A sense of obligation to obey the police is an important predictor of public cooperation and compliance with the law. Minorities tend to feel less obligated to obey the police than the majority. Previous work based on the social resistance framework shows that the experiences that shape the lives and attitudes of minorities may encourage them to actively engage in a variety of everyday resistance acts against the majority group, which may include high-risk and delinquent behaviours. The present study tests this framework for the first time concerning the self-perceived obligation to obey the police while also considering different minority groups who experience varying levels of marginalization. We use a representative sample of about 1,100 Israelis from four minority groups – Muslims, immigrants from the former Soviet Union, ultra-Orthodox Jews and Jews of Ethiopian origin – along with the Jewish majority group. The results show that Muslims feel the least obligation to obey the police, followed by Jews of Ethiopian origin. Social resistance was negatively related to the self-perceived obligation to obey the police among Muslims and ultra-Orthodox Jews while controlling for demographic characteristics and previous theoretical explanations, namely procedural justice, self-help and anger.

Although ethnic governance in the People's Republic of China is often portrayed as a matter of controlling “minority nationalities” in the country's frontier regions, the ethnic affairs bureaucracy operates in every province. The origins of “nationalities work” as a discrete domain of governance can be traced to the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to mobilize scattered Hui communities in the eastern provinces of Shandong and Hebei in the 1930s–1940s. Thanks to the initiative of Hui Communists, local Party leaders came to understand that Hui were not simply scattered but interconnected. They adapted and replicated organizational methods to exploit Hui networks for gathering intelligence, smuggling goods and penetrating enemy-controlled cities. This history offers an instructive case of adaptive governance in the revolutionary period and the role of ethnic minority cadres in policy entrepreneurship. It also underscores the importance of the Party's experience in eastern China in the study of Chinese ethnic policy.

This paper explores household income per capita for the rural Yi and Manchu ethnic minority groups and the Han majority using data from the China Household Income Project 2002, 2013 and 2018. The disparity between total per capita income for the Yi and Han populations narrowed, while the average per capita income for the Manchu population remained relatively similar to that of the Han population. Decomposing total income to its sources shows that the rapid increase in agricultural income among the Yi was a main reason why the disparity in income, compared to the two other ethnic groups, narrowed. Nevertheless, reliance on agricultural income among the Yi was reduced as wage employment and migration increased. The Manchu group and the Han group also experienced rapid increases in wages and self-employment income. The aggregated value of transfers from the public sector was similar for all three ethnic groups.

Following a series of high-profile attacks in Beijing, Kunming and Urumqi by Uyghur militants, the Chinese party-state declared a “war on terror” in 2014. Since then, China's Xinjiang region has witnessed an unprecedented build-up of what we describe as a multi-tiered police force, turning it into one of the most heavily policed regions in the world. This article investigates the securitization of Xinjiang through an analysis of official police recruitment documents. Informal police jobs, which represent the backbone of recent recruitment drives, have historically carried inferior pay levels. Yet, advertised assistant police positions in Xinjiang now offer high salaries despite low educational requirements, thereby attracting lesser-educated applicants, many of whom are ethnic minorities. Besides co-opting Uyghurs into policing their own people, the resulting employment is in itself a significant stability maintenance strategy. While the known numbers of violent attacks have subsided, China's heavy-handed securitization approach risks alienating both minority and Han populations.

Millions of China's ethnic minority citizens remain subject to competing legal standards, even as state officials strive to strengthen a unified notion of state law. Minority customary law continues to bind many minority citizens in both civil and criminal arenas and often conflicts directly with state law. What happens when these laws conflict? Based on fieldwork in Yunnan, this article shows how local officials and communities navigate legal pluralism and what legal and policy provisions guide them. Granting local judges discretionary authority to set aside state law in favour of customary law, although seemingly undermining law enforcement, may in the long run be the best path to strengthening rule of law in China's minority regions.

Using a household sample survey for 2006, this article shows that the Hui population in the rural part of Ningxia Autonomous Region in China is disadvantaged compared to the Han majority as regards length of education and household per capita wealth. Yet, there is no gap in average disposable incomes between the two ethnic groups and poverty rates are very similar. This paradox is owing to members of Hui households earning more off-farm income than members of Han households. In particular, young Hui males living in poor villages have a remarkably high likelihood of migrating, thereby bringing back income to their households.

During field research on environmental governance in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in 2012, the author studied the Chinese state's efforts to promote its agenda and “civilizing mission,” the resistance of local Yi people to both, and the resulting clash of discourses on environmental protection. To understand the nature and mechanisms involved in this conflict, the author focuses on the state's “civilizing mission” in light of Foucault's power concept. The article examines two issues: 1) the strategies by which the central state exerts power and asserts its policies in a minority area, i.e. how it attempts to steer the behaviour of local cadres in order to implement its modernization concept, and 2) whether and to what degree it makes a difference that the researched area is a “minority” (Yi) area. To answer these questions, one county in the prefecture was taken as a case study. Furthermore, this article continuously refers to the policy field of environmental governance to substantiate the thesis of a civilizing project conducted by the centre.