Why did Nikita Khrushchev send missiles to Cuba? This chapter argues that Cuba was important to him for two reasons: it bolstered his self-perception as an equal to the United States and addressed his concerns over a potential US invasion of Cuba, which would affect his reputation in the revolutionary world. He faced a challenge from Mao Zedong, who wanted to wrest the mantle of revolutionary leadership from the Soviets. Yet, having come to the brink over Cuba, Khrushchev backed off, understanding that reputational concerns were not as important as the imperative of avoiding a global nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides not just a useful window into understanding Khrushchev's American policy, with its perennial fears of humiliation and sensitivity to slights, but also a crucial snapshot of Sino-Soviet relations on their downward slide towards an outright confrontation.

This chapter accounts for the twists and turns of Soviet–American and Sino-Soviet relations in 1960–61. Khrushchev's primary concern was resolving the Berlin issue, and he hoped that the new US president, John F. Kennedy, would be more amenable to finding a solution than Eisenhower had been. China continued to be a problem for Khrushchev. During the November 1960 Moscow conference of Communist parties, he faced Chinese resistance and criticism but ultimately prevailed in having the conference adopt a declaration that largely ignored Beijing's objections. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet leader became increasingly concerned with the prospect of Cuba's survival. Berlin, Cuba, and other global issues were at the center of his discussions with Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961. The summit ended on a sour note, but despite Khrushchev's bluster and his optimistic evaluation that the chances of a war with the United States stood at merely 5 percent, he proved unwilling to push his luck over Berlin and ultimately authorized the building of the Berlin Wall to stem the flow of refugees and stabilize a highly volatile situation in East Germany.

The twentieth century saw a renewed interest among Latin America’s philosophical thinkers on questions concerning social justice, economic underdevelopment, and the imperialist threat from industrial powers in the region. After outlining Marxism as a political theory, Chapter 8 first discusses how Latin American political thinkers José Carlos Mariátegui and Ernesto “Che” Guevara introduced their own twists to Marxism in order to solve those questions. The chapter evaluates Mariátegui’s attempted solution, especially as formulated in his account of the problems of “the Indian,” “the land,” and “religion” facing Peru. In the case of Guevara, the chapter looks closely at his “theory of the new human being,” pointing to some major objections facing it. By contrast, for Salvador Allende and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the two moderate socialists of Latin America discussed here, solutions are attainable within the framework of liberal democracy, with no violent revolution necessary. This chapter critically examines their claims that the cause of Latin America’s failed experiments with democracy resides elsewhere – namely, in the imperialist threat from the United States and other industrial powers.