This paper reports the results of a ‘probabilistic dictator game’ experiment in which subjects were given an option to share chances to win a prize with a dummy player. Using a within-subject design we manipulated two aspects of the decision, the relative cost of sharing and the nature of the lottery: the draws were either independent for the two players (‘noncompetitive’ condition) or one's success meant other's failure (‘competitive’ condition). We also asked for decisions in a standard, non-probabilistic, setting. The main results can be summarized as follows: first, a substantial fraction of subjects do share chances to win, also in the competitive treatments, thus showing concern for the other player that cannot be explained by outcome-based models. Second, subjects share less in the competitive treatment than in other treatments, indicating that procedural fairness alone cannot explain the data. Overall, these results suggest that models aiming at generalizing social concerns to risky environments will have to rely on a mix of distributive and procedural fairness.

We propose a framework for identifying discrete behavioural types in experimental data. We re-analyse data from six previous studies of public goods voluntary contribution games. Using hierarchical clustering analysis, we construct a typology of behaviour based on a similarity measure between strategies. We identify four types with distinct stereotypical behaviours, which together account for about 90% of participants. Compared to the previous approaches, our method produces a classification in which different types are more clearly distinguished in terms of strategic behaviour and the resulting economic implications.

Cooperation motives are traditionally elicited in experimental games where players have misaligned interests that yield noncooperation in equilibrium. Research finds a typology of behavioral types such as free riders and conditional cooperators. However, intrinsic motives in conflict settings such as appeasement, punishment, and greed are elusive in such games where noncooperation is the equilibrium prediction. To identify types in the dark side of human interaction, we apply hierarchical cluster analysis to data from the Vendetta Game, which has a payoff structure similar to public goods games but a dynamic move structure that yields cooperation in equilibrium. It allows us to observe diverse non-equilibrium conflict strategies, and to understand how feuds perpetuate. We relate our method and typology to other social dilemmas.

The association between economic variables and the frequency and duration of disability income insurance (DII) claims is well established. Across many jurisdictions, heightened levels of unemployment have been associated with both a higher incidence and a longer duration of DII claims. This motivated us to derive an asset portfolio for which the total asset value moves in line with the level of unemployment, thus, providing a natural match for the DII portfolio liabilities. To achieve this, we develop an economic tracking portfolio where the asset weights in the portfolio are chosen so that the portfolio value changes in a way that reflects, as closely as possible, the level of unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper applying economic tracking portfolios to hedge economic risk in DII. The methodology put forward to establish this asset-liability matching portfolio is illustrated using DII data from the UK between 2004 and 2016. The benefits of our approach for claims reserving in DII portfolios are illustrated using a simulation study.

Exporting northwest Arkansas excess turkey and broiler litter to partially fertilize nutrient-deficient cropland in eastern Arkansas can be more cost effective than to supply all crop nutrients with chemical fertilizer only, given current high fertilizer prices. Cost savings are greater if litter is baled in ultraviolet resistant plastic and transported via truck, since backhaul opportunities reduce truck rates, or alternatively, if raw litter is shipped via a truck-barge combination. Rice is the crop that allows for greater savings according to a mathematical programming model implemented in General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS).

A risk-averse irrigated corn producer would be better off choosing the more expensive subsurface drip irrigation (SDI) over center-pivot sprinkler (CPS), given limited aquifer life and swine effluent and urea fertilization. A stochastic optimization using EPIC data maximized expected utility of 100 years' worth of net revenues for a quarter section. Phosphorus accumulation was more likely with the CPS than with the SDI but soil nitrogen was constant under both systems. SDI conserves more water than CPS per acre but depletes the aquifer faster because a greater area is irrigated. These results were invariant in the sensitivity analysis.