There has been great popular and scholarly interest in the activities of non-Arctic actors in the Arctic region, and in the Arctic Council specifically. We find controversy around the activities of Observers in the Council, with some seeing challenges to Arctic states and others seeing positive co-operation. The Arctic Council is the preeminent governance forum for the Arctic region, consisting of the Arctic states (as of 2023, minus Russia) and six Indigenous peoples’ organisations. Non-Arctic states, intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations can be Observers in the institution. Existing literature has examined the significance, interest and powers of these actors; this paper answers the research question, what do Observers actually do in the Arctic Council? To answer this question, this paper presents the results of content analysis of official Arctic Council Observer reviews and reports, which catalogue their activities. The answer may seem obvious: Observers observe. However, Arctic Council Observers do more than this simple function. This paper proposes that all of the activities of Observers fit into a typology of six types of activity. The ultimate finding is that Observers in the Arctic Council work with Arctic states to enhance institutional work around climate change and sustainable development; we see examples of positive co-operation that enhances regional governance. It is another example of peaceful international relations in the Arctic.

Arctic governance has entered a period of turmoil following the March 2022 Arctic Council pause in operations and, subsequently, the strained relations between the member states. As climate change dramatically alters the Arctic environment, opening the region to new economic possibilities and more global attention, the need for cooperation is greater than ever. This article examines the current geopolitical and environmental pressures that are undermining the Arctic Council’s legitimacy and operations at a critical juncture in Arctic governance. It contends that the Arctic Council must rethink how it engages with Arctic Council observers and the wider global community to ensure that pressing ecological, economic, and social issues are addressed judiciously to prevent potentially irreparable harm in the region. Specifically, the case is made that a shift to “inclusive regionalism” could secure the Arctic Council’s position as the pre-eminent forum to address Arctic issues and to re-establish the spirit of collaboration that reigned for a quarter century.

The linkages between the Arctic and the rest of the world have become more profound and the region is increasingly attracting attention, also from non-Arctic state actors. Parallel to this development, the discussion about the future Arctic is taking place in various arenas, forums and among an increasing number of actors with interest in the region. At a time of high tension in international relations, and an increased likelihood of spill-over to Arctic cooperation, issues of governance of the Arctic region are potentially at stake. This makes it important that scholars are accurate in their analyses; confusing the mandate, responsibilities and purposes of different arenas for cooperation can be unfortunate. This article finds support in the literature on regime complexes and aims to show and analyse the differences between three key players in the Arctic: the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly. In addition to exploring their differences, we ask what role these entities play in shaping policy in and for the Arctic. From mapping out the mandates, roles and responsibilities of the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly, and by nuancing their formal and informal aspects, we aim to contribute to clarifying misunderstandings regarding their functions and positions vis-à-vis each other.

As ice recedes, the governance of the Arctic is undergoing a significant change. What was once considered a frozen desert with little relevance to the legal system, the Arctic has gradually become a global object of governance. Furthermore, the growing political salience of the Arctic Ocean has generated interest in its governance beyond Arctic states, particularly Asian states such as China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. These countries have been actively participating in regional cooperation arrangements, including the Arctic Council. Undoubtedly, science diplomacy has been an important driver in shaping the governance of the Arctic and maintaining it as a low-tension area. However, this perception is now being put to the test following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Amidst this crisis, we explore whether science diplomacy can continue to promote peaceful collaboration in the Arctic region. Our research suggests that science diplomacy could potentially aid in the future of Arctic governance, particularly with regard to the involvement of Asian states. We analyse the legal and geopolitical factors involved in determining the potential roles of Asian states in Arctic governance, including whether they could serve as a bridge between the West and Russia or if their actions might further fragment Arctic governance.

Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 was the end of the Arctic cooperation between states and others as we knew it, despite the fact that Russia’s illegal actions are not occurring in the Arctic region. Russia’s attack on Ukraine caused pronounced security fears and responses, particularly from the European and North American countries, including the other Arctic states. This naturally affected Arctic cooperation because it is precisely in the Arctic region that Russia is such a vastly central actor. For example, the region’s pre-eminent inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council, is struggling to continue its activities in full, as the seven western Arctic states paused participating in meetings held in and activities involving Russia. On the other hand, the first in-person meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) fisheries agreement in late November 2022 successfully adopted its COP Rules of Procedure by consensus, including Russia. The purpose of this article is to investigate how adversely Arctic international cooperation in inter-governmental forums and treaties has suffered due to the Ukraine war, utilising a qualitative research methodology to collect internal and sensitive information from key informants. In particular, the article aims to find an answer to the following question: In which types of Arctic inter-governmental structures have the states been able to continue the cooperation and for what reasons? The hypothesis that will be tested in this article is whether treaty-based cooperation has fared better than cooperation founded on soft law. This article will flesh out the current state of Arctic cooperative frameworks and actual cooperative activities under them, analysing three soft law-based cooperative frameworks, including the Arctic Council and several treaty-based cooperative frameworks, such as the CAO fisheries agreement and Arctic Science Cooperation Agreement. This article is based on the facts as of 22 February 2023.

The Arctic Contaminants Action Programme (ACAP), originally intended to follow up the work of AMAP (the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme) on identifying the sources of pollution, became an official working group under the Arctic Council in 2006. ACAP has focussed on pollution from Russian sources, the main objective being to accelerate the reduction of national emissions of various environmental pollutants and climate forcers. Basically, ACAP initiates projects with a scientific basis in AMAP assessments of the health of the Arctic. The idea behind the creation of ACAP was to channel the work of the Arctic Council in a more practical direction and to improve the use of the knowledge produced by AMAP. ACAP is one of only two Council working groups not to have been specifically evaluated and analysed by external bodies and academics. This article undertakes a critical analysis of ACAP and argues that there are great potentials for improving its work. ACAP has established a forum where it has been possible to facilitate pilot projects aimed at limiting harmful emissions; this work should be strengthened.

The utilization of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) in wildlife management has been a prominent topic for several decades. Since its establishment, Arctic Council (AC) has emphasized the importance of TEK and its utilization in its work. Yet, the process of knowledge coproduction in the AC has never been assessed. To what extent has TEK been meaningfully incorporated into the AC? The research uses qualitative content analysis to analyze the AC working groups’ meeting minutes, reports, scientific reports and assessments as well as reports released by Permanent Participants in order to investigate how the TEK has been incorporated into the AC. The study investigates that the process of knowledge coproduction in the AC turned into lip service, and suggests the set of recommendations that could potentially guide the TEK projects in the process of knowledge co-production. These recommendations, including the use of participatory methodology, the use of Indigenous methods, a recognition that TEK is local, application to policy, and better cross-cultural communication, could result in the more meaningful integration of TEK into scientific projects as well as wildlife management policies.

Since its inception, the Arctic Council (AC) has focused on biodiversity, under its working group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. By adopting a holistic, cross-sectoral approach to biodiversity governance, the AC has acknowledged that biodiversity is not only a matter for the Council and its governments: also non-state actors must be involved. This article analyses whether and how three essential non-state actors – science, business and NGOs – influence AC processes on Arctic biodiversity, comparing the roles of these actors on biodiversity governance in the wider international context. AC work on biodiversity has remained largely scientific, with fewer political commitments for states and the Council as such: science has had a significant influence, whereas there has been limited space for the involvement of the business sector. NGOs have served mainly as contributors and partners in scientific work, increasingly also assuming policy advocacy roles. This article notes the need for closer political cooperation on biodiversity in the AC, with firmer commitments for states and the AC, inspired by work in other AC focal areas.

Despite its numerous valuable contributions to Arctic governance, throughout its history the Arctic Council (AC) has been subject to criticism and reform proposals from academic, non-governmental and practitioner communities alike. In order to inform this ongoing debate, the paper evaluates the proposals that have been presented for the AC thus far. The proposals are grouped into three clusters: legal reforms, organisational reforms and functional reforms. Each of them is examined in terms of its applicability and usefulness to the case of the AC, and specifically its suitability given the prevailing conditions in the Arctic. What the conducted analysis reveals is that the ideas regarding means to enhance the AC’s effectiveness can be largely attributed to the assumptions their proponents make—oftentimes implicitly—about the nature of state actors and international relations more broadly, without attending to the particular conditions of the case study at hand. This is an important inference, given the unrelenting change happening in both Arctic and global socio-environmental settings that calls into question the usefulness of past modes of thinking and forms of international cooperation. Far from offering solutions, their continuous application in particular circumstances might even impede progress in addressing present and future challenges.

The regulation of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) is widely seen as an important dimension of global atmospheric pollution control and climate change governance. SLCPs emitted outside the Arctic influence the Arctic atmosphere, Arctic communities, and the rate of ice melt. As an intergovernmental forum that brings together three of the world’s major petroleum producers (Russia, the United States, and Canada), the Arctic Council has a pivotal role in reducing the rate of Arctic warming through SLCP mitigation. This article explores the Arctic Council’s approach to SLCP mitigation. It begins by addressing the current status of black carbon and methane in international legal instruments, and goes on to explore the important regime linkages that are set in place through the Arctic Council’s Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions. The article suggests that the Arctic Council provides an experimental platform that may catalyze SLCP regulation not only in Arctic jurisdictions but also in Arctic Council observer states, such as China and India. The transnational and inclusive character of the Arctic Council’s constitutional framework and knowledge-generating mechanisms enables new pathways for global action on climate change and air pollution governance.

This article proposes an Arctic Ocean Coordinating Agreement (AOCA) as a framework for more effective coordination and sharing of practices regarding national conservation and management policies in the marine Arctic. It envisions a nimble, versatile body that operates without creating new institutions and focuses instead on convening and coordinating existing individuals and institutions whose expertise can assist the Arctic states with questions that the Arctic states define. The AOCA could incorporate aspects of regional seas agreements (RSAs) into a less formal regional arrangement that would differ significantly from traditional RSAs. Identifying the Arctic Council as the right entity to launch AOCA discussions, the article proposes that an AOCA should draw on entities already engaged in work relevant to the emerging challenges in the Arctic Ocean: the Helsinki and OSPAR Commissions, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the North Pacific Marine Science Organization (PICES), and other institutions that have successfully convened appropriate sets of actors for targeted responses to shared marine management concerns around the world.