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Summary

The chapter analyzes whether governments signal responsiveness more broadly in the EU's legislative decision-making process. The findings suggests that the bargaining strategies and outcomes crucially depend on the electoral cycles at the domestic level. Governments that face elections signal that they are responsive to their voters: they are less likely to move from their initial bargaining position and they are more likely to achieve bargaining outcomes that are close to their ideal positions. Supporting the theoretical argument, I further find evidence that credit-claiming behavior becomes stronger when governments have ample motives and opportunities to posture. Consistent with my findings on the EU budget negotiations, governments are more likely to achieve successful bargaining outcomes when unemployment rates are high, and when they can use hidden cooperation to signal responsiveness. Whereas the likelihood of credit-claiming depends on motives and opportunities, this is not the case for position-taking and position-defending strategies.

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7 - The Legislative Leviathan Marionette

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7 - The Legislative Leviathan Marionette

Summary