This chapter discusses how AI technologies permeate the media sector. It sketches opportunities and benefits of the use of AI in media content gathering and production, media content distribution, fact-checking, and content moderation. The chapter then zooms in on ethical and legal risks raised by AI-driven media applications: lack of data availability, poor data quality, and bias in training datasets, lack of transparency, risks for the right to freedom of expression, threats to media freedom and pluralism online, and threats to media independence. Finally, the chapter introduces the relevant elements of the EU legal framework which aim to mitigate these risks, such as the Digital Services Act, the European Media Freedom Act, and the AI Act.

The conditional legal immunity for hosting unlawful content (safe harbour) provided by Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) is central to the regulation of online platforms in India for two reasons. First, absent this immunity, platforms in India risk being secondarily liable for a wide range of civil and criminal offences. Second, the Indian Government has recognised that legal immunity for user-generated content is key to platform operations and has sought to regulate platform behaviour by prescribing several pre-conditions to safe harbour. This chapter examines the different obligations set out in the Intermediary Guidelines and evaluates the efforts of the Indian government to regulate platform behaviour in India through the pre-conditions for safe harbour. This chapter finds that the obligations set out in the Intermediary Guidelines are enforced in a patchwork and inconsistent manner through courts. However, the Indian Government retains powerful controls over content and platform behaviour by virtue of its power to block content under Section 69A of the IT Act and the ability to impose personal liability on platform employees within India.

This paper considers the goals of regulators in different countries working on regulating online platforms and how those varied motivations influence the potential for international coordination and cooperation on platform governance. different policy debates and goals surrounding online platform responsibility. The analysis identifies different policy goals related to three different types of obligations that regulators may impose on online platforms: responsibilities to target particular categories of unwanted content, responsibilities for platforms that wield particularly significant influence, and responsibilities to be transparent about platform decision-making. Reviewing the proposals that have emerged in each of these categories across different countries, the paper examines which of these three policy goals present the greatest opportunities for international coordination and agreement and which of them actually require such coordination in order to be effectively implemented. Finally, it considers what lessons can be drawn from existing policy efforts for how to foster greater coordination around areas of common interest related to online platforms.

This paper summarizes the United States’ legal framework governing Internet “platforms” that publish third-party content. It highlights three key features of U.S. law: the constitutional protections for free speech and press, the statutory immunity provided by 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), and the limits on state regulation of the Internet. It also discusses US efforts to impose mandatory transparency obligations on Internet “platforms.”

Like information disseminated through online platforms, infectious diseases can cross international borders as they track the movement of people (and sometimes animals and goods) and spread globally. Hence, their control and management have major implications for international relations, and international law. Drawing on this analogy, this chapter looks to global health governance to formulate suggestions for the governance of online platforms. Successes in global health governance suggest that the principle of tackling low-hanging fruit first to build trust and momentum towards more challenging goals may extend to online platform governance. Progress beyond the low-hanging fruit appears more challenging: For one, disagreement on the issue of resource allocation in the online platform setting may lead to “outbreaks” of disinformation being relegated to regions of the world that may not be at the top of online platforms’ market priorities lists. Secondly, while there may be wide consensus on the harms of infectious disease outbreaks, the harms from the spread of disinformation are more contested. Relying on national definitions of disinformation would hardly yield coherent international cooperation. Global health governance would thus suggest that an internationally negotiated agreement on standards as it relates to disinformation may be necessary.

In order to manage the issue of diversity of regulatory vision, States may, to some extent, harmonize substantive regulation—eliminating diversity. This is less likely than States determining unilaterally or multilaterally to develop manageable rules of jurisdiction, so that their regulation applies only in limited circumstances. The fullest realization of this “choice of law” solution would involve geoblocking or other technology that divides up regulatory authority according to a specified, and a perhaps agreed, principle. Geoblocking may be costly and ultimately porous, but it would allow different communities to effectuate their different visions of the good in the platform context. To the extent that the principles of jurisdiction are agreed, and are structured to be exclusive, platforms would have the certainty of knowing the requirements under which they must operate in each market. Of course, different communities may remain territorial states, but given the a-territorial nature of the internet, it may be possible for other divisions of authority and responsibility to develop. Cultural affinity, or political perspective, may be more compelling as an organizational principle to some than territorial co-location.

On October 27, 2022, the Digital Services Act (DSA) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (EU). The DSA, which has been portrayed as the Europe’s new “Digital Constitution”, sets out a cross-sector regulatory framework for online services and regulates the responsibility of online intermediaries for illegal content. Against this background, this chapters provides a brief overview of recent regulatory developments regarding platform responsibility in the EU. The chapter seeks to add a European perspective to the global debate about platform regulation. Section 3.1 provides an overview of the regulatory framework in the EU and recent legislative developments. Section 3.2 analyses different approaches regarding the enforcement of rules on platform responsibility. Section 3.3 takes a closer look at the regulation of content moderation by digital platforms in the EU. Finally, Section 3.4 adds some observations on the international effects of EU rules on platform responsibility.

While the social media and digital platforms started with an objective to enhance social connectivity and information sharing, they also present a significant challenge in content moderation resulting in spreading disinformation. Disinformation Paradox is a phenomenon where an attempt to regulate harmful content online can inadvertently amplifies it. The social media platforms often serve as breeding grounds for disinformation. This chapter discusses the inherent difficulties in moderating content at a large scale, different responses of these platforms and potential solutions.

This chapter examines China’s approach to platform responsibility for content moderation. It notes that China’s approach is rooted in its overarching goal of public opinion management, which requires platforms to proactively monitor, moderate, and sometimes censor content, especially politically sensitive content. Despite its patchy and iterative approach, China’s platform regulation is consistent and marked by its distinct characteristics, embodied in its defining of illegal and harmful content, its heavy platform obligations, and its strong reliance on administrative enforcement measures. China’s approach reflects its authoritarian nature and the asymmetrical power relations between the government and private platforms. This chapter also provides a nuanced understanding of China’s approach to platform responsibility, including Chinese platforms’ "conditional liability" for tort damages and the regulators’ growing emphasis on user protection and personal information privacy. This chapter includes a case study on TikTok that shows the interplay between the Chinese approach, oversees laws and regulations and the Chinese online platform’s content moderation practices.

Platform governance and regulation have been salient political issues in Brazil for years, particularly as part of Congress’ response to democratic threats posed by former President Bolsonaro. The question became even more important after the January 8th attempted insurrection in Brasília, which many blame on social media. This includes the newly installed Lula administration. In a letter read on the February 2023 UNESCO “Internet for Trust” global conference, the President, now in his third (non-consecutive) term in office wrote that the attack on the nation’s seats of power was “the culmination of a campaign, initiated much before, and that used, as ammunition, lies and disinformation,” which “was nurtured, organized, and disseminated through several digital platforms and messaging apps.” The new administration has made platform regulation a policy priority, with regulatory and administrative pushes across the board. Brazil has been a battleground where proposals for platform responsibility have been advanced — and disputed.

Fifteen years ago in All Politics is Global, I developed a typological theory of global economic governance, arguing that globalization had not transformed international relations but merely expanded the arenas of contestation to include policy arenas that had previously been the exclusive province of domestic politics. In my model, what truly mattered to global governance was the distribution of preferences among the great powers. When great power coordination was achieved, then effective governance would be the outcome. When great power coordination was not, then global governance would exist in name only. Demands for greater content moderation across platforms have increased as the modern economy has become increasingly data-driven. Can any standards be negotiated at the global level? The likeliest result will be a hypocritical system of “sham governance.” Under this system, a few token agreements might be negotiated at the global level. Even these arrangements, however, will lack enforcement mechanisms and likely be honored only in the breach. The regulatory center of gravity will remain at the national level. Changes at the societal and global levels over the past fifteen years only reinforce the dynamics that lead to such an outcome.

Global platforms present novel challenges. They serve as powerful conduits of commerce and global community. Yet their power to influence political and consumer behavior is enormous. Their responsibility for the use of this power – for their content – is statutorily limited by national laws such as Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in the US. National efforts to demand and guide appropriate content moderation, and to avoid private abuse of this power, is in tension with concern in liberal states to avoid excessive government regulation, especially of speech. Diverse and sometimes contradictory national rules responding to these tensions on a national basis threaten to splinter platforms, and reduce their utility to both wealthy and poor countries. This edited volume sets out to respond to the question whether a global approach can be developed to address these tensions while maintaining or even enhancing the social contribution of platforms.

There is a potentially correct analogy between international tax regulation and platform content regulation because there is an homology between capital and information. On this basis, this chapter foregrounds three resemblances between tax regulation and content moderation. First, non-State actors access, manage and regulate through platforms flows of capital and similarly flows of information exploiting regulatory differentials, so that there is the need for regulatory alignment in both cases. Second, since both capital and information escape the regulatory reach of States, a common standard must be achieved in both cases. Third, such common standard can be achieved only if home States of Global Actors owning platforms assume together the obligation to moderate profit diversion as well as immoderate use of platform content through procedural accountability. The chapter explains the scope of the global tax problem, and then details the process by which policies have been developed and describes the tax implications of platforms. The chapter concludes suggesting lessons that can be learned from tax regulation for platform responsibility rules: the homology between capital and information points to regulatory structures that reduce excessive opportunism and immoderation in the use of computational capital by platforms.

Much of the internet of today is dominated by the big tech companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon that use it to amass profits. The chapter looks at three ways in which their pursuit of profit arbitrarily interferes with people’s access to and use of the internet. (1) Big Tech corporations operate a version of the internet that forces users to yield personal data in exchange for ‘free’ services. The chapter explains why this routine harvesting of personal data is morally problematic as it forces internet users to choose between two elements of minimally decent lives: their privacy and accessing the internet. (2) Social media platforms are among the dominant online services today. They have enhanced opportunities for exercising human rights, but their business practices also limit people in the enjoyment of these rights. The chapter suggests several ways for improving the situation. (3) Some businesses lobby for ending net neutrality. The chapter explains why net neutrality is crucial for keeping internet access free from arbitrary interferences, and argues for a version of net neutrality that allows some unequal treatment of data that does not diminish human rights.

The term “content moderation,” a holdover from the days of small bulletin-board discussion groups, is quite a bland way to describe an immensely powerful and consequential aspect of social governance. Today’s largest platforms make judgments on millions of pieces of content a day, with world-shaping consequences. And in the United States, they do so mostly unconstrained by legal requirements. One senses that “content moderation” – the preferred term in industry and in the policy community – is something of a euphemism for content regulation, a way to cope with the unease that attends the knowledge (1) that so much unchecked power has been vested in so few hands and (2) that the alternatives to this arrangement are so hard to glimpse.

An entity – a landlord, a manufacturer, a phone company, a credit card company, an internet platform, a self-driving-car manufacturer – is making money off its customers’ activities. Some of those customers are using the entity’s services in ways that are criminal, tortious, or otherwise reprehensible. Should the entity be held responsible, legally or morally, for its role (however unintentional) in facilitating its customers’ activities? This question has famously been at the center of the debates about platform content moderation,1 but it can come up in other contexts as well.2