The Introduction locates the current volume initially in the context of the work of the Alexander equipe since 1997, and then more broadly in the context of visions of Alexander proffered since the work of Droysen in 1833, with particular attention to those of Berve (1926), Wilcken 1931, Tarn (1948), Schachermeyr (1949), Badian (1958–), Lane Fox 1973 and Bosworth (1980–). A response is given to the objections voiced against the approach of the activities of the equipe formulated by James Davidson in 2001 under the slogan ‘Alexanderland’. The breakdown of the book’s parts and chapters is laid out and justified, with the contents of each contribution briefly summarized. Particular attention is given to the selection of the historical sources accorded focused discussions in Part III.

Chapter 1 argues that Heidegger, like many reconstructive interpreters, takes up the main question posed by the first Critique and attempts to identify Kant’s most plausible line of response to it, consulting the claims in Kant’s text alongside Heidegger’s own beliefs. Because Heidegger seeks to attribute true claims to Kant, his method of interpretation resembles that of Davidson and Gadamer. However, Heidegger improves on their method, because he recognizes the methodological role of disagreement in coming to agree with some author, thereby making room for differences in view between interpreter and text. He argues that we should expect great thinkers to struggle with their subject matter, offering competing strands of argument as they attempt to work out their view. The interpreter, therefore, must isolate the most promising strand of argument, differentiating it from less compelling arguments. Accordingly, Heidegger offers a two-strand interpretation of Kant that differentiates an insightful line of argumentation prioritizing imagination from a less promising line prioritizing understanding. Further, Heidegger offers a theory of error explaining why Kant struggles with his subject matter: Kant retreats to his less compelling argument due to the anxiety he experiences in uncovering the fundamental structure of the human being.

Some 10,000 people of colour lived in London around 1800, and none escaped white people’s antipathy and prejudice. Thistlewood’s fellow Spencean Wedderburn and the conspirator Davidson were both born of enslaved mothers on Jamaica plantations. Long settled in England, they were mocked in person as well as in satire, though in his Soho ‘chapel’ Wedderburn returned as good as he got.Davidson’s dramatic life story was in good part invented (it is still falsely alleged that his father was Jamaica’s attorney general), but though he was latterly reduced to beggary he was fully literate and well schooled in the Bible. He was the only conspirator who went to his death in terror and penitence.

This chapter explores how Gadamer’s hermeneutics has influenced important strands of contemporary philosophy and has converged with other philosophical school of thought. Mostly importantly, this chapter considers the relation of Gadamer’s thought to the thought of Rorty and Davidson. Rorty is influenced by Gadamer. Davidson shows no direct influence but is a case of overlap and convergence. Rorty aims to show the internal exhaustion of the twentieth–century epistemological–psychological tradition. He uses criticisms from within that tradition, including Gadamer. Philosophy is seen by Rorty, much like Gadamer, to a matter of joining a conversation. Rorty’s importation of Gadamer’s hermeneutic model is not without is difficulties. Rorty embraces incommensurability and Gadamer rejects it. Gadamer attempts an ontology and Rorty rejects ontology. Rorty cites Gadamer. Davidson never does and shows no signs of being influenced by Gadamer. Yet there some remarkable convergences. Davidson’s principle of charity and the communality of understanding and interpreting align very well with Gadamer.