This is a case study of Guatemala’s judicial system, initially designed to be a pluralist model in 1984. However, it is now captured by political entrepreneurs who are undermining liberal democracy. The research warns about similar risks in other young democracies and explains the pitfalls of judicial councils and capturable courts. Although judiciaries are now seen as safeguards against authoritarianism, this study demonstrates how they can be subverted. Unlike authoritarian populists who weaken judicial institutions through popular support, this case shows how entrepreneurs rely on intimidation and capture. Using data of the growth of lawyers, I propose the entrepreneurs outnumbered the elites committed to democracy and captured the nomination process in favor of uncommitted elites leading to democratic backsliding.

How does the mass public form attitudes on electoral rules and reforms? Existing research on this question reveals a trade-off between principles, such as fairness, and partisan self-interest. I use two survey experiments on state legislative redistricting to explore how voters weigh principles against partisan self-interest when forming opinions on electoral reforms. First, I ask whether the public’s partisan self-interest motivation stems more from individual representation considerations or broader partisan power considerations. I find that both considerations provide a powerful enough incentive to activate partisan self-interest regarding preferences for state legislative district maps. Unexpectedly, the two considerations have quite similar effects on public support for redistricting reforms. Second, I explore the principles versus partisan self-interest trade-off through the lens of loss aversion, a concept developed in behavioral economics. In line with expectations, I find that preventing loss provides a more powerful incentive for Americans to violate democratic principles than achieving partisan gain. In sum, this research sheds light on voters’ decision between principles and partisan self-interest in the formation of opinion on electoral reform.

In this essay, we bridge the gap between two understandings of the power of the European Union (EU): as a normative actor, guided by ethical principles and empowered by the internal market, and as a geopolitical actor, building its own military capabilities and ready to defend its interests through deterrence and defense. In view of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we challenge the established “values vs. interests” dichotomy and argue that defending liberal democratic values is an essential foundation of the EU's existing and potential geopolitical power. We show how, over the last decade, opting for short-term expediency and capitulating to a kind of realpolitik “regime indifference” in dealings with authoritarian regimes at home and abroad have severely weakened the EU and also diminished Ukraine's capacities to defend itself as it fights for these shared values on the battlefield. We argue that it is in the EU's strategic interest to strengthen its commitment to values-based foreign and defense policies, revive a meritocratic and credible enlargement process, and work with the United States to provide more effective military assistance to Ukraine in its fight for liberal democratic values and a rules-based European security order.

International courts are increasingly serving as bulwarks of democracy. These courts, however, often depend on the cooperation of the very governments they seek to hold accountable, exposing them to potential retaliation for attempting to constrain their behavior. As governments’ response to adverse decision-making is often conditional on public support, we explore whether citizens actually support international courts’ judicial power over questions of democracy. We argue that citizens’ support for this form of judicial power depends on their democratic values and their desire for institutional checks and balances against the executive. Furthermore, we contest that this support is conditional on partisanship, with this relationship holding for opposition partisans while government partisans are generally opposed to international courts’ judicial power. We support our expectations using original survey data collected from Hungary before their 2022 national legislative elections, and examining citizens’ support for judicial power for the Court of Justice of the European Union.

How can autonomous apex courts with specific attitudes and role conceptions counter executive aggrandizement? This article theorizes two causal mechanisms through which justices can resist democratic erosion. The first mechanism involves apex courts employing judicial review to neutralize autocratic legalism by blocking strategies such as institutional conversion, replacement, and layering that executives use to expand their power. The second involves apex courts building coalitions within and beyond the judiciary, enabling diverse actors – including judges, political parties, the media, and NGOs – to leverage their unique resources against executive encroachment. I conceptualize these two mechanisms by combining theory-building process tracing with counterfactual analysis of an unlikely case of democratic resilience: Argentina from 2007 to 2015. Drawing on evidence from 125 elite interviews, over a thousand newspaper articles, hundreds of state documents, memoirs, and other primary sources, this article demonstrates how the Supreme Court nullified President Cristina Kirchner’s attempts to undermine freedom of expression and judicial independence, thereby contributing to democratic resilience.

Despite a long history of research on democratic backsliding, the process itself − in which the executive branch amasses power and undermines democratic processes and institutions − remains poorly understood. We seek to shed light on the underlying mechanisms by studying democratic near misses: cases in which a period of autocratic governance is quickly reversed or full backsliding is prevented at the last minute. Building on the literature on near misses in sociotechnical systems such as nuclear power plants, we adapt the drift-to-danger model to the study of democratic systems. Two key findings emerge: First, democratic backsliding is often triggered by political elites pushing the boundaries of their power by violating norms, which are crucial yet vulnerable safeguards for democracy. Second, democratic backsliding is unpredictable and non-linear, being driven by the interaction between political elites and the public. Norm-violating elites may feel legitimized by a supportive public that sees norm violations as justified. At the same time, political elites may signal that norm-violating behaviour is acceptable, potentially leading the public to adopt anti-democratic beliefs and behaviours. We identify risk factors that make norm violations more likely and outline behavioural sciences-based interventions to address these violations.

When democracy is under attack, the hope is often that citizens will punish undemocratic incumbents. However, recent studies show that not all citizens punish governments for their undemocratic actions. In this article, we argue that citizens' understanding of and satisfaction with democracy are sources of heterogeneous reactions. In a survey experiment conducted in Germany and Poland, we show that the importance that citizens attach to specific institutions under threat, as well as their understanding of democracy, can explain much of the variance in citizens' responses to undemocratic actions. Citizens are willing to defend what they consider important for democracy – regardless of whether this reflects theoretical conceptions of democracy. Moreover, in times of democratic backsliding, Polish ‘critical citizens’, those who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Poland, are more likely to punish governments for undemocratic actions. Our findings help us understand how to increase citizens' resilience against democratic backsliding.

Political polarization is a systemic-level and multifaceted process that severs cross-cutting ties and shifts perceptions of politics to a zero-sum game. When it turns pernicious, political actors and supporters view opponents as an existential threat and the capacity of democratic institutions to process political conflict breaks down. The article identifies four common fault lines of polarization globally – who belongs, democracy, inequality and social contract. It argues that while Latin American countries experience, to varying degrees, all four of the fault lines, it is the deep-seated, persistent social hierarchies oriented around class, race, and place that stand out relative to other countries. Reaching consensus on reforms that may renew or reformulate agreements on the terms of the social contract, boundaries of community membership, and redressing social inequality is a tall task. Yet the region’s sustained consensus on the democratic rules of the game can provide the mechanisms for addressing this task if new majority coalitions can be formed.

Brazil, for many scholars and pundits, showcased the risk of democratic breakdown with the election of a far-right populist like Jair Bolsonaro. Against pessimistic expectations, however, not only has Brazilian democracy survived but politics has returned to business as usual. What can explain this supposedly unanticipated outcome? This article provides an analytical assessment of this this puzzle and offers an alternative explanation. We argue that both the diagnoses of Brazilian institutions and the predictions made were misguided. We explore the role played by the Supreme Court, party system, media, and congressional politics in restricting Bolsonaro’s illiberal initiatives.