In the third chapter, the authors discuss the origins and evolution of the Shia political Islam with a focus on the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Ayatollahs’ revolutionary vision which aimed to export the Iranian political-religious model to other countries. This chapter gives an overview of the psycho-biographies of influential Shia leaders: Ali Khamenei, Hassan Rouhani, Ali al-Sistani, and Nouri al-Maliki. The authors discuss the operational code analysis results and deliberate on what kind of generic foreign policy behavior and strategies we should expect from Shia political Islamist leaders. The chapter also sheds light on what these results and strategies mean for the MENA politics and consider the implications of this analysis for Iran’s relations with the United States, the EU, and regional powers; Iraq’s foreign relations; and the future of Iraq as a viable power in regional politics. The authors conclude by discussing what these results mean for foreign policy decision-making and the international relations discipline.

With the Iran–Iraq conflict and the Cold War coming to an end, the US–Iran relationship appeared to warm as each country no longer faced the existential threats that had once consumed them. With the death of Khomeini, Iran also found itself at a crucial juncture as more pragmatic figures came to the fore. The ascent of new leadership marked a more pragmatic turn for Iran. Meanwhile, in the US, George H.W. Bush attempted to usher the US into the post–Cold War world, and seemed more eager than his predecessor to engage with Iran. Time would not be on his side, however, and other priorities – especially the revolutions in Eastern Europe and Operation Desert Storm – distracted Bush from making any significant steps toward rapprochement. His successor, Bill Clinton, did nothing to better the relationship in his first term, but with the surprise election of the reformist Mohammad Khatami the two rival nations began warming to the prospect of serious engagement. Despite some initial gestures and successful Track II diplomatic exchanges, however, time and expectations again would become factors and the decade would close without concrete agreements.

Barack Obama entered the presidency with a clear plan for engaging Iran. Rather than building on past rhetoric and emphasizing Iran’s "misbehavior," he opted for a new approach. In a speech marking Iran’s new year, he praised Iran’s rich history, then reached out directly to the country's new president, Hassan Rouhani. The approach did not show immediate results, but the two countries, along with European powers, Russia, and China, began to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program – a key issue for the relationship since the 1990s. The P5+1 talks (and secret US–Iran meetings) slowly began to turn the tide. The JCPOA finally came into being, representing a significant diplomatic achievement. Through it would prove to be short-lived, the Iran deal demonstrated that progress could be achieved. After forty years of near-constant enmity, the two countries appeared to be on the verge of détente. When Donald Trump unilaterally pulled the US out of the deal, these hopes were again dashed. But lessons from the negotiations remain for future policymakers hoping to resolve this most confounding of global issues.