both levels, we perform a distinctive systematization of multiple approaches to the assessment of EU issue congruence, probing the substantive consistency of ensuing results. The findings qualify and soften the conventional wisdom of a chasm between pro-European elites and lukewarm citizens. While most countries exhibit pro-EU elite bias in terms of averages and proportions alike, mass–elite alignment is the rule when the general dimension and its sub-dimensions are understood as binary. Party-level analyses display different outcomes, depending on whether party positions are derived from elites' self-placement or their voters' perceptions, yet discrepancies are generally lower than in past assessments. Altogether, ‘constraining dissensus’ chiefly emerges along sub-dimensions concerning decision-making authority, as opposed to sub-dimensions evoking solidarity and burden-sharing. The layered panorama of congruence and incongruence implies a dependence of mass–elite interplays on context and sub-dimensions, drawing attention to the mediating role of critical junctures and elite entrepreneurship.

Despite promises by European Union (EU) policymakers to “fundamentally change” cybersecurity certification, they have recently created a regime that is strikingly similar to already existing certification arrangements. How can we explain this puzzle? Through a process-tracing analysis based on 41 documents and 18 interviews, this article traces the development of the EU cybersecurity certification regime over the past two decades. It deconstructs certification into standardisation, accreditation, certification, and evaluation; analyses how each regime component changed over time; and discusses to what extent causal mechanisms that are derived from classic theories of EU integration explain the limited nature of policy change. The observed dynamics uncover a “Europeanization on Demand” model that allows national authorities to completely control the extent of integration. This study challenges the dichotomous understanding portrayed by EU integration literature, of mutually exclusive dynamics of market or core state powers integration, highlighting intriguing political dynamics in EU cybersecurity policymaking.

This article analyzes the politicization of European integration in Italy. Has the euro crisis catalyzed a new electoral supply, which may have been matched by voters’ responses? After the crisis, Italian parties have increased their entrepreneurial efforts to prime EU issues into the political debate, trying to win over votes. This pattern may have led to a full politicization of European integration. To study the transformations in party strategies and voting behavior, I analyze the fluctuations in EU issue entrepreneurship and EU issue voting between 2009 and 2014. The findings reveal mixed results: parties have actually developed new strategies on EU issues, but without significantly changing voter preferences along the pro/anti-European dimension.

This article explains variation in the quality of representation in the context of European Parliament elections. Specifically, it clarifies how voters relate to political parties on the issue of European integration and whether they are represented, misrepresented, or indifferent to this issue. The analysis shows that perceived benefits of European integration do drive a perfect voter-party match while perceived costs, when high, drive a perfect match between Eurosceptic voters and likeminded parties and make voters less indifferent. The analysis draws attention to the high number of status quo voters who, in the absence of a party with similar views, could channel their vote towards a party promoting integration, but only if their knowledge about the EU and its benefits increases.

European migrant citizens and their social rights are strongly contested in British political debate. This article seeks to challenge some common concerns and perceptions regarding the exceptionality of the British welfare state and the alleged ‘costs’ to it from intra-EU migration. The article first provides a brief overview of the foundations for EU citizenship and associated social rights, highlighting the semi-sovereign nature of welfare states in the European Union. It then (i) rejects the significance of the often-claimed difference between contributory and non-contributory welfare states in the context of EU migration; and (ii) challenges concerns about the costs of EU migration. The article contrasts the experiences of Britain and Germany. It concludes by considering how concerns often associated with EU migration can be addressed by improving administrative and state capacities.

The institutional architecture of the European Union is based on two fundamentally competing ideas: supranational rule and national sovereignty. These two underlying ideas are not reconcilable and work at different levels in the background of the policy debate. While on the normative level public sentiments remain strongly linked to the idea of state autonomy, on the cognitive level the paradigm of a functional necessity to cooperate is decisive for actual policy making. Only in some policy domains, such as the single market program, have policy-makers attempted to re-couple normative and cognitive ideas. In contrast to this, the central argument is that policy-makers mostly adhere to an alternative strategy: the systematic decoupling of normative and cognitive ideas. Focusing on public administration, it is shown how deft policy instrumentation allows actors to realize program ideas that satisfy demands for increased supranational governance. At the same time, however, these instruments are in dissonance with how policies are framed against the background of public sentiments that assume domestic bureaucratic independence.

The European Union (EU) and the antebellum US represent attempts to overcome anarchy without substituting hierarchy. Understood as ‘states unions’, these two systems are shown here to share foundational indeterminacy over sovereignty and the constitution of the people (i.e. the boundaries of the political community). Existing scholarship appreciates the EU's resulting democratic deficit but fails to problematize how dual ambiguity is sustained. The contrast between both states unions is used to probe this mutually constitutive relationship between sovereignty and democracy in an anti-hierarchical order. Defining the boundaries of the people by invoking popular sovereignty led in the antebellum, the paper argues, to a bifurcated debate over where the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy resided, destroying ambiguity. The contrast further shows that the EU has avoided the development of such rival, mutually exclusive constitutional visions that seek to make the people and sovereignty congruent at either the unit or union level. Instead, the EU has sustained dual constitutional ambiguity by allowing for multiple accountability claims reliant on overlapping notions of the people. Democratizing international cooperation thus should focus on the form democratic accountability can take rather than seeking to use popular sovereignty to establish some decision-making level where sovereignty and the people are congruent.