The closeness of the John Howard and George W Bush administrations is a commonplace of commentary on that era; one uncritical account even describes the relationship between the two countries and leaders as a ‘partnership’, although Howard only appeared three times in the former president’s memoirs, published in 2010. Prime Minister Howard’s invocation of the ANZUS (Australia New Zealand United States) Treaty in 2001, his determination to participate in the Iraq invasion and occupation, and his scepticism on anthropogenic climate change were all of a piece with the mood that prevailed in Washington. In February 2007, US Vice-President Dick Cheney visited Australia expressly to record Washington’s gratitude for Australia’s consistent role in the ‘global war on terror’. So close was Howard’s identification with Bush that his judgment of what bounds should be observed in commentary on domestic US politics was compromised. Thus in February 2007 he took the unprecedented step of criticising presidential candidate Barack Obama’s strategy on Iraq by claiming it served the interests of al Qaeda.

This chapter examines collective self-defence treaty arrangements. It engages with a diverse range of examples of the collective self-defence treaties (or treaties that contain collective self-defence aspects) that have emerged since 1945 to draw out common themes as to the nature, process, and role of such arrangements, as well as to establish notable variations. The aim is to contribute an overall picture of collective self-defence today specifically in the context of treaty relationships. The chapter argues that such relationships inevitably impose only weak obligations on their parties to defend each other and also can cause notable issues related to overlapping memberships, bureaucracy, and antagonism amongst members (amongst other difficulties). Equally, these arrangements – of which there are now hundreds – are concluded for good reason(s). They provide a range of benefits, especially in terms of their deterrent effect.