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1 results

  • 12 - Beyond Welfarism

  • from Part II - Developing Modern Welfare Economics
  • Edited by Roger E. Backhouse, Antoinette Baujard, Tamotsu Nishizawa
  • Book:
    Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values
    Published online:
    04 March 2021
    Print publication:
    25 March 2021, pp 277-297

  • Summary

    The capability approach is widely considered to be a promising alternative to welfarist approaches in welfare economics. Indeed, prominent criticism of the informational basis of utilitarianism and resource-based approaches in welfare economics and political philosophy stand at the origins of the approach. What is not straightforward is whether the capability approach can indeed overcome the problems that motivated its origins. This chapter discusses the latter issue, covering the intrinsic importance of freedom, issues of preference adaptation and the neglect of diversity linked to paternalism. Drawing both on the wide diversity of the literature on capabilities and on the axiomatic literature on freedom rankings, we show that the characteristic features of the capability approach are not enough to respect these three criteria together. We conclude that any promising non-welfarist approach will require further scrutiny of the conceptualisation of freedom, and the modalities of application of value pluralism.