Anselm described god as “something than which nothing greater can be thought” [1, p. 93], and Descartes viewed him as “a supreme being” [7, p. 122]. I first capture those characterizations formally in a simple language for monadic predicate logic. Next, I construct a model class inspired by Stoic and medieval doctrines of grades of being [8, 20]. Third, I prove the models sufficient for recovering, as internal mathematics, the famous ontological argument of Anselm, and show that argument to be, on this formalization, valid. Fourth, I extend the models to incorporate a modality fit for proving that any item than which necessarily no greater can be thought is also necessarily real. Lastly, with the present approach, I blunt the sharp edges of notable objections to ontological arguments by Gaunilo and by Grant. A trigger warning: every page of this writing flouts the old saw “Existence is not a predicate” and flagrantly.

Jesus’ hyperbolic saying that ‘it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven’, present in the synoptic tradition (Matt 19.24; Mark 10.25; Luke 18.25), has long been subject to the suggestion that the ‘eye of a needle’ does not refer to an actual needle but is the name of a small gate in the Jerusalem wall. Today, most biblical scholars are convinced that this theory is incorrect, but no study identifies the sources of the error and traces the history of this myth. This note focuses on tracking the origins of the flaw and points specifically to the sources of the misconception that the term ‘eye of a needle’ should not be taken literally.

The earliest note that mentions a gate called the ‘eye of a needle’ seems to be a gloss attributed to Anselm of Canterbury (11th cent.). This gloss can be found in the thirteenth-century work of Thomas Aquinas Catena aurea. What is false, however, is the oft-repeated belief that the source of the information is the eleventh-century Gospel Commentary of Theophylact.

In this paper, I explore Kant's much-studied critique of the ontological argument, seeking to place Immanuel Kant and Anselm of Canterbury more directly in contact with one another; I do this in two ways. First, I discuss the historical reception of the ontological argument in Kant's eighteenth century context. Second, I move the discussion away from the first Critique, and look towards Kant's Pre-critical discussion of the ontological argument in The Only Possible Argument, where he initially sets out his primary objection. By shifting the focus towards these areas of Kant's thought, I aim to achieve three interrelated goals. First, I show that Kant had a limited knowledge of the history and origins of the ontological argument, which was transmitted to him through Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, who put a Cartesian spin on it. Second, I provide textual evidence which shows that Kant's objection does not succeed against Anselm's argument. Third, I elucidate that Kant's identification of God as the ens realissimum is compatible with Anselm's identification of God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’.

The opening chapters of Anselm's Monologion contain a ‘proof’ of a perfect being, which has received far less attention than the more famous Proslogion proof, and the ontological arguments derived from it. I wish to rectify this by developing an argument in defence of a crucial premise of the Monologion proof. This premise states that ‘the Good’, i.e. that in virtue of which numerically distinct things may all be good, must itself be a supremely good thing (if it exists). I motivate the argument before considering objections to both premises, as well as putative ‘parodies’ of my argument. Part of the motivation of my argument will involve the claim that the Good, if it is good at all, must be a paradigm good thing. I conclude that theists have a second kind of ontological argument at their disposal.

Contemporary analyses of Anselm's objective description of Christ's atonement have often resulted in a trend of interpretation that tends to ignore the relevance of this model to a development and understanding of a western doctrine of Christian sanctification. Through the examination of some overlooked insights offered in Cur Deus homo and their integration with other spiritual writings in Anselm's corpus, the present article attempts to redirect current scholarship towards a more holistic engagement with Anselm's doctrine of atonement, out of which an original doctrine of Christian perfection can be outlined.

Anselm's argument for the salvific necessity of the Incarnation in his Cur Deus Homo is justly famous and elegantly simple: only man ought; only God can; therefore, only a God-man both ought and can (atone for sin). Unfortunately it is a paralogism, trading on an equivocal use of ‘ought’. It is not difficult, however, to reconceive the meaning of the terms ‘ought’ and ‘can’ in a way that both renders the argument formally valid and deepens our christology. Sin may be conceived, per Anselm's own insistence, as a condition of the human soul in its relation to God, a failure of the human will to establish itself in harmonious union with the divine will. If the integrity of created human nature requires that its psychological conditions are propagated together with it, then one who has both the duty and ability to atone for sin must be descended from Adam but must enjoy the original justice of the soul that Adam rejected and deformed in himself. Thus, systematically reconstructing Anselm's argument has the surprising consequence of enabling us to posit an argument for the salvific necessity of the Immaculate Conception as a preparatory stage in the hypostatic union of the Incarnation.

Recent work on the morality of hell spans the various subdisciplines of theology, with the ironic exception of theological ethics. An adequate defence of hell requires a positive account of how God's eternally tormenting some humans is beautiful, just and worthy of worship. This suggests a short-term and long-term task. The short-term task, which this article pursues, tests whether an adequate moral theory is available by evaluating three possible candidates, the third of which is the most interesting, as it offers a historicist defence of hell: we believe hell is cruel only because of aversions to cruel and unusual punishment that emerged in modernity. Nonetheless, all three defences are inadequate, suggesting a longer term goal: we need either better moral theories or better accounts of hell, as well as greater analytic clarity regarding theological statements of the form, I want doctrine y to be true but believe doctrine x is true.

The article re-examines Karl Barth's claim that his 1931 book on Anselm of Canterbury's proof of the existence of God from Proslogion 2–4, the Fides Quaerens Intellectum, provides a ‘vital key’ for understanding the rationality of his later theology. The article takes up the question of what ‘dialectics’ denotes in Barth's theology. Re-engaging the issue of dialectics in Karl Barth's theology, particularly in light of the developments of his thought, leads to a critical revision of Bruce McCormack's influential interpretation of Barth's dialectical theology.

Through a close reading of the section, ‘The manner of theology’, from the first of the two parts of Fides Quaerens Intellectum the article sheds light on how Barth envisions the construction of the theoretical concepts of theology in light of his concrete exegetical praxis. By focusing on the relationship between theory and praxis, an understanding of Barth's dialectical theology as a form of ‘speculative reading’ emerges. This notion of dialectics as developing in light of a practice of speculative reading allows us to compare certain aspects of concept-formation in the theology of Karl Barth and the dialectical philosophy of the German Idealist, G. W. F. Hegel. Drawing explicitly on Hegel's analysis of infinite judgement from the second volume of his 1812 Science of Logic, Barth's use of the tautology ‘God is God’ in his second commentary on Romans from 1922 is shown to provide important insight into the structure of Barth's dialectical thinking. This explicitly relates to the important issue of the relationship between faith and reason in Karl Barth's theology, which sheds a new light on how his understanding of the rational basis of the theory and praxis of theology developed from his second Romans commentary onwards.

Finally, Barth's use of dialectics and his account of the rationality of theology as a form of ‘speculative reading’ permits some final reflections on the significance of pneumatology for constructive theology by underscoring how Barth insists on the priority of praxis over theory. To understand Barth's theology and the way it changes over the years is to understand the rationality of its concrete praxis.

In this article, I argue that at the root of the ‘ontological’ argument lies the notion that the idea of God is truth: in the idea of God, the meaning of the concept and the reality of the Being actually converge; the idea of God is God. After looking at a number of thinkers whose philosophical method is reminiscent of Anselm's I conclude that, while Anselm did not furnish a conclusive proof of the necessary existence of God, his argument shows how the question of the existence of God is one and the same with the question of the intelligibility and coherence of God and with the question of the intelligibility and coherence of reality.

In this paper I seek to address the question of the interpretation and translation of the Proslogion and to understand why the text of this major work is repeatedly mistranslated. Having identified the various strands in the interpretative tradition and taken as my paradigm case an analysis of a passage from Proslogion, 4, I suggest that the reason for the errors to be found in the various attempts at translating this passage is to be found in the fact that the translators are influenced by the interpretative tradition and translate in accordance with it, even when this leads to ‘obvious’ mistranslation. I ask whether there can be a definitive interpretation and translation of the Proslogion, and answer this question in the negative, primarily because important elements of Anselm's thought are not available to us. Nevertheless, I suggest that it is possible to avoid errors of interpretation and translation by remaining within the constraints of the text. Finally, I attempt to lay some ground rules for those readers who are interested in an accurate reading of the Proslogion.