We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The chapter discusses distributional analysis as a method of legal analysis interested in understanding the consequences of rules. While recognizing that this method shares this goal with proportionality analysis, the author intimately discards a reconciliation of both based on their different relationship to a theory of democracy. The author argues that proportionality analysis is wed to a vision of judges as restrained by the commands of legislators (or constitutional lawmakers), while distributional analysis sees judges as political actors entrusted with realizing the goal of redistribution. The case of gender mainstreaming is used to illustrate that arguing in favor of the use of distributional analysis does not mean forcing judges into continually adopting structural injunctions, nor provokes such levels of polarization that the sought-after redistribution is sabotaged by increased levels of countermobilization or backlash.
The interplay between Christianity and international law … The terms “Christianity” and “international law,” as well as their relationship to each other, are not easy to understand – at least where there might be consensus. The aim here is to diagnose the elusiveness of these phenomena, to explain why this is important to understand, and to set the stage for further investigations.
So why is it that we cannot come to a consensus about this issue of “Christianity and international law”? If you are inclined, pause a moment with this text and build a list of possible reasons … Some contrarians might answer that we actually do have a relative consensus, that most reasonable people, at least with the opportunity to learn, find common agreement over most things and whatever differences simply reflect the diversity, the spice, the irreducible uniqueness of individual personalities and cultures.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.