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  • 6 - Value Judgement within Pareto’s Economic and Sociological Approaches to Welfare

  • from Part I - Plurality of Welfare in the Making of Welfare Economics
  • Edited by Roger E. Backhouse, Antoinette Baujard, Tamotsu Nishizawa
  • Book:
    Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values
    Published online:
    04 March 2021
    Print publication:
    25 March 2021, pp 135-156

  • Summary

    Pareto’s advocacy of ‘ethical neutrality’ in social science is well known, but, over the course of his scholarly career, he devoted more and more attention to accommodating the influence of sentiment (value judgement) within welfare theory. This paper plots Pareto’s evolving treatment of value judgement from his early economic works on production efficiency and collective economic welfare through to his mature sociological reflections on collective social welfare. Within that context, Pareto’s contribution to the ‘new welfare economics’, as a stream of what John Hicks called economic welfarism, is discussed; as is his attempt to accommodate the values of each individual member of society within his sociological approach to collective welfare. However, in contrast to the position taken under Hicks’s conception of non-welfarism, the policy advisor who adopts Pareto’s sociology of welfare is still obliged to follow an ethically neutral position when considering the values of individuals to provide advice on improving social welfare.