The 2020 presidential campaign occurred in the midst of the first worldwide pandemic in 100 years. The pandemic engulfed the United States for the entire length of the campaign and the incumbent president was hospitalized with the virus at the height of the fall campaign. In this chapter, we show that people’s concern about the coronavirus pandemic increased significantly after Trump contracted COVID-19. Furthermore, and consistent with the citizen-centered theory of campaigns, we find that psychological predispositions, along with political and demographic characteristics, substantively and significantly predict changes in worry about the coronavirus from September to October. For instance, people high in authoritarianism and conflict avoidance become significantly more worried about the coronavirus pandemic from September to October. Finally, we show that people are more likely to consider assessments of the candidates’ competence for dealing with the coronavirus when developing overall evaluations of the candidates in October – after Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis – compared to September.

As scholars and activists seek to define and promote greater corporate political responsibility (CPR), they will benefit from understanding practitioner perspectives and how executives are responding to rising scrutiny of their political influences, reputational risk and pressure from employees, customers and investors to get involved in civic, political, and societal issues. This chapter draws on firsthand conversations with practitioners, including executives in government affairs; sustainability; senior leadership; and diversity, equity and inclusion, during the launch of a university-based CPR initiative. I summarize practitioner motivations, interests, barriers and challenges related to engaging in conversations about CPR, as well as committing or acting to improve CPR. Following the summary, I present implications for further research and several possible paths forward, including leveraging practitioners’ value on accountability, sustaining external calls for transparency, strengthening awareness of systems, and reframing CPR as part of a larger dialogue around society’s “social contract.”

This chapter is concerned with Germany’s stand on State responsibility and liability. It is found that Germany mistakenly attributed acts by the Houthi rebels to the State of Yemen and mistakenly assumed that the Houthi rebels are bound by Yemen’s international human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Further, Germany’s position that Russia is responsible for the use of a chemical weapon in the poisoning of Alexei Nawalny will be addressed. It will be argued that Germany should have cooperated directly with Russia rather than only calling the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Concerning the Federal Parliament’s Scientific Research Services’ assessment on claims against China for damages incurred due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, it will be argued that the only conclusion to be drawn from the report is that legal actions against China must be doomed to failure. Finally, the question will be raised whether Malta apologising for a Maltese ambassador who compared the German Chancellor to Hitler forms a rare example of a formal State apology.