Does Chinese aid to African countries trigger Chinese foreign direct investment? Bridging the literature on the impact of foreign aid on foreign direct investment (FDI) and that on state ownership, we consider FDI by China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared with that of its privately owned enterprises (POEs) and find FDI by the former is more likely to follow Chinese governmental aid to Africa. Borrowing from institutional theory, we posit that FDI by SOEs follows political imperatives while FDI by POEs pursues market motives. Using data from multiple sources on 3,760 Chinese FDI projects in Africa between 2001 and 2015, we find a correlation between SOE FDI and government aid than that of POEs; that aid has a greater impact on the probability of FDI when the policies of the host country and those of China are in sync, especially in the case of SOEs; and that in low-investment-risk countries the link between aid and investment is weakened, especially in the case of POEs. The results are robust and consistent across different measures and analyses. We contribute to the literature on the relationship between aid and FDI, as well as to that on varieties of capitalism.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) mobilizes Chinese construction and investment in developing countries. Ethiopia is Africa's “model” BRI country, due to China's elaborate infrastructure financing and building and its many manufacturing enterprises. Based on field and documentary research, we examine the BRI's meaning, as understood from the perspective of Ethiopia, in comparison to many China-oriented studies. We find that it is an informal Chinese state promise that even when capital flows from China to non-BRI states are curbed, flows to BRI states will be encouraged, and that Ethiopia exercises agency in leveraging the BRI for its development agenda. Using a comprehensive data set, we show that Chinese investment has become even more important in Ethiopia with the BRI and that neither COVID-19 nor Ethiopia's civil war has reversed that trend. We also discuss local criticisms of Chinese activities, which challenge the wholly positive view of the BRI, but do not affirm the US-generated negative narrative.

Peace and security were once marginal in Sino-African relations. Recently, however, reflecting China's more proactive role as a global security actor, they have become central. Yet while China's actions mirror this shift, the official China–Africa discourse has not changed. This article, based on fieldwork interviews and discourse analysis of official Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) documents, proposes a theoretically grounded study of China's Africa discourse to account for the role it plays in maintaining continuity through time. It makes a threefold claim. First, while the China–Africa discourse has not been given much attention in the literature, it is crucial to explaining the overall success of China's engagement in the continent. Second, the shift in China's policies towards greater participation in peace and security is not mirrored by changes in the official discourse. Third, and related, this is owing mostly to the successful articulation of the link between the promotion of economic growth and the achievement of stability – the security–development nexus – and to the generally positive reception the discourse has found among African leaders.

China's increasing participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations reached a milestone in 2013 when Beijing agreed to send a large detachment of personnel, including combat forces for the first time, to support UN peacekeeping operations in Mali after that country fell into civil war. This commitment was also distinct in that unlike other African countries where Beijing has supplied peacekeepers, Mali is not a major trading partner with China. However, this mission has both cemented Beijing's greater commitment to building African partnerships as well as demonstrating its determination to move beyond “resource diplomacy” and towards a more comprehensive approach to engaging the continent. Although China has warmed to the principles of humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts, Mali has been a critical test of China's ability to participate in UN operations in a country which is still facing ongoing violence. The Mali mission is an important step in Beijing's turn towards greater realpolitik in Chinese Beijing's peacekeeping policies in keeping with its great power status. At the same time, participation in the Mali mission has been beneficial for China, not only in helping to build the country's peacekeeping credentials in Africa but also in underscoring China's increasingly distinct views on addressing intervention in civil conflicts.

Africa is an increasingly important business context, yet we still know little about it. We review the challenges and opportunities that firms in Africa face and propose that these can serve as the basis for extending current theories and models of the firm. We do so by challenging some of the implicit assumptions and stereotypes on firms in Africa and by proposing three avenues for extending theories. One is taking the extreme conditions of some Africa countries and using them as a laboratory for modifying current theories and models of the firm, as we illustrate in the case of institutional theory and the resource-based view. A second one is identifying new themes that arise from analyzing firms in Africa and their contexts of operation, and we discuss four themes: migrating multinationals and the meaning of home country, diaspora networks within and across countries, a recasting of cultural and institutional distance, and new hybrid organizational forms. A third one is developing new theories based on alternative paradigms of social relationships that have emerged in Africa that differ from those underpinning existing theories of the firm, such as kgotla and its view of community-based relationships or ubuntu and its humanizing view of relationships.

Hydropower dams are back in the spotlight owing to a shifting preference for low carbon energy generation and their possible contribution to mitigating climate change. At the forefront of the renaissance of large hydropower dams are Chinese companies, as the builders of the world's largest dams at home and abroad, opening up opportunities for low- and middle-income countries. However, large hydropower dams, despite their possible developmental and carbon reduction contributions, are accompanied by huge economic costs, profound negative environmental changes and social impacts. Using fieldwork data from four hydropower projects in Ghana, Nigeria, Cambodia and Malaysia, this paper evaluates the behaviour of Chinese stakeholders engaged in large hydropower projects in Asia and Africa. We do this by first exploring the interests of the different Chinese stakeholders and then by investigating the wider implications of these Chinese dams on the local, national and international contexts. The paper concludes that hydropower dams will continue to play a prominent role in future efforts to increase energy security and reduce energy poverty worldwide, therefore the planning, building and mitigation strategies need to be implemented in a more sustainable way that takes into account national development priorities, the needs of local people and the impacts on natural habitats.

This article explores China's engagement with the development of norms on security in Africa, with particular attention to its changing post-conflict engagement. Applying the gradualism characteristic of its approach to policy formulation and implementation, the Chinese policymaking community is playing a key role in seeking to redefine the contemporary international approach to managing African security dilemmas. By reinterpreting concepts such as liberal peacebuilding, Chinese policymakers have begun a process of reframing established norms on security and development that are more in line with its principles and core interests. This agenda in the making has enabled the Chinese government to move beyond the constraints of a rhetoric rooted in non-interference in domestic affairs that prohibited involvement in African security issues to a set of practices that allows China to play a more substantive role in security on the continent.