Mate preferences probably evolved to increase fitness; however, studies using arranged and non-arranged marriage as proxies for limited and free mate choice (respectively) do not find any reproductive differences. We explore why arranged and non-arranged marriages are an imperfect proxy for limited and free-choice matings and what fitness effects different marriage types could produce. Data from focus group discussions with men and women in Nepal show that there are three spouse choice categories with differing levels of parental influence over mate choice, reinforcing that arranged and non-arranged are not dichotomous. Discussions also show that parents and offspring, especially sons, may be more aligned in in-law/mate preferences than expected, demonstrating the need to establish clear domains of parent–offspring disagreement over spouse choice in the community before investigating fitness. Several social and financial benefits that are only available to arranged couples in this community were detected, and these benefits could compensate for any costs of not choosing a spouse independently. These benefits of arranged marriage are more salient for women than for men. These discussions indicate that predictions about the effects of spouse choice on fitness outcomes may differ for men and women and depend on community-specific socioeconomic benefits.

Success in marriage markets has lasting impacts on women's wellbeing. By arranging marriages, parents exert financial and social powers to influence spouse characteristics and ensure optimal marriages. While arranging marriages is a major focus of parental investment, marriage decisions are also a source of conflict between parents and daughters in which parents often have more power. The process of market integration may alter parental investment strategies, however, increasing children's bargaining power and reducing parents’ influence over children's marriage decisions. We use data from a market integrating region of Bangladesh to (a) describe temporal changes in marriage types, (b) identify which women enter arranged marriages and (c) determine how market integration affects patterns of arranged marriage. Most women's marriages were arranged, with love marriages more recent. We found few predictors of who entered arranged vs. love marriages, and family-level market integration did not predict marriage type at the individual level. However, based on descriptive findings, and findings relating women's and fathers’ education to groom characteristics, we argue that at the society-level market integration has opened a novel path in which daughters use their own status, gained via parental investments, to facilitate good marriages under conditions of reduced parental assistance or control.