This chapter analyzes the dangers posed by the politics of warfare by drawing on concrete examples from contemporary politics. It focuses on the controversial “Flight 93” essay by Michael J. Anton and shows how the rhetoric of warfare politics informed its theses and recommendations. It warns that this type of destructive politics, fueled by an apocalyptic rhetoric and Manichaean view, has become all too common in American society, and suggests a few way to fight against it.

This chapter examines the design and performance of the most prominent recent innovation in platform governance, the Facebook (now Meta) Oversight Board. It contextualizes the examination of that board in the rule of law ideas of the preceding chapter. In the course of this analysis, it also develops some ideas about the normative function of platform legalism in building a kind of hybrid corporate/userbase platform identity which may be morally valuable as well as tactically valuable in resolving controversial governance issues. Finally, it suggests that the Oversight Board's handling of the "great deplatforming" of Donald Trump illustrates the capacity of lawlike modes of the decision to shape such an identity. It also serves as a counterexample to some of Carl Schmitt's ideas about sovereignty and emergency power.

Waseem Yaqoob examines how four prominent German political philosophers responded to the ‘crisis of historicism’ by re-thinking the relation between ethics, politics and history. The trigger for the crisis was Germany’s defeat in World War I, when the presumed convergence of the monarchical nation state with ethical fulfilment and historical destiny dissolved in defeat and political upheaval. Among the first to respond was Friedrich Meinecke, whose earlier confidence in that convergence was replaced by an awareness of historical contingency, and of the difficulty of aligning ethics with reason of state. Notoriously harder line was Carl Schmitt, for whom an appreciation of contingency in a ‘world of enemies’ entailed the assertion of sovereignty at the expense of ethics. With the collapse of Nazism and advent of the Cold War, Reinhart Koselleck renewed Schmitt’s critique of moralising historical philosophy (identified with the Enlightenment), before turning to ‘conceptual history’ to suggest that the state would best adapt to the accelerating temporality of modernity by avoiding all normative choices. By contrast, Hannah Arendt would seek in the contingency of history the space to make such choices, and the opportunity to revive the ancient ideal of active citizenship. In conclusion, Yaqoob sets German post-Historicist thinking off against the anti-historical tendency of Anglo-American political philosophy associated with John Rawls, suggesting that the former may offer a more sophisticated historical ‘realism’ than that current among Rawls’ critics.

The outcome of the Great War shook to its foundations the idea of the Westphalian state, which existed primarily for itself and its own security. This chapter explores three alternatives to the Westphalian state, at the intersection of political and intellectual history. A ’Wilsonian imperium’ posited a world governed by a transnational community of liberal citizens that would regulate state behaviour. The state would remain an institutionalised locus of sovereignty, but all states would be guided by a common moral compass. At first, a ’Bolshevik imperium’ envisaged world revolution, which eventually would be able to dispense with the Westphalian state altogether. However, in the process of winning the civil war, the Bolsheviks began to turn the former imperial Russia into a unique species of imperial state, which never wholly renounced the ideological goals of the Bolshevik imperium. The successor state appeared to resemble the Westphalian state, in its fixation of borders and security. However, it rested on new and unstable foundations – the imperative to maximise and naturalse both ethnic and historical boundaries. In complementary ways, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt opened up a space in the theory of successor state sovereignty that could be occupied by the race, or Volk. No reimagining of state sovereignty after the Great War did more to disrupt and ultimately overthrow the interwar international system.

Chapter 1 is dedicated to the explanandum of the book. In a first step, the chapter asks how to conceptualize autocratic rule and how to delineate it from rivalling concepts like authoritarianism and totalitarianism, but also sultanism, tyranny, despotism, and dictatorship. In a second step, the chapter clarifies different understandings of stability: persistence vs. continuity. In a third step, the chapter establishes the rationale behind the two logics of autocratic rule. Drawing on a Schmittian conception of the political, over-politicization is portrayed as the process of ideologically inflating a (political, social, religious, ethnic, etc.) difference, thereby defining an absolute foe (hostis), thus justifying the usage of hard repression and relying on formal ways of co-optation. In contrast, de-politicization is the reverse process of neutralizing contested issues, pulling conflictive issues out of the political arena by emphasizing performance legitimation, shying away from hard, but using soft repression and by being indifferent in its forms of co-optation.

This chapter discusses Ernst Fränkel’s analysis of Nazi Germany as a dual state that combined remnants of legal governance with a practice of permanent dictatorship. It is argued that Fränkel’s dual state thesis sheds a critical light on recent appropriations of the notion of material constitution. This claim is developed by way of an analysis and defence of Fränkel’s critique of Carl Schmitt’s concrete order thought.

This chapter revisits Carl Schmitt’s argument about constitutional identity. By excavating Schmitt’s material conception of constitutional law, I chart the path of affective constitutionalism in the interwar period of the twentieth century. To facilitate the task of relating mind to matter, I bring to bear insights from Raymond Williams, the literary theorist, and develop an argument about constitutions as ’structures of feeling’. By making this approach to materiality usable for thinking about the affective life of constitutions, I hope to bring phenomenology – the philosophy of experience – to the study of constitutional law.

One particular twentieth-century scholar stands out in how influential he was in ensuring Gentili’s position as a key protagonist in the history of international law: Carl Schmitt. This chapter argues that Schmitt’s influential emphasis on Gentili is not simply an inheritance of nineteenth-century narratives. Rather, Schmitt places Gentili at the heart of his history of the development of international law and the evolution of the concept of war in a move that should be understood as part of his broader attempt to defend authoritarian rule. In particular, I argue that placing so much emphasis on Gentili provided Schmitt with a way to make absolutist forms of rule seem normatively desirable. Schmitt came to associate absolutism with the humanization and the rationalization of warfare, not through an analysis of historical facts (which would have made the endeavor difficult) but through a partial interpretation of the works of some “great” thinkers, most importantly Gentili’s treatise on war.

This chapter locates Orbanian discourse and measures on migration in a Schmittian paradigm. The theory of Carl Schmitt helps us make sense of Hungarian constitutional developments, because Orbán has continuously concentrated on the political friend and foe to maintain a permanent ‘crisis’ situation. The chapter shows how Orbán’s authoritarian goals have determined the management of regular migration and the control of irregular migration and especially asylum. Most rules applicable during the fictitious ‘state of crisis caused by mass immigration’ in Hungary contradict EU law and breach international asylum law. The chapter argues that the ‘external constraining force’ of the EU is nevertheless relevant both in the context of migration and for the possibilities of democratic resistance. The chapter finds potential for legal resilience on the international and EU level, whereas domestically techniques of democratic resistance developed during feudalism (e.g., the tradition of free cities or ‘passive resistance’) and socialism (e.g., samizdat) can be mixed with those based on the leftovers of the rule of law regime.

That the Constitution of the United States of America might be thought of as a Christian document is even stranger than thinking of it as a just war document. Using – if also criticizing – the work of German political theorist Carl Schmitt, this chapter argues for a distinct kind of political theology understood in terms of time and that, in this regard, the Constitution reveals a kind of temporal posture that might best be understood, at least broadly, as “Christian.” The distinct way that the Constitution imagines time and how to stand in it (a posture in time) aligns best with the vision of time offered by Protestants – and particularly those in the Reformed tradition – at the time of the document’s writing. The way the United States and other constitutions imagine time continues to shape jurisprudence and societies. Troublingly, this temporal posture manifests in three problems that make the likelihood and shape of climate-shaped violence especially acute: using temporal deferral as a delaying maneuver, confusing optimism with hope, and fetishizing a particular modern expression of freedom.

Chapter Six looks at how the design and implementation of the Hong Kong version of “One Country, Two Systems” and its discontents. The Basic Law guarantees some fundamental rights and freedoms for Hong Kong’s residents. It promises eventual universal suffrage of the government. But an alliance of Beijing and the local business elite prevented it from specifying the exact form and timetable for universal suffrage. It also contains a clause about the necessity of anti-subversion legislation that threatens preexisting rights and freedoms. These contradictions and ambiguities of the Basic Law sowed the seeds of political conflicts after 1997. These conflicts, coupled with the rising monopoly of Chinese capital in Hong Kong, stimulated Beijing’s urge to forfeit indirect rule and move to a radical assimilationist politics and direct rule. Beijing’s urge has been articulated systematically by a group of official scholars who advocated Beijing’s statist absorption of Hong Kong as a rehearsal of China’s power projection farther abroad. Beijing’s premature crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy unleashed escalating resistance that culminated in the great clash of 2019.

Did capitalism, including the ethics of some of its leaders, go astray as a result of the upheavals of World War I and democratic politics? Did one witness a new phase of “political capitalism,” a term sociologist Max Weber coined originally with respect to ancient and premodern forms of capitalism? These questions not only reflected anticapitalist resentments but were a way to describe the close cooperation of political and economic interests and some of the more excessive forms of “booty” and “adventure capitalism,” including political and economic corruption. They also addressed certain enterprises, social groups, and individuals. Although not outright antisemitic, “political capitalism” always provided a springboard for antisemitic agendas. With the onset of the Great Depression, the latter was to become crucially important in the context of efforts not just to restore forms of a “rational” neoliberal economic order but also to purge the excesses of the previous years, including the persons who appeared to represent this “political capitalism.” These purges lasted well into the National Socialist period, which at the same time witnessed new and excessive forms of booty capitalism directed against the “enemies” of the Volksgemeinschaft and later also the occupied countries.