EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• A scholar from Nahdlatul Ulama by the name of Imaduddin Utsman has recently challenged the long-accepted claim that the Ba‘Alawi—Muslims of Hadhrami descent also known in Indonesia as habaib—are descendants of Prophet Muhammad. The challenge arose out of his critical examination of available records on the Prophet's lineage from the fifth century to the tenth century of Islam.

• His unprecedented challenge courted controversy in Indonesia. It was even more surprising that it came from a religious scholar with a traditionalist background.

• The debate that ensued was inevitable as the habaib community had to defend their ancestry, and joining them in their defence were some Javanese Muslim scholars. However, Imaduddin actively rebutted their responses, alongside several other like-minded non-Arab scholars.

• This article examines the debate where both sides presented documents and theories about the (dis)connection of the Ba‘Alawi lineage to Prophet Muhammad. We argue that while Imaduddin's research does not fully invalidate the Ba‘Alawi lineage, the habaib have not been entirely convincing—from Imaduddin's perspective—about their genealogy.

• Nevertheless, the authority of the habaib remains intact despite the challenge to their lineage. This is because they can derive their authority from other factors apart from their lineage.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

INTRODUCTION

China-Singapore relations have come a long way since diplomatic ties were established in 1990. At that time, China needed friends and foreign investments, and Singapore played a role in befriending Beijing and bringing in investments from abroad. The West had then ostracized Beijing due to the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Today, a much stronger China faces a somewhat similar hostile external environment. Most notable is the escalating tensions between China and the United States, which has created a unique geopolitical context that necessitates a careful examination of the future trajectory of China-Singapore ties. As both nations navigate this complex geopolitical environment, they must adapt and respond to evolving circumstances so that they can continue to reap mutual benefits.

The strong and dynamic economic relationship between China and Singapore is well-known. This article will delve into the political-security dimensions of their bilateral ties by examining three issues, i.e., the South China Sea issue, Singapore’s relationship with the US, and the Taiwan issue. The paper argues that Singapore’s position on these three issues will need to be adjusted as China grows more powerful, and given the intensifying China-US competition in Asia. Such an adjustment will help ensure that China-Singapore ties have ample room to grow and flourish. The article will first trace how Chinese narratives on Singapore have evolved over the years and how these will continue to be shaped by Singapore’s stand on the above three issues.

NARRATIVES ON SINGAPORE’s ROLE IN CHINA’s DEVELOPMENT

The resilience of China-Singapore ties has been consistently demonstrated over the past few years, even when the COVID-19 pandemic strained political and economic interactions. Zhai Kun, a distinguished scholar in international relations at Peking University, notes that amongst all Southeast Asian nations, Singapore has been deeply involved in China’s reform and opening-up journey, and the city-state shares very close alignment with Chinese interests. This viewpoint primarily underscores the strong foundation for cooperation between China and Singapore in the economic arena, such as in trade, finance and technological exchanges. Singapore’s standing as the world’s largest offshore trading centre for renminbi (RMB) and a Southeast Asian nexus for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reinforce this congruence of interests.

Viewed through the lens of economic and trade collaboration, China is Singapore’s prime trading partner, export market, and the most substantial source of imports.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Amid China-US geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific, it is imperative for both China and Singapore to adapt and respond to evolving circumstances for mutual benefit.

• • The enduring trust and solid foundation between China and Singapore in economic and trade cooperation are validated through their active involvement in each other’s initiatives. This proved true even when the recent COVID-19 pandemic strained political interactions.

• • The political-security dimensions of the relationship between China and Singapore are complex and constantly evolving, influenced as they are by factors such as Singapore’s military training in Taiwan, the contentious South China Sea disputes, and US foreign policy in the region.

• • However, Singapore’s longstanding hedging strategy between the two superpowers may face increasingly severe tests as China-US rivalry escalates.

• • If carefully managed, Singapore’s successful track record of facilitating dialogue between conflicting parties can continue to make it a valuable player in easing tensions between China and the US.

INTRODUCTION

The term “Madani” was introduced on 26 September 1995 by Anwar Ibrahim when he spoke of “Masyarakat Madani” (Madani Society) during the Istiqlal Festival, an Islamic cultural event held in Jakarta, Indonesia. In his speech entitled “Islam and the Establishment of Civil Society”, Anwar emphasized that Islam introduced humankind “to the ideals of social justice and the establishment of civil society that is a democratic civil society” (Anisma 2019, pp. 147–48). This was the core principle around which Anwar conceptualized Masyarakat Madani.

One of the key elements of Masyarakat Madani was the importance of freedom of thought. Anwar believed that “freedom of thought should definitely be a prerequisite to successfully deal with the challenges of globalization” (Anwar Ibrahim 1997, p. 8). However, despite the emphasis on freedom of thought, and in the mould of his mentor Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, he emphasized that “we do not need to be secular in order to succeed” (ibid., pp. 8–9). From his perspective, secularism—which focused on more worldly matters such as freedom of thought—should not overpower the spiritual aspect of life, which Madani would provide.

Another key element was Islam’s emphasis on social justice. Anwar emphasized that “Islam was the first to introduce the ideal of social justice and the development of Masyarakat Madani or a democratic civil society” (ibid., p. 9). However, he reminded the audience that despite the arrival of Islam, the Malay rulers and religious authorities continued to neglect and violate the rights of individuals. This was well documented by Abdullah Munshi in his writings and by Sejarah Melayu (ibid., p. 10). The purpose of Madani as a moral principle was, therefore, to ensure citizen rights and transparency, and prevent corruption, extremism, terrorism, poverty, injustice, intellectual depletion, social depravity, wealth inequality and authoritarianism. To achieve this, the ummah had to examine their own internal conscience before achieving outward justice (ibid., pp. 10–11).

Finally, Anwar stressed that moderation and pragmatism were important criteria for achieving Madani. Aided by modern democracy and Fiqh Awlawiyyat, these two criteria would inculcate in the ummah the values of tolerance, multiculturalism, and reciprocity (ibid., p. 12). In summary, Anwar stated that the core values of Masyarakat Madani were morality, justice, equality and dialogue (ibid., p. 13).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • In 1995, then Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim introduced “Masyarakat Madani” as his proposed economic framework for Malaysia. The term was heavily debated among scholars and politicians across all parties and ideologies. It was often argued that Madani was an effort to limit the rise of political Islam.

• • Following Anwar Ibrahim's dismissal from government in 1998, Madani came to be more narrowly redefined as “civil society”. However, Anwar’s supporters, known as the “Anwarinas”, strove to keep the spirit of Madani alive and continued to promote its ideals of social justice, democratic values and inclusivity. They were encouraged further by the fall of Barisan Nasional from federal power in the 14th General Election in 2018.

• • After Anwar Ibrahim became Malaysia’s tenth Prime Minister in 2022, he reintroduced Madani as a framework for the country, to be implemented in various sectors. Anwar Ibrahim likely received help from scholars such as Ziauddin Sardar, as reflected in his election manifesto, Script for a Better Malaysia. This time around, the core component of Madani is Maqasid Al-Shariah, or the higher objectives of sharia.

• • In that sense, Madani is now arguably more an expression of what may be called post-Islamism. For it to succeed, however, it will have to counteract the growing power of the conservatives and Islamists. This may be an uphill battle, given that a key component party of the unity government—UMNO—is facing several allegations of corruption.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

In Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, it is not difficult to find voices expressing the agenda of feminism, Muslim women’s identity and gender activism. They engage with their religion to articulate their understandings of gender orders using diverse Islamic and Islamist orientations. On one hand, we can see women’s movements taking ‘modernist’ and ‘moderate’ orientations. On the other hand, some purportedly women’s or even gender movements can be seen taking Islamist orientations, focusing on efforts to return to the foundational texts of Islam and critiquing those opposing them.

Indonesia is renowned for its moderate Islam, emphasising wasatiyya—middle-path or centrist Islam—that advocates tolerance and humanitarian perspectives, showcasing a progressive vision of Islam. Moderate and progressive Muslims believe that gender justice is part of this vision (Nisa 2019). The middle-path rhetoric, however, has also been used by conservatives and Islamists who claim that their understandings and practices of Islam are also the manifestation of wasatiyya Islam. This then leaves us to question, what does ‘moderate Islam’ or ‘moderate Muslim’ mean? Wasatiyya Islam is vital to the discussion of gender orders and norms in Indonesia: gender-just perspectives advocated by Muslim gender activists are born from the voices of moderate modernist Muslims from different Muslim-majority countries (Schlehe and Nisa 2016: 7).

Moderation brought by modernist-cum-reformist thinkers has been influential in Indonesia. This includes Egyptians Rifā’ah Rāfi’ al-Tahtāwī (1801–1873), an Azhari modernist of nineteenth-century Egypt who was known as an advocate of women’s economic empowerment; his disciple Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), known as the founder of modernism and for his call for the abolition of polygamy (Nisa 2021: 157); and ‘Abduh’s disciple, Qāsim Amīn (1863–1908), celebrated as the most important male writer to contemporary free and modernised women (Nisa 2022). In addition to the modernists in Egypt, the Ottoman Tanzimat (1839–1876) was crucial to overcoming gender inequalities in education by establishing the first secondary school for girls in 1858. Following this, later generations of male progressive thinkers have also contributed to the discussion of gender equality in Islam and Muslim women’s empowerment, especially Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), Mohammad Arkoun (1928–2010), Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943–2010), Muhammad Shahrour (1938–2019), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (b. 1936), Abdulkarim Soroush (b. 1945), Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (b. 1946), and Khaled Abou el-Fadl (b. 1963) (Nisa 2021: 157).

In 2018, the Indonesian government scaled up its conditional cash transfer program called the Family Hope Program. Approximately 10 million poor women became entitled to social assistance programs. This reflects a trend across the global South: social assistance programs have increasingly provided women with new social entitlements. Despite significant achievements in the expansion of social assistance, issues of exclusion and gender inequality in Indonesia persist (OECD 2019).

Although public discourse has focused on issues of exclusion and inclusion errors due to mistargeting, the debate tends to overlook ‘exclusion by design’—omission of particular population groups due to their lack of legal entitlements (Leisering 2019). While in Indonesia social assistance or social insurance has extended considerably, it tends to overlook some vulnerable population groups such as the elderly, people with disability and those in the informal sector (Holmemo et al. 2020; OECD 2019; TNP2K 2018). This lack of coverage for these vulnerable populations also has a gender dimension.

While Indonesia’s approach parallels other social assistance policies that target women as the primary recipient, gender equality and women’s empowerment are not priority objectives of the country’s social protection strategy (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 2003). While scholars have discussed how social assistance programs overlook the structural barriers faced by women (Bradshaw 2008; Holmes and Jones 2013), researchers also need to examine how different notions of deservingness shape and influence the pattern of exclusion and inclusion.

In this chapter, I examine how the notion of deservingness leads to a pattern of exclusion (Leisering 2019) in Indonesia’s social assistance. Notions of deservingness influence policy around social assistance, such as which groups to target and the rationale and framing that government uses to justify its policy choices. Historically, the idea of the ‘deserving poor’ emerged at the time of the English Poor laws, when overseers of the poor would differentiate between the deserving and the undeserving. This involved categorising those seeking assistance into different groups according to specific moral or ideological judgements (Alcock et al. 2002). The ‘deserving poor’ were those entitled to resources because they could not work due to no fault of their own (Watkins-Hayes and Kovalsky 2016). Overseers considered others as undeserving due to their lack of virtue, including their ‘unemployed’ status. As notions of deservingness change over time, different categories of vulnerable people can move in and out of social assistance programs (ibid.). Such notions of deservingness are also at work in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s path to democracy—the aspiration of the popular movements that led to the toppling of the authoritarian New Order 24 years ago—encompassed ideals of electoral democracy, social justice and equity, summed up in the catchcry of that euphoric moment: pemberdayaan (empowerment) (Manning and van Diermen 2000). This aspiration encompassed women’s rights and gender equity (Robinson and Bessell 2002).

Women’s activism was critical to the genesis of that revolutionary moment. Difficulties faced by households in meeting the needs of everyday life consequent on the 1997 Asian financial crisis sparked street protests against Suharto’s government, the first being Suara Ibu Peduli Demo Susu (Voices of Concerned Mothers Milk Demonstration), held at Jakarta’s iconic HI (Hotel Indonesia) roundabout in February 1998 (Oey- Gardiner 2002: 110). The reactive political theatre deployed by the failing regime included orchestrated rapes of Chinese women in Jakarta as part of a ‘shadow play’ scapegoating Indonesia’s Chinese for the economic chaos (ibid.); this had the unintended consequence of bringing violence against women—hitherto a rumbling complaint from women’s rights activists—into public view.

Interim president Habibie (1998–1999) directed the legislative changes that ushered in the central pillars of the move away from authoritarian rule: direct elections of legislatures and of the president (Hosen 2007); towards decentralising political authority to newly empowered district governments. Habibie decreed the formation of the National Commission on Violence against Women, Komnas Perempuan (Oey-Gardiner 2002: 111; Robinson 2009: 155; Yentriyani, this volume). These political and legal institutions, and a new institution established in 2001—the Constitutional Court, Mahkamah Konstitusi—have been crucial sites for contestations over gendered power in democratising Indonesia.

Gendered power—the sites of struggle

Sex/gender differences are strongly marked in all aspects of society (economics, politics, culture) and there is a tendency to frame issues of gender equity or social participation in terms of ‘status’ or ‘position’, using single indicators such as the number of women in parliament as opposed to the number of men. But of course, ‘status’ is inherently a synthesis of several factors or dimensions. ‘Gender relations are imbricated in the exercise of power in all social arenas’ (Robinson 2014: 107), and connected to power in ‘gender regimes’ understood as the overall patterning of gender relations in an institution, for example, school, nation state or clan (ibid.: 117).

Examining the development of feminist thought and practice in Indonesian arts and culture since the early 2000s, this chapter argues that new forms of cultural activism are emerging; they are feminist, trans-archipelagic and moving towards a decolonial approach. In the first decade of Indonesia’s reformasi, feminist discourses became visible through high-profile media debates and spectacles from the rise of women writers who write openly about sex and sexuality (writing labelled by the media as sastrawangi or fragrant literature), to the controversial Rancangan Undang-Undang Pornografi (Pornography Bill), which became law in 2008. Women in the arts have challenged traditional gender roles prescribed by the New Order regime by reclaiming their agency as creators and decision-makers in literary, music, film, performance and visual art scenes. The two most prominent trajectories of feminist thought, liberal feminism and Islamic feminism, have shaped the discussions around women, gender and feminism, and these influences have continued to thrive in the subsequent decades. With the prevalent use of digital technology, liberal and Islamic feminist ideas have travelled through digital platforms, circulated by the younger generation of feminist activists, often in response to the increasing religious conservatism that attempts to confine women and discriminate against sexual and gender minority groups.

Yet more feminist directions have emerged. The Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration, which began in 2014, has led to a new development in feminist articulations that fit more with free market logic. Centred on the idea of kerja (work) within a neoliberal framework, the Jokowi regime flaunts successful female ministers as well as millennial staff and spokespersons—many of whom are women—as the icons of Indonesia’s assertive move towards a global digital economy and creative entrepreneurship. This development, coinciding with global feminist movements, paved the way for the rise of neoliberal feminism that frames women’s struggles as individual endeavours to break the glass ceiling. There has also been an emerging feminist movement that focuses on forging feminist connections across borders in the nusantara (archipelago) while making interventions to the Jakarta/Java-centric feminist thought and practice. This chapter focuses on the latter movement and highlights its trans-archipelagic and decolonial characteristics. My scope is limited to feminist cultural activism, a specific site within the feminist movement in which collectives use culture as a site for political intervention.

Gender ideologies, representation and contestation

The reformasi era of the past twenty years has ushered in many changes that have simultaneously progressed and challenged gender equality. At the end of the Suharto era, gender equality was a major political demand that underpinned democratic reform. Many legislative changes were made, and with these changes the dismantling of the ‘gender order’ that the New Order established began to be disrupted. However, with every legislative change came also contrary moves that sought to challenge progress towards gender equality. The political ideology of the New Order seems difficult to dismantle completely and has found new expressions and contestations.

The ‘gender order’ that underpinned the political ideology of Suharto’s New Order had heteronormative, binary and static understandings at its core. This period saw ‘male’ and ‘female’ defined more clearly according to a specific set of appearances, social roles and spatial distinctions that privileged the family or kekeluargaan as the foundation on which development—pembangunan—took place. Motherhood for example, was the basis of citizenship for women and assumed subordinate to men in what Julia Suryakusuma (2011) termed ‘state ibuism’. Repressive and restrictive representations of women and circumscribed female roles in public life underpinned the political system. Its binary counterpart, bapakism, heralded the construction of fathers of the nation, as well as the household. These binary constructs were underpinned by kodrat (biologically specific nature), assumed to be God-given and sanctioned by Islam.

Kathryn Robinson (2008, and this volume) developed an approach that identified ways in which this gender order mapped on to specific areas of power during the New Order. Drawing on social theory of gender from R.W. Connell, Robinson’s analysis reflected that ‘gender relations are present in all types of institutions. They may not be the most important structure in a particular case, but they are certainly a major structure of most’ (Connell 1987: 120). Gender relations can be understood as foci for the exercise of social, political and economic power in society; as a multidimensional structure operating in a complex network of institutions. As Kathy Robinson updates in her contribution to this volume, these institutions include, for example, marriage, political representation, laws on domestic violence and sexual violence, and employment settings. Changes to these institutions and processes over the past twenty years have provided room for gender equality gains to be made.

Indonesia is committed to combating child marriage as part of the country’s multiple international commitments, from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child we ratified in 1990 to the Sustainable Development Goals we pledged to achieve by 2030. Joko Widodo’s administration has also identified child marriage as one of the challenges it must tackle in the National Medium Term Development Plan 2020–2024. Most recently, in 2022, the president signed a decree to end violence against children that assigns inter-ministerial priority to, among other initiatives, preventing child marriage. Given over 80 million children will benefit from this protection effort, the impact of such policies is potentially significant.

Beyond international and national promises, there seems to be a crossinstitutional consensus that ending child marriage is a worthy cause, as marriages involving an individual or a couple below the age of 18 can cause long-lasting negative consequences on children’s lives, especially girls. In Indonesia, women who marry early are less likely to access health services during pregnancy, and their utilisation of medically assisted birth and antenatal care is limited (BPS 2016; Bruno et al. 2021). Moreover, women in early marriages have weaker decision-making power. They are less likely to have marriage certificates, and their children are less likely to obtain birth certificates (Cameron et al. 2022). In contrast, women who marry after the age of 18 have higher average educational attainment (BPS et al. 2020).

The impact of child marriage is also long term and may be passed on to the next generation. Child marriage poses a risk of poverty to families, which in turn influences girls’ decision to marry before adulthood (SMERU 2013). Among children whose parents were married before age 18, there are higher risks of infant (under 12 months) mortality, stunted growth and being underweight at birth. Children with young mothers have also demonstrated lower cognitive scores (Cameron et al. 2022).

Child marriage has negative consequences for both women and men who marry early. There is a higher chance of divorce in households with underage marriages (Cameron et al. 2022). Additionally, individuals who marry before turning 18 have low participation in the formal labour market and live in households with lower living standards (BPS 2017).

In this chapter, we first discuss the state of child marriage in Indonesia, the progress made through relevant policies, and the challenges to addressing child marriage.