The Macedonia name dispute was resolved in 2018 with the signing of the Prespa Agreement. Ambassador Nimetz – one of the key players in the solution efforts – queried recently “Why did it take us so long?”, echoing the confusion of foreign observers about what has routinely been seen as an incomprehensible spat. This article provides more context about the past intractability of the dispute by focusing on the role of Greek public opinion. Taking stock of the literature on the relationship between foreign policy-making and public opinion, our analysis identifies key parameters for investigating the influence of Greek public opinion on policy. We test these parameters against empirical data from a comprehensive poll on the name dispute that was conducted in 2016, only a few months before the start of the negotiations that led to the Prespa Agreement. Our analysis demonstrates the extent and depth of the Greek public’s opposition to any compromise, as well as the emotional involvement in the Macedonia name dispute. The findings have implications for our understanding of the process that led to the settlement of the dispute as well as the challenges of implementing the agreement.

This article analyses the impact of mobility on sending CEE countries after the biggest EU enlargement of 2004 with some reference to the EU enlargement of 2007. It is presented on the fifteenth anniversary of the biggest historical EU enlargement with a disclaimer that economic and social changes are still enduring. The aim of this article is to explain the interlinked economic and social impacts of EU enlargements on CEE sending countries relating to: GDP, wages, economic remittances, welfare systems and employment, human capital (tangible and intangible), social remittances and social mobility. It is proved here, that exploring and exploiting the complex catalogue of available arguments and findings across CEE countries, EU enlargements can be seen as outcomes of a set of top-down public policies with their regulation (EU law), distribution (four freedoms) and redistribution functions (EU funds) along with bottom-up activities and developments of migrants themselves.

Contrary to expectations, the EU’s eastward expansion in 2004 did not sound the death knoll of nationalism in the region; rather, it signalled its reinvention and, in some respects, reinvigoration. In this paper, we examine three ways in which nationalism has been redefined in Hungary and Poland in the context of EU enlargement. First, consensus on the desirability of European unification has lessened the importance of left/right party divisions; in its place, the “nation” has provided a fulcrum for inter-party contestation. Second, EU integration has provided nationalists in the region with a backdoor for realising old nationalist ambitions of national reunification across the porous borders of the EU. Third, we examine the way radical nationalist organisations in Hungary and Poland increasingly define themselves in opposition to the EU.

One of the most important activities of the European Union (EU) has been widening the Union, that is, enlargement. Tapping to what extent and why EU citizens support future enlargement rounds has become a popular endeavour among researchers and EU officials. During recent years, a number of studies have indicated that public support for EU integration is likely to also depend on how the national news media portray the EU. Based on an experimental survey design, we test the effects of two news frames on support for future Serbian EU candidacy. We find that exposure to news frames has considerable impact on general understanding of Serbian EU candidacy, issue interpretation, and policy support. This effect is moderated by political knowledge. Knowledgeable participants were able to express their thoughts on Serbian EU candidacy more elaborately, whereas low-knowledge individuals were overall more susceptible to framing effects. We discuss the implications of our findings for current debates such as Euroskepticism and decreasing public support for EU integration.

In the last two decades, post-communist states experienced a fascinatingpolitical journey, from using the rule of law concept in the most general way asan early signal of the coming constitutional and political transformation, tospecifically (as EU Member States) addressing the problem of the supremacy of EUlaw and its effect on emerging national democracy and constitutionalsovereignty. In other words, they moved from asking the question‘which rule of law?’ to the question ‘the rule ofwhich law?’

This move itself indicates the capacity of the rule of law, which is discussed inthis article, to operate as a political ideal and a power technique at the sametime. This duality of the rule of law operations will be outlined against thebackground of the process of European integration and its challenges to thetraditional constitutional notions of sovereignty and legal unity. I shall arguethat post-communist states initially had to embrace the substantive concept ofthe rule of law drawing on liberal and democratic values, which became a validticket for ‘The Return to Europe’ journey. However, the veryprocess of European integration involved technical uses of law often challengingthe substantive notion of the democratic rule of law and constitutionalism. Theaccession of post-communist states to the EU thus highlights the Union's moregeneral problem and intrinsic tension between instrumental legitimacy byoutcomes and substantive legitimacy by democratic procedures and values.

Corporate governance codes have recently been adopted by most of the European markets. Stock markets in Eastern Central Europe, with their weak governance mechanisms and practices, are trying to follow suit. However, drafting such codes may be a much more challenging task in this part of Europe than elsewhere, due to the existence of powerful interest groups and an underdeveloped corporate environment (immature institutional investors, ineffective shareholder activism and a lack of government interest in corporate governance). This paper provides some insights into various governance problems related to the drafting of a ‘private’ corporate governance code for Polish listed corporations. In particular, it focuses on supervisory boards and explains how they should be structured to gain credibility without clashing with blockholder interests. This paper argues that the soft proposition (i.e. independent members should account for less than half the members of supervisory boards) can bring about more far-reaching result, as it takes account of real market conditions. Regrettably, the strong proposition, which is employed in the official code of the Warsaw Stock Exchange, may produce fewer benefits or even fail under the criticism of blockholders. Polish corporate governance dilemmas are common to most of Eastern Central Europe. The solutions presented in this paper may therefore also be useful to code drafters in other countries. This paper strongly advocates that there should be the establishment of an open market for codes that allows companies to choose the best and most suitable governance arrangements. NGOs could play an important role in such a market by stimulating competition, establishing benchmarks and enforcing mechanisms like ratings.