The introduction offers a historical overview of terrorism through the ages and describes the development of international counterterrorism law. It discusses the interplay between terrorism and international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. It also introduces some of the controversy surrounding terrorism as a term.

No unitary definition of terrorism exists in international law and it is unlikely that States will agree upon one in the future. Chapter 1 describes how and why definitions differ in peacetime and in armed conflict and between international terrorism and domestic terrorism. Each of these scenarios evinces particularities in the contours of terrorism under international law. The chapter also explains why the United Nations Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism has not been successfully concluded.

Part II presents the definition of orthorexia nervosa and a proposal of its new definition (‘Salussitomania’) due to the inaccurate etymology of the term Orthorexia Nervosa. It includes diagnostic criteria sets for orthorexia nervosa (proposed by Setnick, 2013; Moroze et al., 2015; Barthels et al., 2015; Dunn and Bratman, 2016) to depict key features of orthorexia nervosa, global study distribution on orthorexia nervosa as well as the divergence and overlap of orthorexia nervosa and other mental disorders, namely anorexia nervosa, obsessive-compulsive disorder and avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder, to enable a differential diagnosis. A summation of the highlights is included at the end of this chapter. The commentaries of the invited international experts (Dr Caterina Novara, University of Padova, Italy and Dr Hana Zickgraf, Rogers Behavioral Health, USA) provide valuable insights on orthorexia nervosa.

‘Early Christian Philosophers on Concepts’ by George Karamanolis integrates some of the themes encountered in previous chapters into the broad theological perspective of the early Christian thinkers, according to which explorations in every area of philosophy are ultimately intended to reveal aspects of God’s relation to His creation. It is argued that the position of the early Christian philosophers on concepts is part of their perceptual realism and their stance against scepticism. Karamanolis examines three case studies: the theories of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa. In all three cases, he maintains, concepts are treated both as mental representations and semantic/linguistic items through which we grasp reality. Clement develops his view on concepts in the context of an anti-sceptical elaboration of his thesis that knowledge of the world is propositional and attainable by humans, while Origen and Gregory of Nyssa defend more sophisticated theories of concepts in connection with their respective epistemologies. In every case a theological question motivates the Christian author’s stance with regard to the nature and formation of concepts.

Most people who regularly use the Internet will be familiar with words like “misinformation,” “fake news,” “disinformation,” and maybe even “malinformation.” It can appear as though these terms are used interchangeably, and they often are. However, they don’t always refer to the same types of content, and just because a news story or social media post is false doesn’t always mean it’s problematic. To add to the confusion, not all misinformation researchers agree on the definition of the problem, or employ a unified terminology. This chapter discusses the terminology around misinformation, guided by illustrative examples of problematic news content. It also looks at what misinformation isn’t: what makes a piece of information “real” or “true”? Finally, we explore how researchers have defined misinformation and how these definitions can be categorized, before presenting the working definition that is used throughout this book.

This conclusion sets out a definitional framework for a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter according to the type theory developed in this monograph. It sets out the contextual elements of that provision and the elements of a ‘use of force’ that are identified and discussed in greater detail in earlier parts of the monograph. Finally, it offers some reflections on the legal nature of this framework and its potential as a tool for scholars and practitioners to assess whether forcible incidents meet the threshold of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law.

This introduction highlights the prevailing uncertainty regarding the meaning of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. It sets out the key research questions that this monograph addresses regarding the meaning of ‘use of force’ under jus ad bellum, including if ‘force’ means physical/armed force only and whether kinetic means or the use of particular weapons required, if a (potential) physical effect is required and the required nature of such effects, if there is a de minimis gravity threshold, and if a coercive or hostile intent is required. It also explains why the definition of prohibited force matters and its consequences under international law, including with respect to the gap between ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) and ‘armed attack’ under article 51 as well as the rise of grey zone operations. Finally, it sets out the aims and contributions of this monograph and an outline of its structure.

This chapter highlights the global wave of populism and the intense fears about democracy’s fate to which it has given rise. I explain why indeed, populism inherently threatens liberal democracy. Then I summarize my main argument, namely that this danger is often averted; consequently, populism’s effective threat is much less severe than often feared. Instead, the analysis of a comprehensive set of populist experiences in Latin America and Europe shows that under many circumstances, democracy proves resilient to populism’s threat; populist leaders manage to suffocate democracy only under special, restrictive conditions. The chapter then defines the central terms, namely democracy, democracy’s destruction, and populism; for the latter, heavily contested concept, I employ my political-strategic definition, whose conceptual validity and analytical value I thoroughly explain. Finally, I justify the study’s focus on Latin America, Europe, and the USA and preview the subsequent chapters with brief summaries of the main arguments and findings.

There are still may supporters of laissez faire and of a market that is supposed to operate efficiently and smoothly if left alone. That free market is supposed to “lift all boats” and leave everyone better off and free. However, reality indicates otherwise. Abuses of the market are common, corruption exists, rent seeking is easily observed, and differences between rich and poor grow, leading to resentment and to populist policies. It would help if the market fundamentalists were more explicit about the role that they would expect the government to play. Socialists and leftists do not seem to have any doubts. Some role is obviously needed for the government, and that role cannot remain constant over time. It is not sufficient to keep repeating that the government should stay out of the market.

The chapter explores the nature of narrative, the various definitions that are used and how we should define narrative in relation to applied research. We need to make a distinction between narratives – the stories – and narrative processes – the means by which we are able to construct and use stories. The chapter also explores the key characteristics of narratives, such as temporality and meaning. All narratives have certain key characteristics, though researchers and theoreticians do not agree on precisely what these characteristics are. Narratives must be rule-based, or we wouldn't understand each other. They must relate to characters and actions, cause and effect and occur over time. They are also changeable. For instance, we have science stories that are about current theory, but we accept that theory changes over time. This is similar to our life stories, that change as new events and new interpretations are created.

“The Sophists” generally refers to Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus, and Antiphon, as well as to a few lesser-known fifth-century figures; but why it does so, and what holds these men together, has been a matter of debate from Plato’s time to our own. Neither of the two standard explanations fit all and only these figures – the philosophical one, that they share some revolutionary epistemological outlook (for instance, relativism or anti-realism), or the sociological one, that they are primarily teachers of virtue of pay. This Introduction proposes revisiting the Sophists as celebrated instances of their time, a period of energetic intellectual discovery, experimentation, and communication. Doing so opens new questions about their continuity with their background culture as well as any distinctive interests, methods, or beliefs they might have. The Introduction goes on to discuss all early uses of the term sophistês in the fifth century (from Pindar through Thucydides) and its dominant uses in the fourth century, allowing us to see the range of kinds of people it applied to and the force with which it was applied. Then it describes the heterogeneous evidence base for Sophists and cognate figures. It concludes with a summary of the volume’s chapters.

Generations of Christians, Janet Soskice demonstrates, once knew God and Christ by hundreds of remarkable names. These included the appellations ‘Messiah’, ‘Emmanuel’, ‘Alpha’, ‘Omega’, ‘Eternal’, ‘All-Powerful’, ‘Lamb’, ‘Lion’, ‘Goat’, ‘One’, ‘Word’, ‘Serpent’ and ‘Bridegroom’. In her much-anticipated new book, Soskice argues that contemporary understandings of divinity could be transformed by a return to a venerable analogical tradition of divine naming. These ancient titles – drawn from scripture – were chanted and sung, crafted and invoked (in polyphony and plainsong) as they were woven into the worship of the faithful. However, during the sixteenth century Descartes moved from ‘naming’ to ‘defining’ God via a series of metaphysical attributes. This made God a thing among things: a being amongst beings. For the author, reclaiming divine naming is not only overdue. It can also re-energise the relationship between philosophy and religious tradition. This path-breaking book shows just how rich and revolutionary such reclamation might be.

This chapter considers what a zoo is and the role of zoos in our culture. It discusses the definition of a ‘zoo’ and the missions statements that zoos produce to explain their purpose to the public. Most zoo visitors are families, they prefer to see large animals, especially mammals, and the primary purpose of their visits is entertainment. Zoos are culturally important. They remind us of our childhood, we give our children toy animals and model zoos, and many zoos keep long-lived animals, such as gorillas and elephants, that become important personalities that we get to know over a long period of our lives. The pattern of visitation is affected by the type of zoo, time of year, weather and other factors, including differential pricing. The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant negative effect on the financial positions of zoos.