There has been great popular and scholarly interest in the activities of non-Arctic actors in the Arctic region, and in the Arctic Council specifically. We find controversy around the activities of Observers in the Council, with some seeing challenges to Arctic states and others seeing positive co-operation. The Arctic Council is the preeminent governance forum for the Arctic region, consisting of the Arctic states (as of 2023, minus Russia) and six Indigenous peoples’ organisations. Non-Arctic states, intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations can be Observers in the institution. Existing literature has examined the significance, interest and powers of these actors; this paper answers the research question, what do Observers actually do in the Arctic Council? To answer this question, this paper presents the results of content analysis of official Arctic Council Observer reviews and reports, which catalogue their activities. The answer may seem obvious: Observers observe. However, Arctic Council Observers do more than this simple function. This paper proposes that all of the activities of Observers fit into a typology of six types of activity. The ultimate finding is that Observers in the Arctic Council work with Arctic states to enhance institutional work around climate change and sustainable development; we see examples of positive co-operation that enhances regional governance. It is another example of peaceful international relations in the Arctic.

Arctic governance has entered a period of turmoil following the March 2022 Arctic Council pause in operations and, subsequently, the strained relations between the member states. As climate change dramatically alters the Arctic environment, opening the region to new economic possibilities and more global attention, the need for cooperation is greater than ever. This article examines the current geopolitical and environmental pressures that are undermining the Arctic Council’s legitimacy and operations at a critical juncture in Arctic governance. It contends that the Arctic Council must rethink how it engages with Arctic Council observers and the wider global community to ensure that pressing ecological, economic, and social issues are addressed judiciously to prevent potentially irreparable harm in the region. Specifically, the case is made that a shift to “inclusive regionalism” could secure the Arctic Council’s position as the pre-eminent forum to address Arctic issues and to re-establish the spirit of collaboration that reigned for a quarter century.

The linkages between the Arctic and the rest of the world have become more profound and the region is increasingly attracting attention, also from non-Arctic state actors. Parallel to this development, the discussion about the future Arctic is taking place in various arenas, forums and among an increasing number of actors with interest in the region. At a time of high tension in international relations, and an increased likelihood of spill-over to Arctic cooperation, issues of governance of the Arctic region are potentially at stake. This makes it important that scholars are accurate in their analyses; confusing the mandate, responsibilities and purposes of different arenas for cooperation can be unfortunate. This article finds support in the literature on regime complexes and aims to show and analyse the differences between three key players in the Arctic: the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly. In addition to exploring their differences, we ask what role these entities play in shaping policy in and for the Arctic. From mapping out the mandates, roles and responsibilities of the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly, and by nuancing their formal and informal aspects, we aim to contribute to clarifying misunderstandings regarding their functions and positions vis-à-vis each other.

As ice recedes, the governance of the Arctic is undergoing a significant change. What was once considered a frozen desert with little relevance to the legal system, the Arctic has gradually become a global object of governance. Furthermore, the growing political salience of the Arctic Ocean has generated interest in its governance beyond Arctic states, particularly Asian states such as China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. These countries have been actively participating in regional cooperation arrangements, including the Arctic Council. Undoubtedly, science diplomacy has been an important driver in shaping the governance of the Arctic and maintaining it as a low-tension area. However, this perception is now being put to the test following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Amidst this crisis, we explore whether science diplomacy can continue to promote peaceful collaboration in the Arctic region. Our research suggests that science diplomacy could potentially aid in the future of Arctic governance, particularly with regard to the involvement of Asian states. We analyse the legal and geopolitical factors involved in determining the potential roles of Asian states in Arctic governance, including whether they could serve as a bridge between the West and Russia or if their actions might further fragment Arctic governance.

It has been argued that science diplomacy (SD) helps avoid or mitigate conflicts among stakeholders in the Arctic. Yet underlying some of these well-intended and sometimes successful initiatives is a one-sided understanding of SD. The most recent literature takes a more differentiated approach towards the means and ends of SD. It shows that international scientific interaction is shaped by the twofold logic of competition and collaboration. Instruments of SD can be meant to serve national interests, collective regional goals or global agendas. The present paper disentangles these confounding discourses of collaboration and competition based on a conceptually enhanced SD framework. It analyses Arctic strategies and two cases of Arctic SD, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation and research activities on Svalbard, to reveal the mechanisms of collaboration and competition in the sphere of international science in relation to security, environment and economy. By pointing out where and how science is currently being used in the Arctic, this article provides (a) a systematic overview of the state of SD in the region and (b) a tool for policy-makers and scientists to assess what impact different facets of SD have in Arctic politics.

Science diplomacy has been instrumental in facilitating cooperation in the Arctic region, yet through the projection of vast hydrocarbon potential in the region, it has also served to undermine the major transformation necessary in Arctic decision-making towards the goals of climate governance. This article surveys the translation of science from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) reports (i.e. the CARA study and Factsheet 2008-3049) on Arctic oil and gas and its transformation into common knowledge within Arctic discourse through repetition by the agents in between and its subsequent adoption into Arctic policy documents. In this process, we interrogate the production of the science underpinning US science diplomacy and the influence of this science on international Arctic discourse and policy use science diplomacy. This paper contributes to the literature of science diplomacy in the Arctic by examining the contributions of the USGS to Arctic policy discourses and its impact on Arctic governance at the nexus of science diplomacy on climate and energy.

The governance of the Arctic as a frontier for international environmental and climate cooperation, resource politics and security governance holds the promise to provide important insights into some of the 21st century’s most enduring and pressing global challenges. This article reviews the state of the art of Arctic governance research (AGR) to assess the potential and limitations of a regional studies community for making sense of Northern politics and contributing to the broader discipline of international relations (IR) research. A bibliometric analysis of 398 articles published in 10 outlets between 2008 and 2019 reveals that AGR faces at least four limitations that undermine understanding and explaining the processes and outcomes of regional politics and inhibit generalisable observations applicable to questions of global governance: academic immaturity, methodological monoculturalism, state-centrism and analytical parochialism. The lack particularly of theoretically driven and comparative research is indicative of a deeper crisis in AGR which, if unaddressed, could further solidify the community’s unjustified reputation as quixotic in orientation and negligible in its contributions to IR research.

Since its inception, the Arctic Council (AC) has focused on biodiversity, under its working group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. By adopting a holistic, cross-sectoral approach to biodiversity governance, the AC has acknowledged that biodiversity is not only a matter for the Council and its governments: also non-state actors must be involved. This article analyses whether and how three essential non-state actors – science, business and NGOs – influence AC processes on Arctic biodiversity, comparing the roles of these actors on biodiversity governance in the wider international context. AC work on biodiversity has remained largely scientific, with fewer political commitments for states and the Council as such: science has had a significant influence, whereas there has been limited space for the involvement of the business sector. NGOs have served mainly as contributors and partners in scientific work, increasingly also assuming policy advocacy roles. This article notes the need for closer political cooperation on biodiversity in the AC, with firmer commitments for states and the AC, inspired by work in other AC focal areas.

The regulation of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) is widely seen as an important dimension of global atmospheric pollution control and climate change governance. SLCPs emitted outside the Arctic influence the Arctic atmosphere, Arctic communities, and the rate of ice melt. As an intergovernmental forum that brings together three of the world’s major petroleum producers (Russia, the United States, and Canada), the Arctic Council has a pivotal role in reducing the rate of Arctic warming through SLCP mitigation. This article explores the Arctic Council’s approach to SLCP mitigation. It begins by addressing the current status of black carbon and methane in international legal instruments, and goes on to explore the important regime linkages that are set in place through the Arctic Council’s Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions. The article suggests that the Arctic Council provides an experimental platform that may catalyze SLCP regulation not only in Arctic jurisdictions but also in Arctic Council observer states, such as China and India. The transnational and inclusive character of the Arctic Council’s constitutional framework and knowledge-generating mechanisms enables new pathways for global action on climate change and air pollution governance.