Previous accounts have suggested a potential divergence between Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang in their approaches to economic governance. This study examines the policy orientations of the two leaders concerning state–market relations, providing empirical evidence for the recent manifestation of what insiders have termed the “dispute between north and south houses” (nanbeiyuan zhi zheng) and its economic implications. By applying semi-supervised machine learning methods to textual data, this study demonstrates that Li favoured market-oriented policies, whereas Xi displayed a pronounced preference for state-centric strategies. The findings notably indicate an initial divergence in policy orientation, which was followed by a considerable convergence during Xi's second term. Our analysis further reveals that Li's market-oriented rhetoric was particularly prominent during “Mass innovation week,” indicating a campaign-style policy mobilization. Moreover, the analysis identifies that the discursive differences between the two leaders are associated with a decline in firm-level investment, suggesting that disparities in policy orientation may engender political uncertainty. This study contributes to the extant literature on the impact of leadership dynamics on economic policy, the implications of mixed signals from the central leadership and the phenomenon of campaign-style mobilization in China.