INTRODUCTION

Addressing the socio-economic root causes of prostitution is essential, as such an approach helps disincentivize Indonesian women and girls from entering the sex industry. However, if there are significant institutional loopholes when governing people's behaviours, disciplines and morality (such as the discussion of the lack of e-regulation on the Internet to crack down on cyber-sex crime), organized sex crime groups can continue to exploit the loose regulatory, legislative, judiciary and law enforcement mechanism to arrange and deliver sex trafficking and prostitution activities (Awaludin 2019). Therefore, this chapter, in order to minimize Indonesian nationals’ violation of anti-extramarital sex, or specifically commercial sex, discusses how commercial sex is institutionally constructed. I then examine the relevant policies to understand how the formation of the institutional mechanism against sex work can be strengthened.

POOR GOVERNANCE, POVERTY AND SEX WORK

Indonesia ranks 130th in the globe, per the Human Development Index, indicating that poverty and inequalities are salient within the country (Antara News 2022). Thus far, this book examines and discusses how poverty, inequalities, a lack of human investment in the form of the distribution of education opportunities and engagement in sex work are interrelated. A primary reason leading to Indonesia's poor human development is the poor governance of the Indonesian government.

As of writing this epilogue, I am reading Stiglitz's (2004) Globalisation and Its Discontents in my cosy apartment in New Taipei City—on the outskirts of Taipei City, Taiwan. Stiglitz argues the importance of sequencing and timing. The Nobel Prize-winning economist notes one of the major policy mistakes performed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the twentieth century was overlooking the importance of sequencing and timing when applying national and regional policies and interventions. While these national and regional policymaking outputs were supposed to raise the quality of life and national competitiveness of the Global South, very often any improper sequenced policy implementation would counter-discourage developing countries from reaching economic growth and social development.

I am thinking about the importance of sequencing and timing when curbing Indonesia's sex work. It is noteworthy that Indonesia's parliament passed the criminal code against the practice of extramarital sex upon the end of the global public crisis of Coronavirus. While I don't think the timing of passing such a criminal code was intentionally designed (as Indonesia had endeavoured to pass such a code for years), criminalizing extramarital sex soon after the declaration of the end of a pandemic could be beneficial to Indonesia's crackdowns on prostitution and sex trafficking. Owing to the economic downturns caused by the pandemic, Indonesia experienced a budget deficit of 3.0 per cent and 2.4 per cent in 2021 and 2022, respectively. However, upon the end of the public health crisis, the IMF (2023) forecasts that Indonesia will enjoy a 5.0 per cent national economic growth in 2023. These figures presented by the IMF demonstrate that Indonesia is recovering well from the economic downturns and repositions itself on the trajectory to reach more economic success ahead.

Under the climate of positive national economic development, more foreign and domestic investments are plausibly recorded, more job opportunities are created, unemployment rates fall, the availability of public funds that can be used for implementing social protection and pro-poor policies increases, and fewer underprivileged women and children in Indonesia shall experience transitorily or chronically financial hardships.

INTRODUCTION

This book engages in the sociological discourse on the (de-)construction of extramarital sex in commercial forms in Indonesia. I explain and address related social theories such as social control and social learning theories and the discussion about the nuanced relationships between poverty and crime in order to support my declaration of how prostitution and sex trafficking occur and persist in Indonesian contexts from a socio-economic perspective. Also, I apply additional theories named cultural deviance and social disorganization theories in order to support the rationalization of how prostitution and sex trafficking are both socio-economically and institutionally constructed. So long as how sex work is being constructed is detailed and clarified, I, in this book, am allowed to suggest how deconstruction should be practised.

SOCIAL CONTROL THEORY

The justification of how juvenile and adult cohorts express criminality or delinquency can be supported by the social control theory. According to the theory, those expressing criminality or delinquency often lack the social forces to harness them from presenting deviance in terms of their behaviours. The social control theory states that people are discouraged from taking part in criminality or delinquency by their social bonds to society (Agnew 1991). Negative life events, such as poor treatment by others (like parents, teachers and peers), lessen the strength of social control over people's criminality or delinquency. For example, when parents and teachers tend to apply devaluing and demeaning approaches to educate the younger generations, the latter cohorts are at higher risk of developing substantial strains that foster their expression of criminality and delinquency. Those who consistently encounter parental absence, denial or rejection, in addition to whoever encounters school and peer bullying, are major drivers of the diminished levels of social bonds to communities and society.

INTRODUCTION

Addressing a gathering at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping talked about the concept of mankind being a community of shared future or with a common destiny. This was Xi's first major foreign policy speech, during his first foreign visit, after taking over as president. Analytical and media discourse at the time paid little attention to this concept. Instead, much of the discussion was focused on what appeared to be the articulation of shared grievances and a convergence of objectives between China and Russia. From a policy perspective, the idea of people being a community of common destiny or shared future was rather vague. Moreover, it did not seem novel. In fact, in Chinese discourse, this concept can be traced back to the pre-Xi era.

As far back as 2007, there were references to people in the Mainland and Taiwan forming a community of common destiny. The phrase was also used by Xi's predecessor, Hu Jintao, in his report to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. In Hu's articulation, the concept of mankind as a community of common destiny largely seemed to refer to the interconnected nature of the world. This implied that it was in China's interests to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries. At the same time, it encapsulated ideas of the need to pursue the construction of a global order featuring common security and common development.

However, in the decade that followed Xi's ascension to power, Chinese foreign policy gradually but decisively shifted away from the era of keeping a low profile towards more purposeful and proactive efforts to shape a favourable external environment. This was reflected in the description of Chinese foreign policy under Xi as exploring a new pathway of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. In this context, the concept of mankind being a community of shared future began to acquire greater salience. It implied the desire to construct “a new concept of morality and interests” in international affairs, with the focus primarily being on China's neighbouring countries and the developing world. Chinese scholars argued that the concept embodied China's responsibility and efforts to reform global governance.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• This paper discusses Chinese President Xi Jinping's flagship global initiatives’ normative implications for the world order.

• It argues that the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which are key pillars of China's proposal to build a community of common destiny for mankind, are driven by Beijing's desire to cultivate authority in the international system.

• Analysing the speeches by Chinese leaders, policy documents, media and analytical discourse in China, along with policy decisions, this study provides an assessment of the Chinese leadership's worldview. It places the launch of GDI, GSI and GCI within this context, before detailing the elements of each initiative and offering a critical analysis.

• This study concludes that through GDI, GSI and GCI, the Chinese leadership hopes to shape an external environment that not only ensures regime security but is also favourable to China's development and security interests. In doing so, however, it is reshaping key norms of global governance towards a fundamentally illiberal direction.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• After more than a decade of deliberations, ASEAN leaders agreed on 11 November 2022 in principle to admit Timor-Leste as the eleventh member of the regional organization and to grant Timor-Leste observer status to attend all ASEAN meetings. Timor-Leste has demonstrated positive developmental progress, and fact-finding missions across the three ASEAN Community pillars have returned generally optimistic results.

• However, an assessment of Timor-Leste's ability to fulfil its commitments and obligations reveals that the country will need to close the gap with the ten existing members on matters such as the ratification and implementation of legally binding agreements and derivative work plans. Creating enforcement mechanisms and finding ways to implement commitments at the local level will be important.

• Timor-Leste has put in place institutional structures and implementing agencies for advancing cooperation with ASEAN. It is also moving towards harmonizing its laws with ASEAN instruments. However, its capacity remains in question due to a lack of substantive knowledge and technical expertise among government officials, as well as inadequate infrastructure, logistics and facilities for hosting ASEAN meetings.

• Strengthening human capital will be a top priority for Timor-Leste. This includes not only enhancing its personnel's knowledge and technical expertise on ASEAN processes and procedures but also skills such as English language proficiency and negotiation. Coordinated capacity-building assistance from ASEAN and dialogue partners will be important. These efforts must also be met with economic diversification and growth of its nascent private sector.

• Apart from bridging gaps, ASEAN needs to grapple with its reservations that Timor-Leste's economic limitations may slow down the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community. There are also concerns that Timor-Leste's membership may entrench differences within the bloc, particularly with regard to geopolitical issues, and dilute the organization's effectiveness or further complicate the consensus-based decision-making process.

INTRODUCTION

In response to Timor-Leste's formal application for ASEAN membership in 2011, ASEAN leaders in November 2022 finally came to an in-principle agreement to admit the country as its eleventh member and to grant Timor-Leste observer status to attend all ASEAN meetings. This follows the positive outcomes of fact-finding missions across the three ASEAN Community pillars, which noted the strong political will and commitment displayed by Timor-Leste for its accession to ASEAN.

Timor-Leste has developed two key documents to help align its national laws, regulations, and policies with ASEAN’s, particularly concerning its binding agreements. The “Timor-Leste ASEAN Mobilization Programme” (TLAMP) and the “Critical Elements for

Accession” (CEA) Work Plan enable the country to map the scope of each agreement and area of cooperation for the benefit of its corresponding government ministries and agencies.

While Timor-Leste has successfully mapped out ASEAN programmes and activities to mobilize its relevant officials, there is still work to be done in fulfilling the obligations and commitments of ASEAN membership. As the fact-finding missions across the three ASEAN Community pillars have reported, Timor-Leste's resolve and determination alone, though commendable, are insufficient for the country to fully comply with all the requirements and responsibilities of membership. Further efforts are needed to bridge the gaps across all cooperation areas, especially to bring the country's regulatory trade and investment regimes to full compliance with over 200 ASEAN economic agreements.

Apart from a long list of agreements, cooperation within ASEAN continues to evolve to address increasingly complex challenges in the region and beyond. Sectoral bodies in ASEAN now cover an expanded scope of cooperation including more military field and table-top exercises, digitalization, e-commerce, cybersecurity, green technology, and innovation, among others. Timor-Leste will need to build its capacity, not just to accede to all legally binding instruments of ASEAN, but also to contribute constructively to all aspects of ASEAN cooperation—current and future.

For this reason, ASEAN has underscored the importance of fully supporting the country to achieve the milestones in a criteria-based roadmap.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

Appendix

The reports of the three fact-finding missions have shown that Timor- Leste has made good developmental progress in its brief independence. It has taken concrete actions including establishing embassies in all ASEAN capitals and is in the process of setting up a Permanent Mission to ASEAN.

Despite concerns over Timor-Leste's economic limitations or the possibility of diluting ASEAN's effectiveness, its accession to ASEAN will anchor the young nation to the regional grouping and provide it with a sense of belonging. There will be greater opportunities for trade and economic cooperation as well as information sharing. Having an additional member will spread the costs of membership and the responsibility of coordinatorship in ASEAN.

Teething problems for Timor-Leste are inevitable. ASEAN member states will need to provide capacity-building and technical support to ensure that Timor-Leste is able to accede to all legally binding agreements and to implement the plethora of work plans under the three Community pillars. Failure to do so or a delay in negotiations over new documents will certainly slow down the ASEAN Community-building process.

Timor-Leste will need to show its commitment by: (i) attending all ASEAN meetings regardless of its manpower, resource, or technical limitations. This includes the meetings of the ASEAN Committees in Third Countries and International Organizations (ACTCs); (ii) expeditiously ratifying all ASEAN instruments and agreements; (iii) supporting the capacity-building programmes provided by ASEAN member states, the ASEAN Secretariat and external partners; (iv) ensuring adequate infrastructure and facilities to host large-scale ASEAN meetings; (v) addressing concerns from ASEAN with regards to economic diversification; and (vi) adhering to strict disciplines including protecting the confidentiality of documents.