This article contributes to the understanding of why states resort to targeted, or smart, sanctions to meet the threat of cyber intrusions and whether this type of response is a forced measure or an effective tool to halt, prevent and punish attacking states. The tools of analysis used in the article are legal positivism and political theories, including Mancur Olson's theory of groups and Francesco Giumelli's analytical framework for assessment of sanctions. The authors address the effectiveness of sanctions as a reaction to cyber-enabled activities through the lens of regulation introduced in the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom, which are the most developed counter-cyber sanction regimes, analysing publicly known cases of cyber-related sanctions.

As humanitarian organizations become more active in the digital domain and reliant upon new technologies, they evolve from simple bystanders to full-fledged stakeholders in cyberspace, able to build on the advantages of new technologies but also vulnerable to adverse cyber operations that can impact their capacity to protect and assist people affected by armed conflict or other situations of violence. The recent hack of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's Restoring Family Links network tools, potentially exposing the personal data of half a million vulnerable individuals to unauthorized access by unknown hackers, is a stark reminder that this is not just a theoretical risk but a very real one.1

The 2020 cyber operation affecting SolarWinds, a major US information technology company, demonstrated the chaos that a hack can cause by targeting digital supply chain components. What does the hack mean for the humanitarian cyberspace, and what can we learn from it? In this article, Massimo Marelli, Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross's Data Protection Office, draws out some possible lessons and considers the way forward by drawing on the notion of “digital sovereignty”.

Transformations in state violence are intimately associated with technological capacity. Like previous era-defining technologies, global digital networks have changed state violence. Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) appear to constitute a major technological development that offers the potential for reducing state violence. This article asks: are OCCs really the better angels of our digital nature? Current scholarship in strategic studies, adopting a narrow definition of violence, conceives of OCCs as largely non-violent. This ignores how technology has given rise to new forms of harm to individuals and communities, particularly in the context of violent state repression. We propose using an expanded definition of violence, including affective and community harms, and argue that OCCs relocate, rather than reduce, state violence towards non-bodily harms. Even though their lethal effects are limited, OCCs are not, as is supposed, a non-violent addition to state arsenals. This conclusion has important implications for international affairs, including re-orienting defensive cybersecurity efforts and altering calculations around the perception of OCCs by adversaries.

This article examines a subset of multilateral forums dealing with security problems posed by digital technologies, such as cyber warfare, cyber crime and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS).1 It identifies structural issues that make it difficult for multilateral forums to discuss fast-moving digital issues and respond in time with the required norms and policy measures. Based on this problem analysis, and the recent experience of regulating cyber conflict and LAWS through Groups of Governmental Experts, the article proposes a schema for multilateral governance of digital technologies in armed conflict. The schema includes a heuristic for understanding human–machine interaction in order to operationalize accountability with international humanitarian law principles and international law applicable to armed conflict in the digital age. The article concludes with specific suggestions for advancing work in multilateral forums dealing with cyber weapons and lethal autonomy.

Digitalization and new technologies have an increasingly important role in today's humanitarian activities. As humanitarian organizations become more active in and reliant on new and digital technologies, they evolve from being simple bystanders to being fully fledged stakeholders in cyberspace, vulnerable to adverse cyber operations that could impact on their capacity to protect and assist people affected by armed conflict or other situations of violence.

This shift makes it essential for humanitarian organizations to understand and properly map their resulting cyber perimeter. Humanitarian organizations can protect themselves and their activities by devising appropriate cyber strategies for the digital environment. Clearly defining the digital boundaries within which they carry out operations lays the groundwork for humanitarian organizations to develop a strategy to support and protect humanitarian action in the digital environment, channel available resources to where they are most needed, and understand the areas in which their operational dialogue and working modalities need to be adapted for cyberspace.

The purpose of this article is to identify the unique problems facing international humanitarian organizations operating in cyberspace and to suggest ways to address them. More specifically, the article identifies the key elements that an international humanitarian organization should consider in developing a cyber security strategy. Throughout, the International Committee of the Red Cross and its specificities are used as an example to illustrate the problems identified and the possible ways to address them.

In this article, we show how Annemarie Mol's notion of ontological politics helps to open up the research agenda for cyber security in Critical Security Studies. The article hence seeks to further the debate about STS and Critical Security Studies. The article's main claim is that the concept of ontological politics enables an engagement with the complex and transformative dynamics of ICT and the new security actors and practices that shape security politics in the digital age. By examining the virulent attacks executed by the Mirai botnet – one of the world's largest, fiercest, and most enduring botnets – we point to four aspects of cyber security that attention to the ontological politics of cyber security attunes us to: the proliferation and entanglement of security agencies, actors, sites, and spaces. These aspects of cyber security, we argue, are becoming increasingly prominent alongside the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G network technology. In conclusion, we discuss the wider security theoretical and normative-democratic implications of an engagement with the ontological politics of security by exploring three avenues for additional conversation between ontological politics and Critical Security Studies.

Since the end of the Cold War, international law has increasingly been challenged by states and other actors. Specific norms have also been challenged in their application by new realities and obstacles. This article focuses on these challenges as they arise from the development of cyberspace and cyber operations, and offers an overview of the main questions arising with regard to the application of international law to cyber operations. By analysing the application of the existing norms of international law to cyber operations as well as identifying their limits, the article offers an accurate lens through which to study the contestation or process of reinterpretation of some norms of international law. The objective of the article is not to deliver a comprehensive analysis of how the norms of international law apply to cyber operations but to provide an overview of the key points and issues linked to the applicability and application of the norms as well as elements of contextualisation, notably after the failure of the 2016–17 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The article comprises three parts. The first part focuses on the applicability of international law to cyber operations. The second part identifies challenges that affect the applicability and application of international law in general, while the third part analyses challenges that affect specific norms of international law, highlighting their limits in dealing with cyber threats.

To date, cyber security research is built on observational studies involving macro-level attributes as causal factors that account for state behaviour in cyberspace. While this tradition resulted in significant findings, it abstracts the importance of individual decision-makers. Specifically, these studies have yet to provide an account as to why states fail to integrate available information resulting in suboptimal judgements such as the misattribution of cyber operations. Using a series of vignette experiments, the study demonstrates that cognitive heuristics and motivated reasoning play a crucial role in the formation of judgements vis-à-vis cyberspace. While this phenomenon is frequently studied relative to the physical domain, it remains relatively unexplored in the context of cyberspace. Consequently, this study extends the existing literature by highlighting the importance of micro-level attributes in interstate cyber interactions.

This paper sets out 99 case studies of insider attacks that took place in the UK. The study involved interviewing investigators, heads of security, information technologists, law enforcement, security officers, human resource managers, line managers, and coworkers who knew the insider. The analysis elucidates how to identify insiders and pathways to these attacks. It also highlights examples of archetypal insiders, in addition to the ‘disgruntled employee’ (e.g., ‘the show off’, ‘the career criminal’, ‘the addict’, etc.). In contrast to other studies, this study highlights multiple pathways to an attack. A conceptual model is set out that considers indicators (both physical and cyber) that might be monitored in an insider risk detection programme. The model stressors need to continuously seek out methods to close down opportunities as well as to monitor behavioural change. It also elucidates potential deterrence and prevention strategies for organisations to consider in an ethical and legal manner.

As technology continues to develop, information and communication technology and operational technology on board ships are increasingly being networked, and more frequently connected to the Internet. The introduction of cyber systems changes the work environment with the aim of decreasing the workload for the navigator, but at the same time introduces more complexity and vulnerabilities that in turn may alter the competencies needed to perform safe and efficient navigation. Contemporary examples of how cyber-attacks can distort situational awareness and interfere with operations are needed to enhance the navigator's competence through increased system awareness. This paper demonstrates some of the possible attack vectors that a cyber-attack can present to a ship, as well as discussing the plausibility and consequences of such attacks. In this study we provide a practical example to better understand how one can demystify cyber threats in order to enhance the navigators' competence.

Several indicators point to a crisis at the heart of the emerging area of international cyber security law. First, proposals for binding international treaties by leading stakeholders, including China and Russia, have been met with little enthusiasm by other states, and are generally seen as having limited prospects of success. Second, states are extremely reluctant to commit themselves to specific interpretations of controversial legal questions and thus to express their cyber opinio juris. Third, instead of interpreting or developing rules, state representatives seek refuge in the more ambiguous term ‘norms’. This article argues that the reluctance of states to engage in international law-making has left a power vacuum, lending credence to claims that international law fails in addressing modern challenges posed by rapid technological development. In response, several non-state-driven norm-making initiatives have sought to fill the void, including Microsoft's cyber norms proposals and the Tallinn Manual project. The article then contends that this emerging body of non-binding norms presents states with a critical window of opportunity to reclaim a central law-making position, similar to historical precedents including the development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety. Whether the supposed crisis will lead to the demise of inter-state cyberspace governance or a recalibration of legal approaches will thus be decided in the near future. States should assume a central role if they want to ensure that the existing power vacuum is not exploited in a way that would upset their ability to achieve strategic and political goals.

Concerns with global warming prompted many governments to mandate increased proportion of electricity generation from renewable sources. This, together with the desire to have more efficient and secure power generation and distribution, has driven research in the next-generation power grid, namely, the smart grid. Through integrating advanced information and communication technologies with power electronic and electric power technologies, smart grid will be highly reliable, efficient, and environmental-friendly. A key component of smart grid is the communication system. This paper explores the design goals and functions of the smart grid communication system, followed by an in-depth investigation on the communication requirements. Discussions on some of the recent developments related to smart grid communication systems are also introduced.

Cyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.