As the result of the initiation of the ‘judicial reform’ in January 2023, and the huge wave of public protest, Israel is currently undergoing a political turmoil which may develop into a fully fledged constitutional crisis. In this article I provide an account of the roots and causes of the present crisis from a public law theory perspective. In particular, I discuss the relationship between constitutional and administrative law in Israeli law. I argue that the core of Israel's constitutional structure has always been the institutions of administrative law as created and developed during the ‘administrative revolution’ of the 1980s. In contrast, Israel's constitutional law has always been a peripheral in the core structure of judicial review over the political branches. Contrary to common wisdom, I argue that the ‘constitutional revolution’ of the mid-1990s has not changed this core structure, but rather provided an external belt of normative barricades for this core structure. Accordingly, and despite the pretentious constitutional discourse developed in the 1990s by the Court, Israel was and still is a monistic democracy with no true constitutional layer of norms that enjoys higher status vis-à-vis regular legislation.

The article aims to further the understanding of the current constitutional crisis in Israel through the lens of political polarisation. Israel, like other countries around the world, is experiencing a substantial increase in political polarisation. Recent data shows that since 2009 affective polarisation (the extent to which individuals have negative feelings towards members of the opposing party or group and positive feelings towards their own party or group) has risen by 180 per cent. The article discusses the various phenomena associated with an increase in polarisation and the problems it raises, traces the reasons for the increase in polarisation in Israel, and argues that polarisation has played an important role in creating the conflict between the current government and the Supreme Court, and in making it so intense and intractable.

What types of institutional dynamics and conditions allow constitutional resilience in the face of attempts at undermining gains in a constitutional democracy? Using Sri Lanka as a case-study, I claim that the legal complex acting in synergy with independent public institutions (the Speaker of the Parliament) and civil society can produce constitutional resilience. Synergy between the legal complex and these institutions can transform constitutional vulnerability into constitutional resilience. I argue therefore that the legal complex theory must be extended to consider the ways in which it can work in synergy with other public institutions in being resilient against attempts at rolling back gains for constitutional democracy. I argue further that synergy between the legal complex and formal and informal institutions over the short term can only result in “simple” constitutional resilience. The development of “reflexive” constitutional resilience requires long-term synergy between the legal complex and other public institutions.

Three great constitutional conflicts — Great Britain: Commons v. Lords — Parliament Act 1911 — United States: President v. Supreme Court over New Deal — Court Packing plan Belgium: King v. conscience — Democracy wins in each of these cases.