This paper examines the effects of heterogeneous biased expectations between the young and old on business cycles and explores its policy implications. Empirical findings reveal that individuals, particularly the young, can have more optimistic or pessimistic views about the future state of the economy compared to the data-generating measure. This study relates these results to the learning-from-experience literature, which suggests that individuals, particularly the young, place greater weight on recent observations when forming their expectations. Incorporating household weighting schemes into a life-cycle learning model, I show that household sensitivity to recent observations amplifies the effects of economic shocks. However, the amplification effects become less extensive as the population ages due to the lower sensitivity of the old. My simulation results indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the old population ratio leads to a 16 percent decrease in output volatility. Regarding policy implications, this paper suggests that the government spending multiplier declines by approximately 10 percent when the old population ratio rises by 10 percentage points due to weak amplification effects. Moreover, the weakened output effects deteriorate the welfare of the population, particularly that of the young.

This paper studies how behavioral biases affect the optimal unemployment insurance. I revisit the optimal UI of Landais et al. (2018) and show how the optimal UI formula is modified and leads to novel economic insights. The optimal UI replacement rate is the conventional Baily-Chetty replacement rate, which solves the trade-off between liquidity and job-search incentives, plus a market tightness correction term which shows how welfare is affected by UI through tightness, and plus a behavioral bias correction term, which shows how welfare is affected by UI through job search effort.

Economists have long been interested in the effect of business sentiment on economic activity. Using text analysis, I construct a new company-level indicator of sentiment based on the net balance of positive and negative words in Australian company disclosures. Company-level investment is very sensitive to changes in this corporate sentiment indicator, even controlling for fundamentals, such as Tobin’s Q, as well as controlling for measures of company-level uncertainty.

The high sensitivity of investment to sentiment could be due to several mechanisms. It could be because of animal spirits among managers or because of sentiment proxies for private information held by managers about company prospects. Overall, I find mixed evidence of the underlying causal mechanism. The effect of sentiment on investment is relatively persistent, which is consistent with managers having private information about company fundamentals. But the sensitivity of investment to sentiment is not any stronger at opaque companies in which managers are likely to be better informed than investors. Further, investment is sensitive to sentiment even when investors have an information advantage over managers by lagging the sentiment indicator by a year. Overall, the sensitivity of investment to sentiment appears to reflect both animal spirits and fundamentals.

Corporate investment has been weak since the global financial crisis (GFC) and demand-side factors, such as lower sales growth, explain more than half of this weakness. Low sentiment and heightened uncertainty weighed on investment during the GFC but have been less important factors since then.

Irresponsible lending practices on the part of financial institutions and proliferation of tradable derivatives were key causal agents of the 2008 financial crisis. However, it is less clear why, historically, loose credit arrangements were so widespread. Somewhat misleadingly, much conjecture has laid blame at the feet of financial institutions themselves. While it is true that duplicitous and even corrupt lending practices were consequential antecedents of the crisis, a legacy commitment to certain – laudable – elements of New-Dealism created context for these elements to become established. To understand really what went wrong, it is necessary to look back before the 2000s and appreciate the interaction that was occurring between a long-term policy commitment to neoliberalism and piecemeal/fragmented application of approaches that aimed to assist financially disadvantaged people. Using the analogy of heart-attack pathology to guide some of its analysis, this essay argues for better policy-integration.

This paper examines how wealth and income inequality dynamics are related to fluctuations in the functional income distribution over the business cycle. In a panel estimation for OECD countries between 1970 and 2016, although inequality is, on average countercyclical and significantly associated with the capital share, one-third of the countries display a pro- or noncyclical relationship. To analyze the observed pattern, we incorporate distributive shocks into an RBC model, where agents are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to wealth and ability. We find that whether wealth and income inequality behave countercyclically or not depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the persistence of shocks. We match the model to quarterly US data using Bayesian techniques. The parameter estimates point toward a non-monotonic relationship between productivity and inequality fluctuations. On impact, inequality increases in response to TFP shocks but subsequently declines. Furthermore, TFP shocks explain 17% of inequality fluctuations.

Do fiscal stabilization policies affect the long-term growth of the economy? If so, are the long-term effects growth enhancing or growth reducing? When addressing these questions from a theoretical perspective, the literature has typically emphasized the importance of structural aspects such as the modeling approach of endogenous technological change while paying less attention to an elaborate design of the considered fiscal stabilization policies. This paper uses an agent-based macroeconomic model that generates endogenous business cycles to emphasize the role of the policy design for long-term growth effects of stabilization policies. By comparing a demand-oriented consumption policy and two different investment subsidizing policies, it can be shown that these policies are successful in smoothing the business cycle but differ in terms of their effects on economic long-term growth. This highlights the importance of policy design for the analysis of long-term effects of stabilization policies.

We consider a firm with assets-in-place and a growth option. There is a funding gap for the expansion investment, which is covered by entering into an equity-for-guarantee swap or fee-for-guarantee swap. We explicitly derive all contingent claim prices with the pricing and timing of the growth option taking business cycle and debt maturity into account. For short-term loan, we produce an explanation why Chinese government suggests that guarantee fee rate should be approximately the fraction 50% of the interest rate of bank loans with the same maturity, but for long-term debt, we show this fraction is too small.

This paper builds a standard search model with flexible prices and wages, and extensive and intensive labor adjustments. Money is introduced into the model through a cash-in-advance constraint in which only consumption is cash constrained. The model reproduces labor-market dynamics under a productivity shock and/or a monetary shock. I can replicate the Beveridge and Phillips curves that are observed in the data, and do not need to rely on the New Keynesian model or real wage rigidity. I find that the nonexistence of an extensive margin and different money mechanisms, such as cash constraints on investment and money in the utility function, do not change the above replications. Furthermore, I can still replicate the Beveridge curve even without money or with rigid prices.

This paper analyzes optimal capital and labor income taxation for households differentiated by labor skill, income, and wealth, under a balanced government budget, over the business cycle. A model incorporating capital–skill complementarity in production and differential access to labor and capital markets is developed to capture the cyclical characteristics of the US economy, as well as the empirical observations on wage (skill premium) and wealth inequality. We find that optimal taxes for middle-income households are more volatile than the remaining taxes. Moreover, the government re-allocates the total tax burden in bad times so that the share of total tax revenue paid by middle-income households rises. This share also rises for low-income households but by significantly less, whereas the tax share for skilled households falls.

We explore the effects of banking regulation on financial stability and macroeconomic dynamics in an agent-based computational model. In particular, we study the minimum level of capital and the lending concentration towards a single counterpart. We show that an overly tight regulation is dangerous because it reduces credit availability. By contrast, overly loose constraints, associated with a high payout ratio, increase financial fragility that, in turn, damage the real economy. Simulation results support the introduction of regulatory rules aimed at assuring an adequate capitalization of banks, such as the Capital Conservation Buffer (Basel III reform).

This paper investigates the effect of financial shocks using a general equilibrium model that links the firm's flows of financing with labor market variables. The results show that financial shocks have sizeable effects on debt, dividend payout, and wages. Shocks to the job destruction rate are important in explaining fluctuations in unemployment. The analysis also investigates the underlying driving forces of some key comovements in the data and finds shocks to the job destructions rate important.

Surprisingly, the strategic management literature has had little to say of an explicit nature on the topic of capitalism. However, the discourse on capitalism is vast in economics and many would say the writings of some economists on the topic of capitalism have been inordinately influential. Bearing this in mind, the differences between three world renowned economists on the topic of capitalism are examined with the intention of identifying where scope exists for strategic management to contribute to the discourse on capitalism. The paper concludes that strategic management is well placed to develop its own organization-centric discourse on the subject.

Did the American public become more protectionist during the Great Recession of 2007–09? If so, why? During this period, many observers expressed concern that rising unemployment would stimulate protectionist pressures. The results of this study indicate that although increased unemployment did not affect the trade preferences of most Americans, individuals working in import-competing industries who lost their jobs during the Great Recession did grow more hostile to trade. However, even greater hostility to trade stemmed from a variety of non-material factors. Increasing ethnocentrism and opposition to involvement in world affairs between 2007 and 2009 help account for growing antipathy toward trade. But most importantly, increasing anxiety that foreign commerce would harm people in the future, even if it had not done so thus far, contributed to mounting opposition to trade among the American public.

The Hodrick–Prescott filter represents one of the most popular methods for trend–cycle extraction in macroeconomic time series. In this paper we provide a multivariate generalization of the Hodrick–Prescott filter, based on the seemingly unrelated time series approach. We first derive closed-form expressions linking the signal–noise matrix ratio to the parameters of the VARMA representation of the model. We then show that the parameters can be estimated using a recently introduced method, called “Moment Estimation Through Aggregation (META).” This method replaces traditional multivariate likelihood estimation with a procedure that requires estimating univariate processes only. This makes the estimation simpler, faster, and better behaved numerically. We prove that our estimation method is consistent and asymptotically normal distributed for the proposed framework. Finally, we present an empirical application focusing on the industrial production of several European countries.

This study demonstrates how expectation errors in a credit market generate economic fluctuations. To this end, we employ simulation analysis using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Our model includes two building blocks that are not included in the standard models: the banking sector and matching friction in the labor market. By introducing the banking sector, we can confirm that if economic agents fallaciously expect a rise in future asset prices, such expectations will cause an economic boom and bust. The variation of this fluctuation is quite large and the recession short-lived, but these drawbacks can be avoided by adding matching friction.

This paper investigates the nonlinear dynamics of the inflation–output type of Phillips curve based on a multiple-regime smooth transition regression model using data from China. The empirical results indicate significant nonlinearities in China's Phillips curve. The relationship between inflation and output can be modeled by a four-regime smooth transition regression model in which the responses of inflation to output depend on both inflation and economic growth rates. The inflation–output type Phillips curve may be positively sloped, negatively sloped, or even vertical in the short term, depending on different business cycles. Furthermore, we analyze business cycle fluctuations based on the nonlinear Phillips curve, indicating a coexisting zone of stable inflation rate and rapid growth rate.

We investigate whether recoveries following normal recessions differ from recoveries following recessions that are associated with either banking crises or housing crises. Using a parametric panel framework that allows for a bounce-back in the level of output during the recovery, we find that normal recessions are followed by strong recoveries in advanced economies. This bounce-back is absent following recessions associated with banking crises and housing crises. Consequently, the permanent output losses of recessions associated with banking crises and housing crises are considerably larger than those of normal recessions.