We consider initially two parallel routes, each of two queues in tandem, with arriving customers choosing the route giving them the shortest expected time in the system, given the queue lengths at the customer's time of arrival. All interarrival and service times are exponential.

We then augment this network to obtain a Wheatstone bridge, in which customers may cross from one route to the other between queues, again choosing the route giving the shortest expected time in the system, given the queue lengths ahead of them.

We find that Braess's paradox can occur: namely in equilibrium the expected transit time in the augmented network, for some service rates, can be greater than in the initial network.

Braess's paradox is said to occur in a network if the addition of an extra link leads to worse performance. It has been shown to occur in transportation networks (such as road networks) and also in queueing networks. Here, we show that it can occur in loss networks.

In an uncongested transportation network, adding routes and capacity to an existing network must decrease, or at worst not change, the average time individuals require to travel through the network from a source to a destination. Braess (1968) discovered that the same is not true in congested networks. Here we give an example of a queuing network in which added capacity leads to an increase in the mean transit time for everyone. Self-seeking individuals are unable to refrain from using the additional capacity, even though using it leads to deterioration in the mean transit time. This example appears to be the first queuing network to demonstrate the general principle that in non-co-operative games with smooth payoff functions, user-determined equilibria generically deviate from system-optimal equilibria.