This chapter uncovers efforts made by village and rural cadres in the immediate post-Mao era to reverse wrongful convictions adjudicated during the Socialist Education Movement (SEM). Drawing on previously unexamined materials, including the personal dossiers of rural cadres in eastern Hebei, it traces the decision-making and policy processes behind how ordinary individuals reexamined cases involving two types of alleged wrongdoings perpetuated by cadres: corruption and extramarital relationships. The chapter highlights the two processes that constituted the reexamination: (1) the implementation of limited transitional justice as the rebuilding of political-legal institutions through the formal mechanisms of the state; and (2) the informal, social processes of interpersonal reconciliation outside the purview of the state. Both dynamics contributed to helping locals come to terms with the complicated legacies of the SEM.

Part II establishes the alternative law and political economy framework by unpacking the dynamics between politics and law in the process of China’s market reforms. It starts with describing the relationship between law and politics in constructing one of the primary mechanisms of macro control in China – China’s socio-economic development blueprint, the “Five-Year Plan.”

It then moves to a chapter-by-chapter analysis of the evolving roles of law during China’s market reforms, outlining a three-stage shift in the allocation of market governance authorities within the Party-state system through legal evidence.

Throughout this part of the book, the author examines the legal configurations of political-power dynamics through a systematic investigation of the vast body of market-related primary and secondary sources of law and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) documents that have been promulgated in China since the early reforms until the present day. This Part reflects how two functions of law – economic and political – have developed side by side, each supporting the other.

The Epilogue addresses the legacies of wartime neutrality and collaboration in Macau. The war period provided a peculiar blueprint for later developments in terms of bilateral Sino–Portuguese relations and of local practices in the enclave, including towards new waves of refugees. The Epilogue also covers recent written and visual representations of wartime neutrality and collaboration in Macau.

This chapter demostrates that the ambiguities of wartime neutrality in Macau continued to haunt China’s relations with Portugal in the post-war years. Five interconnected issues relating to Portuguese neutrality evidence China’s post-war quest for justice and recognition: the re-establishment of regular diplomatic contacts, the handling of Japanese property, the extradition of suspects of war crimes and collaboration, the abolition of extraterritoriality and critiques of neutrality in calls to return Macau to Chinese rule. These issues raised questions about the meaning of justice and the legitimacy of who got to wield it. In its relations with a small and relatively weak European colonial power, China sought to affirm its new post-war international status. However, this process was constrained by resistance to the Nationalists’ anti-imperialist goals in South China and by the changing fortunes of Nationalist power as the Chinese Civil War unfolded.

This chapter addresses Macau’s place in China’s war with Japan from the early 1930s to 1941. Macau featured in Chinese resistance efforts from the start, but its relevance became more pronounced after 1937, especially after Guangdong province was engulfed in the conflict. The chapter argues that, due to its neutrality, Macau became an important meeting place for competing Chinese actors. Both those engaged in Chinese resistance – Nationalists, communists and others – and collaborators with Japan (before and after the consolidation of Wang Jingwei’s Reorganised National Government) used the enclave to circulate materials and propaganda, to mobilise others for their cause and to reach out to opponents.

The essay looks at the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has promoted as an influential actor in Buddhist circles on the global stage, via one of its key instruments for influence in Chinese societies and abroad, the United Front Work Department (UFWD). This chapter argues that Buddhist actors who seek to shape the legal-political framework of their societies according to their values are facing increasing competition from a fellow influential Buddhist association that conveys the positions of its political mentor rather than shared religious values. The chapter contextualizes this issue by presenting the limited influence of Buddhism on legal thought in Chinese history. It then examines the BAC and the status of Buddhism in contemporary life, looks at the CCP UFWD influence on the BAC, and chronicles the BAC emergence as a major actor in Buddhist international organizations. It concludes on the significance of the BAC for Buddhists worldwide and constitutional law.

This chapter explains how, in the wake of the reforms implemented since the early 1980s and the desire to provide a legal framework for State action, successive statutes have laid the foundations for a system of responsibility of public authorities in the People’s Republic of China. Despite the establishment of mechanisms to enforce State responsibility, the system still suffers from a number of shortcomings. Some are inherent in the reluctance of any State to be held responsible; others are more specific and outline the contours of a regime of responsibility specific to China at a time when the country wishes to assert a government model to compete with liberal democracy. In the background, a regime of political rather than legal responsibility has emerged, which both limits the obstacles to public action (in order to ensure efficiency) and emphasizes the government’s duty to ensure common prosperity. The report examines the Chinese bureaucratic culture, its history and the specificities of the current political system to explain the origin of this specifically Chinese conception of the responsibility of public authorities.

This chapter moves beyond individual corporations and corporate types to examine the broader sociopolitical system in China. It focuses on the "fragmented authoritarianism" of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), outlining the main causes of fragmentation, including corruption, factionalism, autonomy of state-owned enterprises, local government self-interest, private firm co-optation of government actors, and internal contradictions within the CCP's own ideology. This fragmentation prevents the CCP from exercising consistent control over corporations and the broader society, leading to a much more complex and diverse corporate-political ecosystem than imagined by many Western commentators.

This chapter examines the international controversies surrounding Huawei Technologies, finding that most fears about this private firm are based on misunderstandings of its coevolution within the Chinese business and political environment, as well as unfounded suspicions about its employee ownership structure and alleged Chinese Communist Party control or military links. However, only further reform of the Chinese political ecosystem will help to reduce the international fear and sanctions on the firm.

This chapter examines Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s judicial interpretation, which has been formally legalized as a source of law for adjudication, as well as its relationship with various other statutes in China’s legislative system. It points out that the inner logic of China’s legislation with different hierarchical status, as distinct from those of democratically elected parliamentary systems, is determined by the de facto distribution of legislative power within its authoritarian regime, where the SPC has become a significant player in exercising legislative power in a way that has largely evolved beyond its constitutional settings. In particular, it investigates the unique inner logic of SPC’s judicial interpretations, which have become a de facto primary source of law for adjudication in practice.

This chapter explores the unique function and role of judicial documents – a significant form of informal state law, as distinguished from formal statutory laws – in China’s legislative enterprise. In particular, it examines why and how, with no explicit statutory delegation, the judicial lawmaking practice of producing judicial documents has become embedded in the adjudication of China’s courts. It accordingly proposes a twilight theory of China’s judicial documents that explains why the practice of judicial lawmaking through producing documents exists in a twilight zone between legal and illegal and is suitable for China’s politically resilient authoritarian regime. Moreover, it demonstrates how the judicial document can be referred to effectively by judges in adjudication. It further investigates the extent to which the judicial document has enabled the court, under the dual leadership of the superior court and the local Party committee, to efficiently and effectively respond to the subnational diversity and the differences of local politics.

This chapter considers the Constitution, the highest law in the legislative hierarchy, and (inescapably) its relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Due to China’s economic development over recent decades, it has been difficult for traditional theories, either communist or liberal ones, to accurately reflect the constitutional reality in China. Concepts such as the “unwritten constitution” or “living constitution” in the Western context are unable to provide a holistic view of China’s Constitution, especially after 1978. China’s Constitution, centred on the CCP and the state, has been largely transformed since this time. This chapter goes beyond the liberal approach and argues that a dual constitution has developed in China, within which the Party’s Constitution attempts to keep pace with that of the state. More specifically, the Party has been endeavouring to integrate itself into the State through political conventions and “intraparty regulations” (dangnei fagui). This dual constitution is unique in the sense that it departs from the model articulated by Mao Zedong, deviates from that of the Soviet Union and does not follow the formalistic approach adopted by Western countries in defining the nature of a constitution.

This chapter discusses the background, thesis, significance and implications of researching the theme of the sources of Chinese law in both comparative and Chinese legal scholarship. It also identifies the significant components of positive law in China’s legislative system and provides a general overview of China’s legislative system, along with the theoretical claims and interdisciplinary analysis involved in the detailed discussion presented in the following chapters.

During his ascent to power in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, Mao had “packed” the CCP upper echelon with people who had sided with him in the many internal power struggles in the party, especially those who had served with him in the First Front Army. Yet even this strategy was insufficient to maintain Mao’s absolute power in the party. When the unexpected shock of the Great Leap Forward led to a precipitous fall of Mao’s prestige within the party, a rival coalition composed of Mao’s former allies emerged to sideline him. Even a formerly loyal protégé such as Deng Xiaoping began to display streaks of independence.

Even at an abstract theoretical level, the power configuration in China after the 1969 9th Party Congress was highly unstable. On the one hand, Mao continued to be an active and powerful chairman of the party. On the other hand, Lin Biao, the anointed successor, had a great deal of control over the military. Without the possibility of other powerful factions in the party to check a potential fight between Mao and Lin, both sides had much temptation to eliminate the other if they believed they had sufficient power to do so (Acemoglu et al. 2008: 162). Fortunately for Mao, he had cultivated two disparate groups to help him govern China in the event of a purge of Lin Biao: the Fourth Front Army (FFA) and the surviving scribblers. Mao’s strategy of cultivating the tainted FFA paid off handsomely. Instead of having to concede to Lin Biao’s reluctance to carry out self-criticism or being forced to rely on Lin’s followers, Mao forced Lin’s hand, knowing that he could credibly threaten Lin with replacing the Lin Biao faction with FFA veterans. After Lin Biao fled, Mao carried out his threat and eradicated close associates of Lin Biao wholesale from the military, replacing them with veterans of the FFA. The Lin Biao incident on September 13, 1971, finally led to the full installation of the coalition of the weak.