This chapter explains the law surrounding consent for the medical treatment of children, when children can give consent themselves, who can give consent of their behalf and when a refusal of consent should be respected. It also considers guidelines relevant for the practice of restraint in paediatric anaesthesia. Finally, it discusses the unique features of the ethics of research involving children, including the levels of risk that are deemed acceptable.

Chapter 1 focuses on the revolution of 1688 in Britian, in which the ideal of liberty as independence was promised to the people as the cornerstone of a new constitution to replace James II’s allegedly despotic use of arbitrary power. After examining the Bill of Rights, in which the fundamental rights of the people are laid out, the chapter turns to consider the provenance of the underlying ideal of liberty as independence and its contrast with arbitrary power. One major source is shown to have been the discussion of civil liberty by the historians and moralists of ancient Rome, especially Cicero, Sallust, Livy and Tacitus. The influence of these sources on the development of early modern republicanism in England is traced, especially in the works of Milton and Harrington. The other major source was the discussion of the law of persons in the Digest of Roman law, in which a fundamental distinction was drawn between free persons and dependants, including slaves. The influence of this legal tradition, especially as filtered by Bracton into English common law, is traced in the strand of constitutional thinking that runs from Fortescue and Thomas Smith to Coke, Selden and their followers.

This chapter analyses limitations to parties’ freedom of contract as to the negotiation and formation stage of the contracts under review, that are aimed at remedying situations where musicians grant excessive rights to corporate partners. These limitations seek to ensure that such contracts have a ‘fair scope’. As yet, awaiting potential EU harmonisation of authorship and initial ownership, there are no relevant harmonising rules at the EU level. Instead, focus lies with restrictions under national law. First, objectionable precontractual behaviour may be sanctioned by precontractual liability, giving right to damages. Subsequently, the requirement of consent is subject to certain requirements. Third, the law limits parties’ freedom as to the scope of rights that may be transferred or licensed and provides tools to determine this scope in practice. Finally, the chapter turns to the negotiation and formation stage of secondary contractual relationships that may arise once the initial contract has been entered into. It concludes with an overview of the main findings.

In the last few decades, governments have increasingly sought to relocate away from their territorial limits border practices that serve to identify, filter, and, if necessary, prevent foreigners’ crossings into their national space. This shift is facilitated by digital innovations that offer new opportunities for making migrants legible from afar, miles away from the border. Yet the turn to emerging technologies is not the preserve of governments. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been using digital technologies, including biometrics data, for several decades. For UNHCR these are becoming an essential tool in accounting for the populations under its protection. This chapter explores this development. The first part surveys the deterritorialization of border controls in state practice with a focus on the enabling role of biometrics and digitization in that process. Then, it demonstrates how the use of biometrics by UNHCR maps onto these states’ practices. The second part considers the consequences of UNHCR’s practices surrounding the biometric registration of refugees, the risks posed by the collection of biometric data in the refugee context, and how the institutional and structural conditions in which UNHCR operates, especially with regard to consent, accountability mechanisms, and legal safeguards, may undermine refugees’ control over their data.

This chapter explores the many forms of bondage in the early English tropics, showing how difficult it can be to even define slavery from a global perspective, especially over the course of the seventeenth century. There was a blurry line between slavery and other conditions of bondage or subjugation, but the English gradually developed a more consistent approach to non-European enslavement across the tropics. By the 1680s, one particularly inflexible and brutal genus of racial slavery – forged in the Caribbean – had outcompeted most other forms of slavery and became the default in the English empire. This chapter highlights the difficulty in defining slavery and shows overlapping elements in bondage systems in the English tropics. It argues that one of the reasons that English slavery became more draconian and permanent than most other forms of slavery was that the English took steps in the comprehensive slave codes passed in the Caribbean to deny the subjecthood of the enslaved.

This chapter explores the theory underpinning qualitative methods, namely semi-structured interviews and focus groups, and issues of methodological coherence in adopting a digital approach. We offer an in-depth exploration of the practical considerations of adopting digital methods. This includes the challenges of building a rapport with the participant, familiarity with technology for both researcher and participant, scheduling, and data protection issues. We explore pertinent ethical considerations, including institutional approval, informed consent, confidentiality, and the ongoing ethical responsibilities of the researcher engaged in qualitative research. We draw upon our experiences of using synchronous online videoconferencing platforms to conduct semi-structured interviews and focus groups, integrating our reflections throughout. Whilst necessitated by the Covid-19 pandemic, the associated need for social distancing and the potential for further regional restrictions, we argue that digital methods transcend the current global situation, offering opportunities to facilitate qualitative research that may extend beyond geographical borders, attenuate fiscal limitations, and enable greater collaboration between researchers.

This chapter charts the processes by which deceptive sex came to be regarded as potentially constituting rape. Through tracing these developments, the chapter shows how doctrinal features of the law, such as the way consent and deception are thought to be related and the modes of deception punished by law, were important to this process. Yet the chapter also argues that to fully appreciate how and why the changes occurred, it is necessary to pay attention to the array of interests the law has sought to protect and how these have shaped the range of topics of deception that might ground a charge of rape. This argument leads to the conclusion that, in the context of deceptive sex, deception has not been considered wrongful because it invalidates or precludes consent, as is commonly thought; rather, deception has invalidated or precluded consent because it has sometimes been considered wrongful. The chapter ends by introducing some reasons why this insight is important to ongoing debates regarding the criminalisation of deceptive sex.

This chapter examines the law of nullity of marriage to consider how deception has affected the existence or validity of consent. It articulates important differences between void and voidable marriages, arguing that these speak to the public and private sides of marriage, respectively. It also showcases the range of deceptions that have been considered legally significant, situating these within the cultural framework outlined in Chapter 1. On top of this, the chapter argues that the range of qualifying deceptions has often been justified with reference to public policy or convention on the basis that the relevant information would typically be important to an intimate partner or that its disclosure would serve a collective interest or value. The chapter concludes by suggesting that changes in the law of nullity, and a small number of related areas of law, demonstrate that there is still a desire for legal recognition of the wrongs and harms associated with inducing intimate relationships, even as these have shifted over time.

This chapter explores the civil wrong of seduction to establish its nature and parameters and draw out its associations with deception. It argues that, as the earliest legal response to deceptive sex, seduction is in some senses the civil law analogue of later criminal laws. The chapter then shows how the action of seduction was rooted in the idea that deception was wrongful because it was one way of leading a woman off the ‘right’ path and that the harms it caused reflected the gendered significance of marriage and other ‘moral’ forms of intimacy. Furthermore, it highlights how these features of the action provided a framework within which the range of qualifying deceptions was limited and the temporal dimensions of the wrong were set. Finally, the chapter offers some reflections on how the distinctions between private and public introduced in Chapter 1 bore on the decision to keep seduction a civil wrong before foregrounding how these observations, and those made throughout the rest of the chapter, are pertinent to contemporary discussions about criminalising deceptive sex.

This chapter analyses legal responses to three situations: someone pretending to intend marriage, someone entering marriage or a civil partnership for ‘ulterior motives’ and someone entering marriage or a civil partnership when an existing relationship disqualifies them from doing so. It argues that, historically, marriage was used to compensate women who experienced the first form of deception and to punish the men who deceived them; that in ‘ulterior motive’ cases, marriage might have been withheld from the deceptive party; and that bigamy provided legal recognition of the harms and wrongs experienced by duped individuals at the same time as it protected the state’s interest in shoring up marriage. The chapter concludes by arguing that the move away from each of these positions over time means that the extent to which the law protects individuals’ interests in avoiding deceptively induced intimate relationships has decreased. It further argues that this development has implications for how we assess the adequacy of contemporary legal responses to inducing intimacy.

This chapter analyses crimes involving procuring sex, including procuring sex by deception. It argues that to appreciate the nature of these offences, and their place within this book, it is necessary both to understand how the verb ‘to procure’ was interpreted, including when and why it required deception, and to pay attention to the acts whose procurement was proscribed by law. The chapter provides elucidation on both fronts, showing how the procuring offences were geared towards prohibiting ‘illicit’ (i.e., immoral) sexual activities and therefore criminalised the use of deception to lure others into committing such acts. In demonstrating this point, the chapter argues that a culturally sensitive vision of what makes intimacy valuable shaped and constrained the use of the procuring offences. Finally, the chapter argues that the demise of the procuring offences set the stage for the expansion of the crime of rape by deception and that examining how the procuring offences worked yields important lessons for those attempting to engage critically with this development.

This chapter summarises the overarching narrative of this book and argues that as was as being intrinsically valuable it can inform contemporary debates about using law to regulate the practices of inducing intimacy. The discussion is organised around three sets of issues: the public and private dimensions of sex and intimate relationships, including the interests protected by law, the form of response (i.e., state or non-state), and the variety of legal response (i.e., public or private); the structure of legal responses, the meaning of consent and its relation to deception, targeted modes of deception, culpability matters, the requirement for a causal link between deception and ‘outcome’, and the temporalities of the legal wrong; and the substance of deceptions, including the dynamics governing the range of topics about which transparency has been expected. Drawing the discussion together, the chapter concludes by offering a new framework for constructing legal responses to deceptively induced intimacy, which builds on the core insight and these responses have historically been predicated on temporally sensitive associations between self-construction and intimacy.