This chapter covers Heinrich Sohnrey, the Question of the Land debate, Junker, the Agrarian League, the marriage of Rye and Iron, Adolf Wagner, Karl Oldenberg, Agrar- und Industriestaat, and Lujo Brentano. It discusses an Agrarian versus an industrial future for Germany. Bernhard von Bülow became Chancellor in 1900. Inner Colonization had been difficult in Posen and West Prussia, as Poles organizde a counter-colonial program. The chapter also discusses the Expropriation Law of 1908, alongside Junker, Bethmann-Hollweg, Sering in the Navy League, Agrarian Romantics who support building an iron Navy, overseas colonialism, and Geoff Eley. This period sees Sering challenged to a duel, Sayre’s law, Dernburg, and German southwest Africa. In 1908, Sering published Inheritance Law and Agriculture in Schleswig-Holstein from an Historical Basis. Race and Colonialism. The journal Archive of Inner Colonization was founded in this period. Inner colonization was a part of a continuum, from adjacent land to overseas colonies. The Society for the Advancement of Inner Colonization was also founded. The Junker were against Sering and the idea of inner colonization, for it demanded the break up of their large landed estates and parcellization into small farms. In 1912 Sering went to Russia.

The theme of the essential activity of the mind provided the exciting intellectual setting that made a compelling case for psychology’s founding, and also gave rise to competing models of psychology. Structural or content psychology, championed by Wundt and Titchener, defined psychology as the experimental study of the data of immediate experience through the method of trained introspection. This natural science model sought to reduce the contents of consciousness to constituent elements of sensory origin. The restricted definition and ambiguous methodology led to challenges. Nevertheless, structural psychology secured recognition of psychology as a science, and Müller, Hering, and Ebbinghaus, attempted to modify structural psychology. Additionally, Mach and Avenarius bolstered the justification for psychology as a natural science. An alternative, described as a human science model, proposed more open definition and methodologies. Brentano’s act psychology stated that the phenomenological processes of psychological events are inseparable from the environment and consciousness. The works of Stumpf, Külpe, Dilthey and Bergson all fall into the human science model, but the lack of systematic theory reduced their successful competition with structural psychology. In many respects, the “founding” of modern psychology was a false beginning, and neither model established a lasting framework for psychology.

This chapter begins defending the 3d account of powers, which combines directedness (i.e., intentionality) and data (i.e., information) as essential ingredients of dispositions (i.e., powers). The first thesis in the 3d account is the Physical Intentionality Thesis, and it is introduced here. Two supporting arguments for this thesis are previewed: the Argument from the Marks of intentionality (to be elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5) and the Argument from the Unity of Nature (to be elaborated in Chapter 8). Then historical precursors to physical intentionality are discussed, including Brentano’s thesis, the primary model for the Physical Intentionality Thesis. Lastly, an epistemic (versus a metaphysical) interpretation of physical intentionality is critiqued, a teleological view of powers is compared to the Physical Intentionality Thesis, and other related views are explored.