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  • 7 - Countermajoritarian Institutions in Turkish Constitution Making

  • from Part III - Debating and Drafting the Constitution in 2011–2013
  • Edited by Felix Petersen, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Zeynep Yanaşmayan
  • Book:
    The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in Turkey
    Published online:
    19 December 2019
    Print publication:
    16 January 2020, pp 218-248

  • Summary

    Countermajoritarian institutions have shaped the course of modern Turkish politics. Because they have mainly acted as institutions of military tutelage, they have been identified as one of the greatest obstacles to democratization. The most notable countermajoritarian institutions in Turkey are the Constitutional Court, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the National Security Council, and the Council of Higher Education. This chapter analyzes the deliberations on possible reform to these institutions in the writing commission of the Constitutional Conciliation Commission ‘Anayasa Uzlama Komisyonu, AUK’ from 2011 to 2013. It shows that delegates agreed on some issues and were close to reaching agreement on others. Yet, the requirement of consensus among all parties enabled certain actors to obstruct final agreements. The partial agreements ultimately yielded no lasting results. After adoption of constitutional amendments in 2017, it seems that countermajoritarian institutions now function as institutions of partisan, executive tutelage.