This study examines how cognitive categorization by host-country investors give rise to negative spillovers among host-country foreign-listed firms from the same home country when one of these foreign-listed firms discloses a financial reporting irregularity. This study further examines how attributes of host-country independent directors mitigate such negative spillover effects through signaling fulfilment of their fiduciary duties. Our results based on Chinese foreign-listed firms on the Singapore Stock Exchange from 2007–2014 reveal that host-country independent directors increase spillover effects among foreign-listed Chinese firms from financial reporting irregularities. However, such increase is attenuated when these directors signal fulfilment of their fiduciary duties through home-country, industry, or task-related experiences, and the observed mitigating effect is stronger when they possess a combination of these experiences.

This study investigates how CEO behavior and incentives change during the CEO's final years in office, known as the horizon problem. We examine how the horizon problem alters managerial slack, a measure of operational inefficiency and managerial value diversion. Using data on Chinese publicly traded firms between 2003 and 2011, we find that managerial slack increases in the last two years of CEO tenure compared to earlier years. We also show that the increase in managerial slack in CEO final years in office is smaller in privately controlled firms than in state-owned enterprises, smaller in firms with CEO equity ownership and more independent boards compared to those without. We conclude that higher quality corporate governance mechanisms ameliorate the perverse incentives associated with the CEO horizon problem, and reduce CEOs’ tendency to increase managerial slack during their final years in office.